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I. INTRODUCTION 
Successor liability is an exception to the general rule that when 
one corporate or other juridical person sells assets to another entity, the 
assets are transferred free and clear of all but valid liens and security 
interests.  When successor liability is imposed, a creditor or plaintiff with 
a claim against the seller may assert that claim against and collect 
payment from the purchaser. 
 Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine, designed to 
eliminate the harsh results that could attend strict application of 
corporate law.  Over time, however, as successor liability doctrines 
evolved, they became in many jurisdictions ossified and lacking in 
flexibility.  As this occurred, corporate lawyers and those who structure 
transactions learned how to avoid application of successor liability 
doctrines, rendering the unpaid creditors’ claims as externalities,1 whose 
cost is borne by the creditors or by society, but not by the transferee or 
transferor.  This article examines what has become of various species of 
non-statutory successor liability with an eye to determining which of 
these species have retained sufficient flexibility to serve the doctrines’ 
original purposes, as well as those which continue to incentivize the 
parties to assess, allocate, and insure against the claims—those which 
have become so ossified that they almost invite their own defeat by 
attorneys of even moderate sophistication. 
 Successor liability does not consist of just one doctrine or 
exception to the general corporate rule of non-liability for asset 
purchasers, but of many.  There are two broad groups of successor 
liability doctrines, those that are judge-made (the “common law” 
exceptions) and those that are creatures of statute.2  Both represent a 
1 Externality:  An effect of one economic agent’s actions on another, such that 
one agent’s decisions make another better or worse off by changing their utility 
or cost.  Beneficial effects are positive externalities; harmful ones are negative 
externalities.  www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/e.html (last visited 
July 5, 2013.) 
 
2 The descriptive portions of this article present a fairly detailed taxonomy of 
the species of successor liability that are applicable in United States 
jurisdictions.  This discussion does not discuss statutory successor liability, 
which is beyond the scope of this article. 
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distinct public policy that in certain instances and for certain liabilities, 
the general rule of non-liability of a successor for a predecessor’s debts 
following an asset sale should not apply.  With regard to the judge-made 
doctrines, some commentators have asserted that they are basically a 
species of liability based upon fraud.3  Others have argued that they are 
based upon an inherently equitable notion that, in certain instances, the 
purchaser must take the bad (the liabilities) with the good (the assets).4  
Still others, embracing a type of result-oriented formalism, have found 
that the liability arises out of an interest in the property sold that is akin 
to an in rem interest that is said to “run with the land.”5 
 
3 See, e.g., Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
745 (2003).  Professor Reilly’s article argues that basing successor liability on 
fraud or fraud-like conduct is different from basing it on a form-over-substance 
approach. Id. This author disagrees.  While “fraud” is a strong word, the first 
thing that comes to mind to an attorney structuring a transaction that might be 
challenged as fraudulent or otherwise avoidable is whether or not there are any 
rigid doctrines of law that can be employed to shelter the transaction from later 
challenges, often by elevating form over substance.  This article argues that the 
evolution of successor liability toward a set of inflexible standards and the use 
of anti-successor liability findings of fact and conclusions of law in 11 U.S.C. § 
363(f) (2006) sale orders represent just this sort of transactional planning 
though elevation of form (and forum) over substance.  Form over substance 
can be very alluring to those faced with difficult, otherwise fact-based 
determinations and opinions. See also, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the 
Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 417 (2005) (proposing that franchisors that take reasonable steps to 
require franchisees to display a notice indicating the franchise is independently 
owned and operated and to require franchisees to carry reasonable levels of 
insurance should be insulated from liability for their franchisee’s torts, 
seemingly without regard to whether or not such insurance is actually in force). 
4 See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Symposium:  The Passage of Time:  The Implications 
for Product Liability, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (1983). 
 
5 David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of 
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created By Running Covenants, Product Liability, and 
Toxic-Waste Clean Up, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1987). 
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 This article examines judge-made successor liability6 and offers a 
number of observations.  First, our current judge-made successor liability 
law is a product of the rise of corporate law in the last half of the 19th 
century and early part of the 20th century.  In fact, it appears to have 
developed because of, and in reaction to, the rise of corporate law.  It 
may be better to characterize it as a part of that body of law, much like 
the “alter ego” or “piercing the corporate veil” doctrines,7 rather than as 
a simple creature of tort law, despite it being used as a tool by plaintiffs 
who are involuntary tort claimants. 
 Many sources and authorities list four to six basic types of 
situations in which judge-made successor liability has sometimes been 
recognized: (1) express or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de facto 
merger, (4) mere continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and (6) 
product line.8  In fact, the matter is more complicated than that.  Each of 
these species of successor liability has, within it, different sub-species 
with different standards and variations in the jurisdictions that recognize 
them.  Some use a list of mandatory elements, while others are based on 
a non-exclusive list of factors and considerations to be weighed and 
balanced in a “totality of the circumstances” fashion.  Some that began 
as an approach consisting of a flexible list of factors have evolved into 
6 This article does not address the independent duty to warn that a successor 
may have when it learns that the predecessor placed defective goods in the 
market or into the stream of commerce prior to the sale of assets from the 
predecessor to the successor.  This represents another, independent ground of 
liability upon which to pursue a successor when the liability in question is one 
caused by a defective product.  This independent duty to warn is available as a 
parallel cause of action to successor liability in the defective product context 
and there is no need for a plaintiff to elect one theory or the other; both may be 
pursued through to judgment.   
 
7 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the 
Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109 (2004). 
 
8 See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 53–54 (Alaska 2001) 
(discussing varied approaches to determinations of whether successor liability 
was a creature of contract and corporate law or tort law as part of its choice of 
law analysis and concluding that successor liability is a tort law doctrine 
designed to expand products liability law; collecting cases and other authorities 
on both sides of the issue).  
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one consisting of one or more mandatory elements.  In any event, to 
state that there are only four to six categories is to oversimplify the 
matter.9  Even so, this approach has been furthered by the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, Products Liability, which seems to have misstated, 
rather than restated, the law in this area.10 
 Even in those jurisdictions that appear to have expanded the 
number of recognized categories of successor liability, there appears to 
be a long-term trend to limit the applicability of the successor liability 
doctrines by stating the applicable standard in the form of a bright-line 
rule or set of rules.  This trend toward bright-line rules threatens the 
original purpose of successor liability, which was born to serve as a 
counterbalance to corporate law’s limitation-of-liability protections 
afforded to asset purchasers.  Like the “alter ego” or “piercing the 
corporate veil” doctrines, it was originally a set of extremely fact-specific 
and context-sensitive standards based upon an examination of non-
exclusive lists of flexible factors rather than rigid bright-lines rules. 
 To serve its original purpose as a safety valve ensuring just results 
in the face of corporate law’s limitations on liability, successor liability 
should remain more flexible and fluid so that its applications can be 
adjusted as new forms of transactions are developed and pursued.  It is 
natural for capital to be deployed, harvested, and redeployed in a manner 
that maximizes the externalities, the costs that society, not the invested 
capital, must bear.  It is natural to attempt to separate liabilities by 
creating negative externalities for existing creditors and future claimants 
whenever possible.  Successor liability stands as a doctrine to regulate or 
moderate this behavior and to prevent the dominance of corporate law 
principles in situations where injustice would result.  This, in turn, can 
force the transferee and transferor to bargain and allocate the risk of 
unpaid and future claims between themselves. 
9 The variance in states’ approaches to successor liability and to the related 
doctrines of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil is one of the reasons that 
the federal courts have adopted a uniform federal common law of these 
subjects under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2005); see 
United States v. General Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298–301 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(collecting authorities). 
10 See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text. 
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 Development of a bright-line standard for successor liability sets 
the stage for avoiding that liability when asset purchasers are represented 
by competent counsel.  Once a rigid standard or safe-harbor has 
emerged, the transaction can be structured so that the standard is 
avoided or the safe-harbor invoked.  Successor liability emerged over 
one hundred years ago in reaction to the rise of insulation of capital from 
liability under corporate law.  Since then there has been a trend toward 
uniform statements of the successor liability doctrines and 
transformation of flexible standards into rigid ones.  This trend seems to 
indicate that corporate law, in the long run, is winning the struggle 
against these exceptions to the no-liability-for-asset-purchaser rule.  
Especially in the case of the future tort claims, corporate law thus 
encourages the externalization of these claims.  As a result, it is future 
claimants and society who are left to bear these claims, rather than the 
parties who benefited from the act that gave rise to them. 
 Section one of this article examines the emergence of successor 
liability at the time of the rise of corporate law.  Section two details the 
subspecies of the various judge-made doctrines that exist under the 
current state of the law.  Section three examines the gravitation of the 
doctrine from a fluid model, which is difficult to draft around with 
confidence, to a rigid one that makes this effort much easier.  Section 
three also examines the use of a federal court order to accomplish what 
the mere agreements of the parties cannot:  preemptive bars of successor 
liability claims. 
 The article concludes that the purpose of the doctrine or 
doctrines was to provide contract and tort creditors with an avenue for 
recovery in appropriate cases against successor entities when the 
predecessor that contracted with them or committed the tort, or the 
action that later gave rise to the tort, had sold substantially all of its assets 
and was no longer a viable source of recovery.11  Its various species acted 
11 Successor liability is not limited, as sometimes claimed, to the field of product 
liability claims.  Ordinary contract claims and other claims are amenable to 
recovery through the doctrine.  See Cab-Tek v. E.B.M., Inc., 571 A.2d 671, 673 
(Vt. 1990) (rejecting notion of limit of successor liability to product liability 
claims). 
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as a pressure relief valve on the strict limitation of liability created by 
corporate law and could force the parties to structure the transaction.  
The doctrine is “equitable” in nature insofar as it is invoked when strict 
application of corporate law would offend the conscience of the court. 
 In large part, the doctrine remains intact and still serves that 
purpose.  However, in those jurisdictions that have either adopted tests 
that contain required elements or refused to accept the continuity 
doctrines of successor liability, the doctrine has eroded.  While failing to 
adopt the continuity doctrines may be a laudable example of judicial 
restraint and deference to the legislature’s role as the primary law-maker, 
the courts’ conversion of flexible factors to rigid, required elements in 
generally accepted judge-made doctrine does not appear to serve the 
aims of equity or justice.12  Rather, it promotes sharp lawyering based 
upon an elevation of form over substance to protect asset purchasers.  
By doing so, instead of incentivizing the parties to bargain and allocate 
the risk of these claims between them (or insure against them), it 
encourages them to structure the transaction to avoid them entirely, 
leaving the creditors or society with the loss.  This article concludes that 
the species of successor liability that feature non-exclusive lists of factors 
to be considered are superior to element-based forms of the doctrine in 
terms of serving its initial goals. 
12 For an amusing decision highlighting the error of employing factors as 
elements, see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs. Ltd., 419 F.3d 594, 
599–600 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 
[T]he district judge may have been confused by the “badges of 
fraud.”  This archaic term, an unfortunate cliché that can have 
a mesmerizing force on lawyers and judges, refers to a list of 
11 symptoms of fraud . . . .  The district judge found that five 
of the “badges” were present in this case, short of a majority 
and thus not enough, he thought, to prove fraud.  But the 
symptoms are not addictive.  To treat them as such is the 
equivalent of saying that if there are 11 common symptoms of 
a serious disease, and a patient has only 5 (a low white 
corpuscle count, internal bleeding, fever, shortness of breath, 
and severe nausea), he is not seriously ill. 
 
Id. at 600. 
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 Finally, the article presents a detailed appendix of the leading 
recent successor liability cases in United States jurisdictions as a guide to 
which sub-species of the doctrine can be found in which environments.  
Rather than discussing the doctrine in terms of general and often 
repeated statements, it makes sense to examine the specific species of 
successor liability that are recognized in particular jurisdictions.  
Generalities blur distinctions that individualized analyses reveals.  It 
bears keeping in mind that the state in which an involuntary tort victim 
resides will often determine where suit can be brought against a 
successor, what law will apply, and thus what species of successor 
liability will be available to a plaintiff. 
II. WHAT SUCCESSOR LIABILITY WAS MEANT TO BE 
A. The General Rule of No Successor Liability and a Traditional Statement of the 
Successor Liability Exceptions 
The general rule is that a purchaser of assets for fair 
consideration does not become liable for the seller’s liabilities, even when 
the purchaser purchases substantially all of the assets of the seller.13  
Absent fraudulent transfers, acquisition of all or substantially all of a 
company’s assets is a necessary but, by itself, insufficient element for a 
finding of successor liability.14  Where exceptions to the general rule of 
13 See Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780 (1971) 
(opinion now flagged by Shepard’s as disapproved, which seems an overly 
negative analysis designed to promote further searching and generation of 
additional search fees since the California Supreme Court expanded California’s 
recognized categories to include the “product line” exception in Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1975) (“Ordinarily when one company sells or transfers all its assets 
to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the 
transferor simply by virtue of its succession to the transferor’s property.”); 
Dana Corp. v. LTV Corp., 668 A.2d 752, 756 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“[A successor] 
will be exposed to liability only if a court follows some exception to the 
traditional rule that a transfer of assets does not pass liabilities unless the 
transferee agrees to assume them.”), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1337 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 
14 Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(finding no successor liability as purchaser had not acquired accounts, customer 
lists, trade names or goodwill);  see also Schwartz, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 781 
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no-successor-liability-for-asset-purchaser are accepted, they typically 
require an additional element over mere acquisition of substantially all 
the assets of an entity to justify imposition of successor liability.15  The 
findings that can constitute the additional element needed to justify 
imposition of successor liability on an asset purchaser are commonly said 
to include: 
(a) An express or implied assumption of liabilities in the 
purchase agreement;16 or 
(b) The transfer of assets to the purchaser that is for the 
fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for the seller’s 
debts;17 or 
(purchaser who did not acquire substantially all of a business and who paid 
valuable and adequate consideration was not liable in tort for defective 
products manufactured by a seller that continued to exist as a separate 
corporate entity with substantial assets to meet its debts). 
 
15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998) 
(collecting and discussing authorities). 
 
16 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pillsbury, Inc., 969 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1992) (asset 
purchaser that acquired franchiser did not expressly or impliedly assume seller’s 
tort liability when acquisition agreement expressly limited obligations assumed 
to certain specified contracts and agreements of seller); Kessinger v. Grefco, 
Inc., 875 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1989) (asset purchaser impliedly assumed a 
seller’s unforeseen liability for certain tort claims where the purchaser agreed 
“to pay, perform and discharge all debts, obligations, contracts and liabilities” 
of the seller); Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997) (asset purchaser impliedly assumed a liability where other liabilities were 
expressly assumed). 
 
17 See, e.g., Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D. Or. 1988) 
(finding corporate restructuring was undertaken to avoid liabilities from 
asbestos claimants and imposing liability on transferee), aff’d, 977 F.2d 499 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Reddy v. Gonzalez, 8 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122 (1992) (under Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act actual intent and inadequate consideration are 
alternative requirements for successor liability based upon fraudulent transfer); 
see also Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (using 
inadequate consideration paid as alternative factor implying fraudulent purpose, 
much like construction fraudulent conveyance theories of recovery). 
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(c) A transaction amounting to a consolidation or a de facto 
merger;18 or 
(d) A purchasing corporation that is merely a continuation of the 
seller (in some jurisdictions this has been expanded to 
include continuity of enterprise);19 or 
(e) Application of the product line exception, imposing liability 
on an asset purchaser that continued production of the 
transferor’s product line with the assets purchased.20 
18 See, e.g., Marks v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1435–36 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (de facto merger found where one corporation takers all of 
another’s assets without providing any consideration to meet the claims of the 
seller’s creditors; five factor test for de facto merger: (i) consideration paid for the 
assets solely belonging to the purchaser or its parent; (ii) continues the same 
enterprise after the sale; (iii) shareholders of the seller corporation become 
shareholders of the purchaser; (iv) the seller liquidates; and (v) the buyer 
assumes the liabilities of the seller necessary to carry on the business); Drug, 
Inc. v. Hunt, 168 A. 87, 96 (Del. 1933) (where consideration for transfer of 
assets was stock in transferee and transferee assumed all debts and liabilities of 
the transferor, there was a de facto merger); Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S. 
2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (de facto merger factors include continuity of 
ownership, liquidation of predecessor, assumption of liabilities needed to carry 
on the business, and continuity of management, personnel, physical location, 
assets and general operations).  
 
19 See, e.g., Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 181 P. 780 (Cal. 1919) (“mere 
continuation successor liability may lie when:  (1) no adequate consideration 
was given for the acquired assets, and (2) where one or more persons were 
officers, directors, or stockholders of both corporations); Turner v. Bituminous 
Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976) (“Continuity is the purpose, 
continuity is the watch word, continuity is the fact.”); Bostick v. Schall’s Brakes 
& Repairs, Inc., 725 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (reversing summary 
judgment and remanding for determination of whether successor was 
established to merely continue the former corporation’s operations). 
 
20 In the seminal (or ovular) case of Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), 
California’s courts introduced the product line exception.  Since 1977, courts in 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, Mississippi, and New Mexico have 
adopted the product line exception, and those of Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Iowa, Texas, Georgia, 
Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Vermont, Florida, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, and the District of 
Columbia have rejected it.  See Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992); 
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The first exception, express or implied assumption of liabilities, 
is fairly straight-forward.  It is based, at least in theory, upon the 
voluntary acts and conduct of the purchaser.  Similarly, the second 
category, fraudulent transfer, is fairly straightforward and the expected 
result when a court is faced with what amounts to a corporate shell game 
to escape liability.  The balance of the exceptions seem to hover around a 
common core:  They are tests that to one degree or another focus on 
one or both of (i) some indicia of a fraudulent-transaction-like scenario 
or (ii) the successor’s enjoyment of the benefits of continuing to operate 
the business essentially as it was before the transfer.  These are two 
distinct justifications for successor liability, although the courts do not 
always clearly distinguish between them when discussing the doctrines. 
B. The Origins of Successor Liability in Railroad Failures and Reorganizations 
Although the doctrine is older, or at least has its roots in a much 
earlier time,21 the failure of many railroads around the turn of the century 
and their reorganization through asset sales and equity receiverships 
Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001) (recognizing product 
line theory as a viable basis for recovery); Garcia v. Coe Mfg., Co., 933 P.2d 
243, 248 (N.M. 1997) (adopting product line theory from Ray v. Alad Corp.); 
accord Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1995); Pesce v. 
Overhead Door Corp., No. 2-91CV0435 JCH, 1998 WL 34347661 (D. Conn. 
Aug. 21, 1998); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985); 
Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Pelc. v. 
Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Young v. 
Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jones v. Johnson 
Mach. & Press. Co. of Elkart, Ind., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Goucher v. 
Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Dawejko v. Jorgenson Steel 
Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 
690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App. 1985); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); see also Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in 
Bankruptcy:  Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper 
Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329 (1996) (collecting cases). New York also 
rejected the “product line” exception in Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 
851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006), see RICHARD E. KAYE, AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d § 
7:27 (updated February 2013) and 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7123.30 
(rev. perm. ed. 1983) (updated September 2012) for a list of states that have 
accepted or rejected this exception.  
 
21 See, e.g., Gibson v. Stevens, 49 U.S. 384 (1850). 
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provides a context in which to see the first real discussion of successor 
liability.  It also provides examples of when the courts found it prudent 
to limit the exceptions to the no-liability-assumption-through-purchase-
of-assets rule.  Claims of successor liability were fact-driven.  Indeed, 
depending on the record developed at trial, they might either be 
sustained or reversed on appeal.  For example, in limiting successor 
liability to cases of intentional assumption of liabilities or fraud, a 
Colorado court, in reversing the trial court’s perhaps-too-liberal 
instruction on successor liability to the jury, explained: 
The seventh instruction, to the effect that, 
in case the jury should find from the 
evidence that the Colorado Springs and 
Interurban Railway Company [the 
successor] was organized and 
incorporated for the purpose and with the 
intention, among other things, of 
acquiring the property, and thereafter to 
carry on the business and affairs, of the 
Colorado Springs Rapid Transit Railway 
Company [the predecessor], in its place 
and stead, the verdict should be against 
both defendants, in case it was in favor of 
plaintiff, is assigned as effort.  The 
interurban company was not charged with 
the negligence complained of.  The 
complaint alleged that said company was 
organized and incorporated in succession 
to its co-defendant, and, among other 
things, for the purpose of acquiring its 
property and to assume its liabilities and 
obligations; that thereafter it did purchase 
and take over all the property of its co-
defendant, and that, “by reason thereof, it did 
assume all obligations and liabilities then 
existing” against said codefendant.  The 
cause was tried upon the theory that 
because all the property of the selling 
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company was transferred to the 
purchasing company, therefore, and 
thereby, the latter company actually or 
impliedly assumed all the obligations and 
liabilities of the other . . . .  The 
allegations of the complaint and the 
evidence in support thereof were not 
sufficient to sustain a judgment against 
the Colorado Springs & Interurban 
Railway Company . . . .  There is no 
allegation or proof that the purchasing 
company expressly agreed to pay or 
assume the obligations, nor evidence of 
intention to pay the claim sued upon, but 
any such intention was expressly denied; 
nor that the new corporation was merely 
the old one under a new name.  It was 
alleged and shown that the new company 
was incorporated for the purpose of not 
only taking over the property of its 
codefendant, but for other purposes, 
among which was the purchase of the 
property of another and similar railway 
company, which it did purchase and take 
over.  There was no consolidation under 
the statute imposing liability.  The rule 
is . . . that, in order that a promise may be 
implied on the part of a corporation to 
pay the debts of another corporation, to 
the property and franchises of which it 
has succeeded by valid purchase, the 
conduct relied upon must show such an 
intention . . . .  If any ground of liability is 
alleged or disclosed, it is that of fraud, 
actual or constructive, by which in respect 
to the property, the purchasing company 
may be held liable in equity to creditors of 
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the old corporation, if fraud is shown in 
the transfer . . . .22 
Thus, this court made it clear that corporate law anti-successor-liability 
principles were dominant absent intentional assumption of liability or 
fraud.  The court also intimated that, even with fraud, the action against 
the successor might be limited to the property that had been transferred, 
what we would today call a fraudulent conveyance action.23 
 Railroad reorganizations could give rise to successor liability in 
the right circumstances, however.  A South Carolina Supreme Court case 
from the 1920s reflects a pro-successor-liability attitude when the court 
was faced with a successor that had, perhaps, issued loose statements 
that the predecessor’s debts would be “taken care of” and then failed to 
document the transaction so as to achieve that result.24  When the 
successor/appellant later stood on its claim of being a newly organized 
corporation that was not responsible for the predecessor’s pre-sale debts, 
the court rejected this position stating: 
The appellant’s position does not appeal 
to us; it is an attempt to dodge the 
damages that respondent has sustained by 
a quirk and technical question of law, and 
smacks too much of a skin game, and 
hand stacked and dealt to dealer from the 
bottom of the deck. 
…. 
The appellant cannot now at this stage of 
the case repudiate its liability.  By its 
action it has allowed the Southern 
Express Company to go out of existence 
22 Colorado Springs Rapid Transit Ry. Co. v. Albrecht, 22 Colo. App. 201, 206–
08 (1912) (emphasis added). 
 
23 Id. (in respect to the “property” in the last quarter of the block quote). 
 
24 Brabham v. So. Express Co., 117 S.E. 368 (S.C. 1922). 
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and now proposes to let the respondent 
whistle for his money, and by its 
technicality, which would besmirch the 
character of any honest man, smacks its 
lips and licks its chops and congratulates 
itself on its shrewdness in avoiding its 
payment of a just claim.25 
 The Third Circuit, in 1986, drawing on Blackstone’s analogy of a 
corporation to the River Thames which remains the same river although 
its water and other constituent parts are constantly changing, 
summarized the law of no-liability-for-asset-purchasers and its four 
“traditional exceptions”—intentional assumption, consolidation or 
merger, fraud, and mere continuation—as follows: 
Describing the characteristics of the 
corporate body, Blackstone wrote that 
“all the individual members that have 
existed from the foundation to the 
present time, or that shall ever hereafter 
exist, are but one person in law, a person 
that never dies; in like manner as the river 
Thames is still the same river, though the 
parts which compose it are changing ever 
instant.” . . .  A corporation whose stock 
is actively traded on an exchange has a 
constantly changing ownership; however, 
that fluctuation does not affect the 
corporation’s liability for its past actions.  
The same concepts of continuing life and 
accountability underlie the law governing 
corporate merger through the purchase of 
stock.  Liability continues because the 
25 Id.  The most recent articulation of successor liability in South Carolina is 
found in Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d 67 (S.C. 2008) (citing 
Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., 622 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 2005); Brown v. Am. Ry. 
Express Co., 123 S.E. 97 (S.C. 1924), which in turn, cites to Brabham)).  
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corporate body itself survives.  A 
different rule applies when one 
corporation purchases the assets of 
another.  Under the well-settled rule of 
corporate law, where one company sells 
or transfers all of its assets to another, the 
second entity does not become liable for 
the debts and liabilities, including torts, of 
the transferor . . . . 
Four generally recognized exceptions 
qualify this principle of successor 
nonliability.  The purchaser may be liable 
where: (1) it assumes liability; (2) the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or 
merger; (3) the transaction is fraudulent 
and intended to provide an escape from 
liability; or (4) the purchasing corporation 
is a mere continuation of the selling 
company . . . . 
The successor rule was designed for the 
corporate contractual world where it 
functions well.  It protects creditors and 
dissenting shareholders, and facilitates 
determination of tax responsibilities, 
while promoting free alienability of 
business assets . . . .  The doctrine reflects 
the general policy that liabilities adhere to 
and follow the corporate entity.  
However, when the form of the transfer 
does not accurately portray substance, the 
courts will not refrain from deciding that 
the new organization is simply the older 
one in another guise.  In that instance, the 
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continuation approach articulated by 
Blackstone remains applicable.26 
The tension is easy to see.  On the one hand, purchasing corporations 
desire some certainty when acquiring a business through an asset sale 
that they will not be liable for pre-closing unsecured debt unless it is 
specifically assumed.  This is the whole point of acquisition by asset sale 
rather than merger.27  This limitation of liability benefits sellers and their 
known creditors, too, by driving up the purchase price rather than 
subjecting the buyer to risks of unknown and, perhaps, unknowable 
claims that would justify a discount in the purchase price or other 
transactional adjustment to allocate the risk.  On the other hand, the 
main group negatively affected by the no-liability rule consists of unpaid 
unsecured creditors and, within that group, the subset of involuntary tort 
creditors, some of whom may not even know of their claim at the time 
of the sale and are thus unable to assert it when assets may be available 
for distribution.28  For them, it creates negative externalities.  A pro-
26 Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77–78 (3d Cir. 1986);  see infra notes 
156–61 and accompanying text discussing how bright-line rules allow careful 
contract drafting and transactional structuring to elevate form over substance 
by drafting into a safe harbor or around standards. 
 
27 See MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT xiv–xv (ABA 2001) (an asset 
purchase “may be the only structure that can be used where a buyer is 
interested in purchasing only a portion of the company’s assets or assuming 
only some of its liabilities.”). 
 
28 This pro-limitation-of-liability inclination is perhaps at its strongest in the 
nation’s bankruptcy courts, where the chant of “benefit to the estate and its 
creditors” and the need not to “chill the bidding” is used to justify fast track 
asset sale transactions that feature the additional protective wrapper of a final 
federal court order that declares the purchaser free of the claims of the 
predecessor’s claims.  See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 19 (2005) (describing combinations of statutory changes in the 
1979 Bankruptcy Code that have led to the development of a federal unified 
foreclosure system in the bankruptcy courts); George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It 
Official:  Adding an Explicit Pre-Plan Sale Process as an Alternative Exit from Chapter 
11, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265 (2004) (discussing shortfalls of section 363 sale 
process as currently required by the Bankruptcy Code and suggesting statutory 
and rule amendments to address the perceived shortfalls); Selling a Business in 
Bankruptcy Court Without a Plan of Reorganization, 18 CEB CAL. BUS. L. PRACT. 57 
(2003) (a brief “how to” guide); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy 
                                                          
 
758       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
limitation-of-liability inclination continues in corporate law generally 
today. 
 Against this background, the next section of this article examines 
the specific non-statutory species and sub-species of successor liability 
currently populating American jurisdictions.  In each case, the particular 
theory is described and then critiqued in terms of whether it serves the 
original purposed of successor liability in ameliorating the otherwise 
harsh results mandated by strict adherence to corporate law principles. 
III. WHAT SUCCESSOR LIABILITY HAS BECOME 
When examined in detail, for purposes of this article, the types of 
successor liability can be classified into five species, each of which is 
made up of separate sub-species, some of which are particular to only a 
single jurisdiction, some of which are found in many, and some of which 
have been alluded to but not specifically identified in others.29  The five 
categories of successor liability species addressed in this article are:  (1) 
Intentional Assumptions of Liabilities, (2) Fraudulent Schemes to Escape 
Liability, (3) De Facto Mergers, (4) The Continuity Exceptions:  Mere 
Continuation and Continuity of Enterprise, and (5) The Product Line 
Exception.  This taxonomy and the sub-species of successor liability 
Code § 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 
(2002) (discussing the evolution and doctrinal basis for current section 363 sale 
practice). See generally Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants 
in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435 (2004). 
 
29 Authorities differ on how many categories of successor liability there are.  
Most seem content with four or five, but at least one identifies nine different 
theories, including statutory successor liability.  See MODEL ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY, EXHIBITS, ANCILLARY DOCUMENTS AND 
APPENDICIES at 144 (ABA 2002) (listing the categories as express or implied 
agreement to assume, de facto merger, mere continuation, fraud, continuity of 
enterprise, product line, duty to warn, inadequate consideration coupled with 
failure to make provision for predecessor’s creditors, and statutory liability). See 
generally 2 DAVID G. OWEN & M. STUART MADDEN, MADDEN & OWEN ON 
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19:6 (3d ed. 2000).  The point of the taxonomy that 
follows is to demonstrate that, actually, there are many different sub-groups 
even within the seven of the ABA’s nine categories discussed in this article. The 
independent duty to warn and statutory successor liability are beyond the scope 
of its piece. 
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recognized in various jurisdictions are summarized in the appendix by 
jurisdiction. 
When examining successor liability, one should keep in mind that 
there is variance and overlap between the species and their standards in 
particular jurisdictions, and the label a court uses for its test is not 
necessarily one with a standardized meaning applicable across 
jurisdictions.  Accordingly, it is dangerous to place too much reliance on 
a name; substance should always be examined. 
A. Intentional (Express or Implied) Assumption of Liabilities 
Intentional assumption of liabilities, express or implied, is 
probably the simplest of the successor liability species.  Imposing liability 
on a successor that, by its actions, is shown to have assumed liabilities is 
essentially an exercise in the realm of contract law, drawing on doctrines 
of construction and the objective theory of contract.30 
Because it focuses on the language of the contract and the 
conduct and communications of the successor, express or implied 
assumption should be the form of successor liability that is the easiest to 
avoid by careful transaction structuring and document drafting.  That 
said, creating a record that will not support a finding of assumption of 
liabilities may be harder to accomplish than it should be given that client 
representatives often do not refrain from volunteering information or 
taking actions inconsistent with the client’s intent not to assume liability.  
Further, the tangled web of cross-references and definitions in an asset 
purchase agreement can trip up lawyers documenting the deal.31 
 
30 Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMRE: New Hampshire Rejects Traditional Test for 
Corporate Successor Liability Following an Asset Purchase, 45 N.H. B.J. 26 (2004). 
 
31 See In re Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 255 B.R. 700, 704 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2000) (intent of the parties as expressed in the terms of an asset purchase 
agreement are controlling); see also Isaacs v. Westchester Wood Works, Inc., 278 
A.D. 2d 184, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (applying ejusdem generis rule of contract 
interpretation to construe broad term maturity and confined to items similar to 
those specifically enumerated). 
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1. Type 1:  The Language of the Contract 
The first sub-species of intentional assumption is based on the 
language of the contract.  Courts look to the language of the asset 
agreement to determine whether the purchaser expressly or impliedly 
agreed to assume liabilities of the successor.32  This express plain-
language approach is a fairly straightforward form of successor liability 
with the most potential for uncertainty in the area of implied terms of 
the contract and application of the canons of construction such as 
ejusdem generis to construe potentially conflicting sections of the 
doctrine.33   
2. Type 2:  Liability Based on Conduct or Representations 
Under a second sub-species of intentional assumption of 
liabilities, the courts look beyond the language of the contract itself and 
examine extrinsic factors to determine if the purchaser impliedly 
assumed the liabilities of the seller.34  For example, Maryland imposes 
successor liability where “the conduct or representations relied upon by 
the party asserting liability . . . indicate an intention of the buyer to pay 
32 Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788 (Ala. 1984); Peglar & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. X05CV970160824S, 
2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002); Gwinnett Hosp. 
Sys., Inc. v. Massey, 469 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Myers v. 
Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Winkler v. V.G. 
Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994); Pearson ex rel. Trent v. 
Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Ky. 2002); Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc., 
No. 023898BLS, 2003 WL 22133177, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003); 
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1970); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., Inc. v. Canron, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 364, 364–
65 (N.Y. 1977); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Companies, 617 N.E.2d 1129, 
1134 (Ohio 1993); Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 
(Or. 1939). 
 
33 See Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, J.V., 209 F.3d 252, 258 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 
34 See Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1292 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1989); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pontiac Plastics & Supply Co., No. 214079, 2000 
WL 33538535, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000); States Roofing Corp. v. 
Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). 
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the debts of the seller.”35  This is reminiscent of the holding in the 
Brabham case from South Carolina quoted in the previous section.36 
3. Type 3:  Undefined 
A substantial number of courts—representing almost thirty 
jurisdictions—have adopted or recited the existence of the express or 
implied assumption of liabilities doctrine, but appear not to have defined 
a test or elaborated further in a reported decision.37  Often this adoption 
35 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1292. 
 
36 See Brabham v. So. Express Co., 117 S.E. 368 (S.C. 1922). 
 
37 Winsor v. Glasswerks, PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Henkel 
Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003); Johnston v. 
Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); In re 
Asbestos Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 
1994); Bingham v. Goldberg.Marchesano.Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89–90 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1994); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 
1982); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); 
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002); 
Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Dir. Bureau of 
Labor Standards v. Diamond Brand, Inc., 588 A.2d 734, 736 (Me. 1991); 
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp. 
v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Chem. Design, Inc. 
v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. 
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Lamb v. Leroy 
Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27–28 (Nev. 1969); Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire 
Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 119 
P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941); G.P. Publ’ns., Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul, 
Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal 
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 
561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Reptr. 479, 
488–89 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1994); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 
(S.C. 1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 
(S.D. 1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-
02699-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001); 
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958-59 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); Mill & 
Logging Supply Co. v. W. Tenino Lumber Co., 265 P.2d 807, 812 (Wash. 1954); 
In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W.Va. 1994); 
Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Wis. 
2003). 
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takes the form of reciting, arguably as dicta, a version of the “typical” or 
“traditional” rule of no successor liability and its exceptions, including 
express or implied assumption, and then moving on to discuss whether 
liability will lie under a species of the doctrine other than express or 
implied assumption.  For example, in Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC,38 
the Arizona Court of Appeal stated the four traditional exceptions, 
including express or implied assumption, and cited to A.R. Teeters & 
Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,39 which itself had taken the recitation of 
four traditional exceptions from two California cases, another Arizona 
case that had cited a Kentucky case, and cases from Hawaii and 
Washington State.  None of these cases actually concerned liability of a 
successor based upon express or implied assumption.  The Winsor court 
also found support in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products 
Liability § 12 (1998), which announced substantially the same general 
rule and exceptions.40 
B. Fraudulent Schemes to Escape Liability 
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using corporate law 
limitation-of-liability principles to defeat the legitimate interests of 
creditors illustrate an example of the need for successor liability to 
prevent injustice.  If a corporation’s equity holders, for example, arrange 
for the company’s assets to be sold to a new company in which they also 
hold an equity or other stake for less value than would be produced if 
the assets were deployed by the original company in the ordinary course 
of business, then the legitimate interest and expectations of the 
company’s creditors have been frustrated.41  By allowing liability to 
 
38 63 P.3d 1040, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
39 836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
 
40 Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1045; Id. 
 
41 “Causation is a required element of all species of the fraud exception.” 
George Kuney, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS: When Can Creditors 
and Tort Victims Sue the Buyer of a Business for the Debts and Torts of the Seller?, 96 
ILL. B.J. 148 n.11 (2008) (citing Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 
N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 2008) (discussing need for causation, but also that judgment 
creditors could look to company’s long term prospects, not just immediate 
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attach to the successor corporation in such instances, the creditors’ 
interests and expectations are respected.  The challenge, of course, is 
defining the standard that separates the fraudulent scheme from the 
legitimate one.  
1. Type 1:  Common Law Fraud or Lack of Good Faith 
Some courts review the record for evidence of common law 
fraud.42  For example, in Eagle Pacific Insurance Co. v. Christensen Motor 
Yacht Corp.43 the court held that the successor corporation was created 
solely to hinder the predecessor’s creditors, and a fraudulent purpose 
was established sufficient to impose liability on the successor.  The 
fraudulent purpose doctrine is closely related to the mere continuation 
doctrine in that the fraudulent scheme is the mere continuation of the 
business with only a superficial change in legal form to defeat the valid 
claims of the predecessor’s creditors.  Both doctrines have similar origins 
and were, perhaps, originally flexible standards addressing similar 
situations featuring differently structured transactions.44 
insolvency, saying “[the creditor] was deprived of the opportunity to wait and 
see whether [predecessor]'s business, now being conducted by [the successor], 
turned around financially to where it was able to repay its debt obligations.”)).  
42 Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 5 S.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Mo. 1928); McKee 
v. Harris-Seybold Co., Div. of Harris-Intertype Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 107 (N.J. 
Law Div. 1970); Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 
P.2d 715, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 
43 Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting trial court’s finding of mere continuation 
successor liability but sustaining successor liability on grounds of actual fraud). 
 
44 See, e.g., Ingram, 5 S.W.2d at 417.  
 
The conclusion is irresistible that the Elmira Coal Company 
was incorporated for the purpose of complying with the 
requirements of the Missouri law, and it was in fact either a 
continuation of the Prairie Block Company or a subsidiary 
corporation.  The rule is, that, where one corporation 
purchases the stock and assets . . . of a mere continuance of 
the selling corporation . . . [it is] ipso facto liable for the debts 
and liabilities of the selling corporation. 
 
Id. at 416.  
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 Other courts review the facts to determine whether “some of the 
elements of a purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the transfer 
was without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not 
provided for . . . [.]”45  Either formulation of the standard appears 
flexible enough to prevent artful dodging through skillful structuring and 
drafting, although the record and facts may be manipulated to make 
proving the case difficult and expensive, as is the case with almost every 
form of fraud. 
2. Type 2:  Statutory Fraud 
Maryland determines successor liability for fraud by 
incorporating the standards of its Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act.46  This inclusion would seem to expand fraudulent conveyance 
liability, which is normally limited to avoidance of the transfer and, thus, 
recovery of the value of the assets transferred.  Successor liability can 
subject all of the purchaser’s assets and insurance to the claims of the 
predecessor’s creditors. 
 
 
45 Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510-11 (Mich. 1999) 
(quoting 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 1546, pp. 922-924; Malone v. Red Top 
Cab Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 268, 273, 60 P.2d 543 (1936)) (also citing Turner v. 
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n. 3 (Mich. 1976) (quoting Schwartz 
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal.App.3d 767, 92 Cal.Rptr. 776 (1971))) (other 
citations omitted); Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc., 
588 A.2d 734, 736 n.5 (Me. 1991) (citing Brennan v. Saco Constr., Inc., 381 
A.2d 656, 662 (Me. 1978) for proposition that “absent fraud, misrepresentation, 
or intent to circumvent overriding public policy, court[s] [are] reluctant to 
disregard corporation form.”); see Huray v. Fournier MC Programming, Inc., 
No. C9-02-1852, 2003 WL 21151772, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 20, 2003); 
Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27-28 (Nev. 1969); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 107 (N.J. Law Div. 1970); Welco Indus., Inc. v. 
Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 
Phila. Co. Reptr. 479, 488–89, No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 
13, 1994) (limiting the exception to inadequacy of consideration or where 
provision was not made for creditors of the transferor); Ostrowski v. Hydra-
Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984). 
 
46 Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 574 (Md. 1991). 
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3. Type 3:  Undefined 
As is the case with intentional assumption,47 many courts have 
adopted or recited the existence of the exception but appear not to have 
defined a test.48  It is not entirely clear if their comments should be 
47 See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text. 
 
48 Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Henkel 
Corp. v. Hardford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003); Johnston v. 
Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Peglar & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. X05CV970160824S, 
2002 WL 1610037, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002); In re Asbestos Litig., 
No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super Ct. Feb. 4, 1994); Bingham 
v. Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89–90 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1994); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982); Farmex Inc. 
v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 
P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Myers v. Putzmeiser, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 
754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 
1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994); Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 
751–52 (Iowa 2002); Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308, 
1312 (Kan. 1972); Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 
(Ky. 2002); Wolfe v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794 
(La. 1916); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 931 (Mass. 1991); Turner 
v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 886–87 (Mich. 1976) (noting that 
fraud might be indicated by inadequate consideration and/or lack of good faith 
in the transaction; the court did not address other possible indications of fraud); 
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp. 
v. Amrihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Jones v. Johnson 
Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Bielagus v. EMRE of 
New Hampshire Corp, 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Schumacher v. Richards 
Shear Co., Inc., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat’l 
Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941); G.P. Publ’ns. v. Quebecor Printing-St. 
Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v. 
Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Welco Indus., Inc. 
v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool 
Co., P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 
170, 174 (Or. 1939); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Reptr. 479, 488–89 
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1994); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 
1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D. 
1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699-
COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001); Ostrowski  v. 
Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 
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considered dicta.  Nor is it clear if these jurisdictions would apply a 
common law fraud, lack of good faith, statutory fraud, or some other 
standard to apply to this species of successor liability. 
C. De Facto Merger 
In a statutory merger, the successor corporation becomes liable 
for the predecessor’s debts.49  The de facto merger species of successor 
liability creates the same result in the asset sale context to avoid allowing 
form to overcome substance.  A de facto merger, then, allows liability to 
attach when an asset sale has mimicked the results of a statutory merger 
except for the continuity of liability.  The main difference between the 
sub-species of de facto merger in various jurisdictions is how rigid or 
flexible the test is.  In other words, how many required elements must be 
shown to establish applicability of the doctrine?  On one end of the 
spectrum is the lengthy, mandatory checklist of required elements.  On 
the other, the non-exclusive list of factors to be weighed in a totality of 
the circumstances fashion. 
1. Type 1:  Element-Based Test 
Courts applying an element-based de facto merger test require a 
showing of certain required elements.  Generally, “[t]o find a de facto 
merger there must be a continuity of the selling corporation evidenced 
by the same management, personnel, assets and physical location; a 
continuity of the stockholders, accomplished by paying for the acquired 
corporation with shares of stock; a dissolution of the selling corporation; 
and assumption of the liabilities.”50  This is a rigid test that allows 
605, 609 (Va. 1992); In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–
25 (W. Va. 1994); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Wis. 
1985). 
 
49 G. William Joyner, III, Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Successor Liability in North 
Carolina, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 894 (1995). 
 
50 Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d 958, 960 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 
2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);  see Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 
533 S.E.2d 136, 145–46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 
N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 
N.W.2d 873, 891 (Mich. 1976); Howell v. Atlantic-Meeco, Inc., No. 01CA0084, 
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transactions to be structured so as to avoid exposure to liability.  For 
example, counsel that is aware of the applicability of this sub-species of 
successor liability is likely to disfavor 100% stock payments in 
acquisitions of substantially all the assets of a business.  Counsel can 
require that the seller continue to exist and not dissolve post-sale and 
arrange for the seller to fund payments to its voluntary, ordinary course 
of business creditors out of the purchase price to avoid assuming any 
pre-sale unsecured liabilities.  This sort of lawyering, encouraged by the 
rigid “required elements” approach to de facto merger, elevates form over 
substance and undermines successor liability’s usefulness as a tool to 
soften the harsh results that may obtain from strict application of 
corporate law principles. 
2. Type 2:  Threshold Requirement Plus Non-Dispositive Factors 
Other courts require a threshold finding of continuity of 
ownership and then consider other not-necessarily dispositive factors, 
including dissolution of the predecessor necessary to operate the 
business.51 
2002 WL 857685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2002).  Vermont only requires 
evidence of three elements.  CAB-TEK, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc., 571 A.2d 671, 
672–73 (Vt. 1990) (stating de facto merger occurs where a corporation (1) takes 
control of all of the assets of another corporation, (2) without consideration, 
and (3) the predecessor ceases to function). 
 
51 Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794 (La. 
1916) (Louisiana has not adopted the de facto merger exception per se, but its 
“continuation doctrine” appears to be the traditional de facto merger exception 
with a requirement of continuity of ownership); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson 
Mach., Inc. 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D. 1986) (“When the seller corporation 
retains its existence while parting with its assets, a ‘de facto merger’ may be found 
if the consideration given by the purchaser corporation is shares of its own 
stock.”) (citations omitted); Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 
956, 958–59 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (requiring “that the buyer paid for the asset 
purchase with its own stock”); Schawk, Inc. v. City Brewing Co., No. 02-1833, 
2003 WL 1563767, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2003) (requiring that 
consideration for the assets be stock in the purchasing corporation and 
examining the following four non-dispositive factors:  (1) the assets of the seller 
corporation are acquired with shares of the stock in the buyer corporation, 
resulting in a continuity of shareholders; (2) the seller ceases operations and 
dissolves soon after the sale; (3) the buyer continues the enterprise of the seller 
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 Although more flexible than the pure required element-based 
approach to de facto merger, this hybrid approach suffers from some 
rigidity because it rests on the touchstone of “ownership,” itself a largely 
illusory concept in the modern corporate world.  Under the classical 
model, the “owners” of the corporation are the common shareholders 
who are said to “control” the corporation through their power to elect 
directors and, thus, indirectly, control management.  The first criticism 
of the classical model is that, outside of the small, closely held 
corporation, most, or at least many, shareholders have no meaningful 
control or power to elect even one director.  More importantly, though, 
corporate and lending lawyers in the real work have sliced and diced 
corporate securities and debt interests and instruments with precision 
and the result has been to increase the control over directors, 
management, and operations held by debt and preferred stock holders.52  
Further, as modern corporate law recognizes, the real “owners” of a 
corporation are the lowest priority debt or interest holders that are 
supported by value in the corporation.  Even directors’ duties are aimed 
corporation so that there is a continuity of management, employees, business 
location, assets and general business operations; and (4) the buyer assumes 
those liabilities of the seller necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of 
normal business operations). 
 
52 Douglas G. Caird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2006). 
 
In our Essay, we explore this missing lever of corporate 
governance:  the control that creditors exercise through 
elaborate loan covenants.  Bondholders typically can do little 
until a corporation defaults on a loan payment.  Even then, 
their remedies are limited.  Not so with bank debt or debt 
issued by nonfinancial institutions.  These loans—and their 
volume now exceeds half a trillion dollars per year—come 
with elaborate covenants covering everything from minimum 
cash receipts to timely delivery of audited financial statements.  
When a business trips one of the wires in a large loan, the 
lender is able to exercise de facto control rights—such as 
replacing the CEO of a company—that shareholders of a 
public company simply do not have. 
Id.  
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at this last residual value class, whether or not it is named “common 
stock.”53 
 Faced with a required element of de facto merger like 
“commonality of ownership,” the transactional gambit is to avoid it by 
providing old equity with something entirely different in the purchasing 
company.  Contingent promissory notes, convertible debt, or, if 
appropriate, continued employment with salary and preferred stock 
options would also serve to leave old equity with some skin in the game.  
And these are the easy, almost transparent solutions.  The use of 
derivative securities and coordinated debt, equity, and workout swaps all 
achieve the same end.  The hybrid approach to de facto merger that 
requires commonality of ownership is fairly easy to address, and avoid, 
by competent counsel structuring the acquisition. 
3. Type 3:  Non-Dispositive Factor Test 
Other courts essentially use a completely non-dispositive factor 
from of the test for de facto merger and weigh these factors in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.54  This is the most flexible form of de facto 
53 See generally Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties, The 
Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141 (2002).  The duty 
shifting from stockholders to other corporate constituents is largely based on 
the seminal case of Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns. 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 
54 Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986) (adding an additional factor to the general test:  “was the 
consideration paid for the assets solely stock of the purchaser or its parent”); 
Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. 
X05CV970160824S., 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002); 
Sorenson v. Allied Prods. Corp, 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) 
(Indiana courts acknowledge the four traditional factors but have not clearly 
expressed whether their de facto merger test requires a threshold finding of 
continuity of shareholders); Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 
815, 818–19 (Mass. 1997) (noting that although continuity of ownership is not a 
threshold requirement, “in determining whether a de facto merger has occurred, 
courts pay particular attention to the continuation of management, officers, 
directors and shareholders”); Harache v. Flinkote Co., 848 S.W.2d 506, 509 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (listing the four traditional elements but noting, “[i]t is not 
necessary to find all the elements to find a de facto merger”); Woodrick v. Jack J. 
Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); In 
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merger and is not as susceptible to the “draft around.”  The result is that 
corporate attorneys and their clients will lack the certainty of a bright-line 
rule or elements that they can work around to create a safe haven for 
their transaction. 
4. Type 4: Undefined 
Finally, still other courts have adopted or recited the existence of 
the exception but do not appear to have illustrated its application in their 
jurisdiction or defined a test.55  
re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 810 A.2d 127, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002); Richmond Ready-Mix v. Atl. Concrete Forms, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-0960, 
2004 WL 877595, at *10 (R.I. Apr. 21, 2004).  
 
55 Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 786–88 (Ala. 1984); Winsor 
v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C. 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Johnston v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Asbestos 
Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994); 
Bingham v. Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89-90 (D.C. 
1994); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); 
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002); 
Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Pearson ex rel 
Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (indicating that 
continuity of shareholders, management, or other indicia of merger or 
consolidation is necessary before the de facto merger exception will apply); 
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 571–72 (Md. 1991); Niccum v. Hydra 
Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost 
Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press 
Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27–
28 (Nev. 1969); Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 
564 (N.H. 2003); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat’l Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 
1941); G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 
679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 
N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 71 
(Okla. 1977); Tyree Oil, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 7 P.3d 571, 573 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924); 
Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699-COA-R3-
CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 
413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 
789–90 (Wash. 1984); In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 
424–25 (W. Va. 1994). 
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D. Continuation of the Business:  The Continuity Exceptions 
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor 
liability when the successor continues the business of the seller:  mere 
continuation and continuity of enterprise.  Each has sub-species 
particular to specific jurisdictions within it.  The two share roughly the 
same indications, but continuity of enterprise does not require continuity 
of shareholders or directors or officers between the predecessor and the 
successor—a requirement said to be one of the mere continuation 
exception’s dispositive elements or factors.56  Courts are not altogether 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. g. (AM. 
LAW INST. (1998)); AM. TRAVERS ET AL., AMERICAN LAW PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 7:20 (3d ed. 2004);  see, e.g., Holloway v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 
432 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. S.C. 1977) (relying on Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) and denying summary judgment to the defendant 
successor in a products liability suit because (1) the business continued at its 
same address with virtually all of the previous employees; (2) the successor was 
responsible for maintenance and repairs on the products sold by the 
predecessor prior to its sale of assets; (3) the successor continued 
manufacturing the same or similar products as the predecessor; and (4) the 
successor held itself out to the public as a business entity under a virtually 
identical name as its predecessor; not requiring continuity of ownership and 
control but calling the doctrine applied “mere continuation” anyway.);  see also 
Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Mississippi law and citing Holloway and Cyr as cases following the continuity of 
enterprise theory); TRAVERS ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
3d § 7:22 (2004) (noting that the court in Holloway denied summary judgment to 
a successor despite a lack of continuity of ownership even though the court 
treated its ruling as an application of the mere continuation theory); 2 MADDEN 
& OWEN ON PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19:6, n.25 (3d. ed. 2000) (noting an 
increasing number of courts have adopted the continuity of enterprise 
exception including the Holloway court and the Ohio Supreme Court in Flaugher 
v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987)); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., 
Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 854–55, n.44 (1999) 
(noting that states following the continuity of enterprise approach include 
South Carolina (citing Holloway), Ohio (citing Flaugher), Alabama, Michigan, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire (citing Cyr)); Phillip I. Blumberg, The 
Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States Law, 10 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375–76 (1996) (collecting cases applying the continuity of 
enterprise theory, including Holloway and Flaugher); 30 S.C. JUR. PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 12 (stating the court in Holloway denied the successor’s motion for 
summary judgment “where the evidence indicated that the [successor] was a 
mere continuation of the predecessor corporation”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
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careful or uniform in labeling which exception they are applying.  There 
appear to be four general sub-species of mere continuation and three of 
continuity of enterprise.  The similarity of these doctrines to those of de 
facto merger is striking.57 
1. The Four Species of Mere Continuation 
a. Type 1:  Element-Based Mere Continuation 
For some courts, mere continuation is a conclusion derived from 
a showing of a set of required elements.  For example, “[t]he primary 
elements of the ‘mere continuation’ exception include use by the buyer 
of the seller’s name, location, and employees, and a common identity of 
stockholders and directors.”58  Much as with the first type of de facto 
merger where a test comprised of required elements is used, this sub-
species of mere continuation is user friendly for corporate lawyers.  It 
provides the bright-line certainty needed to have confidence that one has 
insulated a transaction from this form of successor liability by arranging 
for potential relocation, change of employees, and a new group of 
directors and shareholders.  Presumably, in most cases, the successor 
would wish to use the predecessor’s trade name and goodwill, but if not, 
that too could be dropped—or not even acquired—to further insulate 
the transaction from successful attack. 
b. Type 2:  Threshold Finding Plus Non-Dispositive Factors Mere 
Continuation 
Another set of jurisdictions approach the mere continuation 
doctrine by requiring continuity of ownership as a threshold matter.  
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. (1998)) (citing 
only Alabama, Michigan, and New Hampshire as jurisdictions that have 
adopted the continuity of enterprise theory). 
 
57 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221–22 (Vt. 2005).  Cases 
from the beginning of the last century in Idaho preserve another term that 
seems to capture all or part of the de facto merger, mere continuation, and 
continuity of enterprise exceptions:  “reorganization.”  See infra notes 274–76 
and accompanying text. 
 
58 Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001). 
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Then they consider other relevant factors on an ad hoc basis.59  As with 
the de facto merger sub-species that employs a requirement of continuity 
59 Alcan Aluminum Corp., Met. Goods Div. v. Elec. Metal Prods., 837 P.2d 
282, 283 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring “continuation of directors and 
management, shareholder interest, and, in some cases, inadequate 
consideration”); In re Asbestos Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *4 
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994) (“[I]t must be established that the 
transaction . . . was an arms’ length transaction and not simply a corporate 
name and that [the successor] has different owners than [the predecessor]”); 
Amjad Minim, M.D., P.A. v. Avar, M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (“The key element of a continuation is a common identity of the 
officers, directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporation”); 
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga. 1985); Ney-
Copeland & Assocs., Inc. v. Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 862, 862–63 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1980); Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (Ill. 1997) 
(requiring continuity of ownership without listing other non-dispositive 
factors); Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996); Pearson 
ex rel Trent, v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (The court noted 
that there must be continuity of “shareholders [or] management” before 
liability would be imposed, but it did not define the test further); Wolff v. 
Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794 (La. 1916) (Louisiana 
has not adopted the mere continuation exception, but its “continuation 
doctrine” appears to take cognizance of the mere continuation exception that 
requires continuity of ownership); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247 
(N.M. 1997) (noting that the “key element of a ‘continuation’ is a common 
identity of officers, directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing 
corporations”); G.P. Publ’ns., Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul, Inc., 481 
S.E.2d 674, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (indicating that continuity of ownership 
may not be necessary under corporate successorship, but did not clarify to 
which exception this analysis would apply); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 
617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993) (stating continuity of ownership is as a 
threshold requirement but the court expressly limited its holding to contract 
related actions); Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958–59 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (“A continuation demands ‘a common identity of stock, 
directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the 
completion of the transfer’”); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 
1992) (requiring continuity of ownership, then adding that an additional inquiry 
is whether “the purchase of all the assets of a corporation is a bona fide, arm’s-
length transaction.”); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 17–18 
(Wis. 1982) (noting common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders is 
a key element for continuation); California courts require, as a threshold matter, 
inadequacy of consideration; continuity of ownership is a crucial factor. 
Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d 683, 690 (Cal. 1993) 
(requiring a showing of no adequate consideration and some commonality of 
officers, directors, or stockholders and then considering other factors).  
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of ownership as its touchstone (de facto merger type 260), lack of this 
single dispositive element can be understood to provide the key to 
structuring the transaction to avoid the doctrine.  Faced with the threat 
of this type of mere continuation liability, a change in ownership is 
critical.  If prior owners are to have any interest in the successor entity, 
such interest should be as employees or creditors, perhaps with notes 
that are payable based upon contingencies (such as requiring the 
successor to meet revenue targets, among other things). 
c. Type 3:  Non-Dispositive-Factors Mere Continuation 
A number of courts have examined a non-exclusive list of non-
dispositive factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis.  Typically, 
these factors include commonality of directors, officers, or shareholders; 
continuation of business practices; dissolution of the predecessor; 
sufficiency of consideration, and the like.  As with the de facto merger, this 
flexible approach is probably superior in terms of allowing the doctrine 
to operate flexibility as a safety valve to avoid unduly harsh results from 
the strict application of corporate law.  For precisely the same reason, it 
is the least acceptable approach for those who structure and finance 
corporate transactions and desire bright-line rule and safe harbors. 
d. Type 4:  Undefined mere Continuation 
Finally, a number of courts have adopted or recited the existence of 
the exception but appear not to have specifically defined a test.61 
Arizona courts require proof of both insufficient consideration and continuity 
of ownership as a threshold matter.  See A.R. Teeters & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1039-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring 
proof of insufficient consideration and looking at certain other non-dispositive 
factors; a crucial (though non-dispositive) factor is “substantial similarity in the 
ownership and control of the two corporation”).  
 
60 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 
61 Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Evanston Ins. 
Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Sorenson v. Allied 
Products Co., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“An indication that 
the corporate entity has been continued is a common identity of stock, 
directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the 
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2. The Three Species of Continuity of Enterprise 
Unlike the more traditional and long standing mere continuation 
exception, the continuity of enterprise theory does not require strict 
continuity of shareholders or owners (and possibly directors and 
officers) between the predecessor and the successor, although the degree 
or extent of continuity of owners, directors and officers is a factor.62  
Further, continuity of enterprise generally does not require dissolution of 
the predecessor upon or soon after the sale, which is often a factor, and 
sometimes a requirement, in jurisdictions applying the mere continuation 
doctrine.63 
A detailed examination of continuity of enterprise in the 
jurisdictions that have adopted it discloses three sub-species at work.  All 
completion of the transfer.”) (emphasis added); Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc. No. 
023898BLS, 2003 WL 22133177, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003) (“[T]he 
de facto merger exception subsumes the continuation exception.”); Paradise Co. 
v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Bielagus v. EMRE of 
New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Schumacher v. 
Richards Shear Co., Inc., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); Downtowner, Inc. 
v. Acromental Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Davis v. Loopco 
Indus., Inc., 609 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ohio 1993) (expressly declining to adopt a 
test for the mere continuation exception for product liability cases); Pulis v. 
U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 71 (Okla. 1977); Erickson v. Grande Ronde 
Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. 1939); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 
S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 
515, 518 (S.D. 1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. 
E2000-02699-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 
2001); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Co., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); In re State 
Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W. Va. 1994); Polius v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (D.V.I. 1985). 
 
62 Mozingo v. Correct Mfg., 752 F.2d 168, 174–75 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
the traditional mere continuation exception requires identity of stockholders, 
directors and officers); see also Savage Arms Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, Co., 18 
P.3d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001) (mere continuation theory requires “the existence of 
identical shareholders”). 
 
63 See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 1976) 
(dissolution of the seller soon after the sale one of four enumerated factors 
indicating continuity of enterprise). 
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the variations of the continuity of enterprise exception derive from 
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.64  Variations in the application of the Turner 
factors create the three sub-species. 
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the four 
traditional categories of successor liability and, in so doing, developed a 
continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.65  The court adopted 
the rule that, in the sale of corporate assets for cash, three criteria would 
be the threshold guidelines to establish whether there is continuity of 
enterprise between the transferee and the transferor corporations:  (1) 
“There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, 
assets, and general business operations;” (2) “[t]he seller corporation 
ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon 
as legally and practically possible;” and (3) “[t]he purchasing corporation 
assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary 
for the interrupted continuation of normal business operations of the 
seller corporation.”66 
The Turner court went on to state that: 
Because this is a products liability case, 
however, there is a second aspect on 
continuity which must also be considered.  
Where the successor corporation 
represents itself either affirmatively or, by 
64 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). 
 
65 Id. at 878–79. 
 
66 Id. at 879 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., Div. of Harris-Intertype 
Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 103–05 (N.J. 1970), aff’d, 288 A.2d 585 (1972)).  These are 
three of the four factors from McKee used to determine whether liability will 
arise under the de facto merger form of successor liability. The court in Turner 
decided that the absence of the factor omitted in this article—that “[t]here is a 
continuity of shareholders which results from the Purchasing corporation 
paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately 
coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they 
become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.”—should not be 
conclusive. Id. at 880. 
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omitting to do otherwise, as in effect a 
continuation of the original 
manufacturing enterprise, a strong 
indication of continuity is established.67 
If continuity is established, “then the transferee must accept the 
liabilit[ies] with the benefits.”68  Thus, when applying its rule, the Turner 
court stated that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of 
“continuation of corporate responsibility for products liability” by 
proving: 
(1) There was basic continuity of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, 
including, apparently, a retention of key 
personnel, assets, general business 
operations, and even the [corporate] 
name.  (2) The seller corporation ceased 
ordinary business operations, liquidated, 
and dissolved soon after distribution of 
consideration received from the buying 
corporation.  (3) The purchasing 
corporation assumed those liabilities and 
obligations of the seller ordinarily 
necessary for the continuation of the 
normal business operations of the seller 
corporations, (4) The purchasing 
corporation held itself out to the world as 
the effective continuation of the seller 
corporation.69 
In Turner the showings are presented as “guidelines,” making it 
somewhat ambiguous as to whether they were required elements, non-
exclusive factors, or if they were to be weighed and balanced. 
67 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882. 
 
68 Id. at 883. 
 
69 Id. at 883–84. 
 
                                                          
778       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
 The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the limits of the 
continuity of enterprise exception again until 1999 in Foster v. Cone-
Blanchard Mach. Co.70  In Foster, a plaintiff, injured while operating a feed 
screw machine, sued the corporate successor after receiving a $500,000 
settlement from the predecessor corporation.71  The court held that 
“because [the] predecessor was available for recourse as witnessed by 
plaintiff’s negotiated settlement with the predecessor for $500,000, the 
continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability is inapplicable.”72 
 The Foster court thus resolved two issues left open in Turner.  
First, the Michigan appellate decisions prior to Foster cited Turner for the 
proposition that the continuity of enterprise test was comprised of four 
elements or factors, following the four items enumerated in the Turner 
70 597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999).  In the interim, the court cited Turner in three 
decisions, none of which clarified the key Turner holding.  Jeffrey v. Rapid Am. 
Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644, 656 (Mich. 1995) (citing Turner for the proposition that 
corporate law principles should not be rigidly applied in products liability 
cases); Stevens v. McLough Steel Prods. Corp., 446 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Mich. 1989) 
(citing Turner as a case where the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the 
doctrine of successor liability in the context of a products liability suit); Langley 
v. Harris Corp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664–65 (Mich. 1982) (citing Turner for the 
proposition that an acquiring corporation maybe held liable for products 
liability claims arising from activities of its predecessor corporation under a 
continuity of enterprise theory but then holding that the Turner rationale will 
not allow a corporation to seek indemnity from the plaintiff’s employer in a 
products liability suit).  One appellate court decision between Turner and Foster 
concluded that satisfying the fourth consideration in Turner (the purchasing 
corporation’s holding itself out as a continuation of the selling corporation) was 
not sufficient for a finding of successor liability where the first three 
considerations were not met.  The court noted that to impose successor liability 
in such circumstances would effectively be an adoption of the broader “product 
line exception.”  Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1981) (finding where a successor bought only 8% of the assets of 
another corporation in a bankruptcy sale and did not meet the first three 
criteria of Turner but held itself out as a continuation of the liquidating 
corporation, the mere continuation test was not satisfied). 
 
71 Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Mich. 1999). 
 
72 Id. 
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court’s holding and not the three listed in its announcement of the rule.73  
The Foster court clarified that, in fact, only three items are involved in the 
Turner rule, and they are required elements: 
Turner held that a prima facie case of 
continuity of enterprise exists where the 
plaintiff establishes the following facts:  
(1) there is continuation of the seller 
corporation, so that there is a continuity 
of management, personnel, physical 
location, assets, and general business 
operations of the predecessor 
corporation; (2) the predecessor 
corporation ceases its ordinary business 
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
soon as legally and practically possible; 
and (3) the purchasing corporation 
assumes those liabilities and obligations 
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the selling 
corporation.  Turner identified as an 
additional principle relevant to 
determining successor liability, whether 
the purchasing corporation holds itself 
out to the world as the effective 
continuation of the seller corporation.74 
In a footnote, the Foster court recognized the relationship between the 
three necessary elements for continuity of enterprise and the fourth 
73 Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. Sorensen-Gross Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 221, 
225–26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 105 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc. 285 N.W.2d 402, 406 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 618; State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Pitney Bowes Mgmt Ser., Inc., No. 205164, 1999 WL 33451719, at *1 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1999). 
 
74 Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 510 (emphasis added). 
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“separate and relevant inquiry”—whether the purchasing corporation 
holds itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller 
corporation: 
This principle has been called the fourth 
guideline of the Turner continuity of 
enterprise analysis.  However, we note 
that a truer reading of Turner suggests that 
the first three guidelines were intended to 
complete the continuity of enterprise 
inquiry where there is a sale of corporate 
assets.  Turner went on to identify as a 
separate and relevant inquiry whether a 
purchasing corporation holds itself out as 
the effective continuation of the seller.75 
It is not readily apparent what this “separate and relevant inquiry” is to 
be used for under Foster.  Thus, after Foster, a plaintiff alleging successor 
liability under the continuity of enterprise exception must only establish 
the three articulated elements.76 
 Second, the Foster court held that the “‘continuity of enterprise’ 
doctrine applies only when the transferor is no longer viable and capable 
of being sued.”77  The court’s interpretation of the underlying rationale 
of Turner was “to provide a source of recovery for injured plaintiffs.”78  
According to Justice Brickley, the Turner court expanded liability based 
on the successor’s continued enjoyment of “certain continuing benefits”:  
“[T]he test in Turner is designed to determine whether the company (or 
‘enterprise’) involved in the lawsuit is essentially the same company that 
was allegedly negligent in designing or manufacturing the offending 
75 Id. at 510 n.6 
 
76 Meram v. Clark Refining & Mktg., Inc., No. 221342, 2001 WL 1606883, at *2 
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (quoting Foster, 597 N.W.2d). 
 
77 Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511. 
 
78 Id. Justice Brickley, in dissent, disagreed with the majority as to the underlying 
rationale of Turner. 
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product.”79  Furthermore, the dissent stated that the Turner court had 
explained that the policy basis for the continuity of the enterprise 
requirement was that “the enterprise, the going concern, ought to bear 
the liability for the damages done by its defective products.”80  The court 
reasoned that, because “[the] enterprise enjoys certain continuing 
benefits, such as goodwill and expertise, [it must] also accept continuing 
responsibility for the costs that the enterprise has imposed on society 
through its negligence.”81  Therefore, the majority relies upon the policy 
of providing plaintiff with a recovery as the fundamental basis for 
extending successor liability under Turner whereas the minority would 
impose successor liability where the successor enjoys the continuing 
benefits of the enterprise.82 
 The dissent notwithstanding, the Foster decision appears to return 
Michigan law to its state immediately after Turner was decided:  
continuity of enterprise is a recognized doctrine of successor liability and 
the doctrine has three required elements.  To the extent that intervening 
decisions had narrowed Turner with the addition of a fourth factor—
whether the purchasing corporation holds itself out to the world as the 
effective continuation of the seller corporation—that revision of the 
doctrine appears to have been reversed.  Further, to the extent that 
Turner’s “guidelines” had been considered factors by other courts 
adopting the continuity of enterprise, the Foster court made it clear that 
the rule was to be comprised of elements. 
a. Type 1:  Element-based Continuity of Enterprise 
Some courts apply the Turner factors as elements.83  As with 
other rigid, element-based forms of successor liability, this renders the 
79 Id. at 513; Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Mich. 
1976). 
 
80 Id. at 513–14 (citing Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 876). 
 
81 Id. at 514. 
 
82 See id. 
 
83 Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599–600 (Ala. 1995); Foster, 597 
N.W.2d at 510 (Michigan courts also consider, to the extent discussed above, 
                                                          
 
782       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
doctrine susceptible to the “draft around.”  Structuring the transaction to 
avoid continuities of the seller business with the same management, 
personnel, assets and location, will defeat the first element.  That, 
however, is probably an acceptable result.  It is this continuity that 
suggests successor liability is appropriate in some sense; if the 
constituent parts are at fault in some way and they continue to operate, 
then subjecting the new whole of which they are part to liability has 
some legitimacy.  For requirements two and three, predecessor cessation 
of operations and liquidation and successor assumption of ordinary 
course of business debts of the predecessor, both of these required 
elements can be structured around by requiring the predecessor to 
remain in existence and to operate some business with the proceeds of 
the sale, perhaps even as a passive investor, and forcing the predecessor 
to pay claims against it out of sale proceeds rather than having the 
successor entity assume them.  To allow a successor to escape liability 
because of a structure that adopts these features is to elevate form over 
substance. 
b. Type 2:  Factor-based Continuity of Enterprise 
When continuity of enterprise is defined by a factor-based test 
lacking required elements, it bears a striking resemblance to factor-based 
de facto merger and factor-based mere continuation.  Courts using this 
test look for evidence of the following key factors:  (1) continuity of key 
personnel, assets, and business operations; (2) speedy dissolution of the 
predecessor corporation; (3) assumption by the successor of those 
predecessor liabilities and obligations necessary for continuation of 
normal business operations; and (4) continuation of corporate identity.84  
an additional factor identified in Turner: “whether the purchasing corporation 
holds itself out to the world as ‘the effective continuation of the seller 
corporation.”); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 
242, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1985) (neglecting to cite the fourth 
“consideration” of Turner and relaxing Turner’s requirement of prompt 
dissolution). 
 
84 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55;  see also Paradise 
Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2003). 
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It is likely that, although sporting different names in different 
jurisdictions, factor-based de facto merger, mere continuation, and 
continuity of enterprise are, really, the same species of successor liability. 
E. The Product Line Exception of Ray v. Alad 
In Ray v. Alad,85 the California Supreme Court recognized the 
product line exception to the general rule of successor non-liability.  It is 
a species of liability that is very similar to continuity of enterprise.  The 
court articulated the following “justifications” for imposing liability on a 
successor corporation: 
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s 
remedies against the original 
manufacturer caused by the successor’s 
acquisition of the business, (2) the 
successor’s ability to assume the original 
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and 
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor 
to assume a responsibility for defective 
products that was a burden necessarily 
attached to the original manufacturer’s 
goodwill being enjoyed by the successor 
in the continued operation of the 
business.86 
[Continuity of enterprise] considers the traditional [mere 
continuation] factors as well as other factors such as:  (1) 
retention of the same employees; (2) retention of the same 
supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production 
facilities in the same physical location; (4) production of the 
same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) successor 
holds itself out as the continuation of the previous enterprise. 
 
85 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). 
 
86 Id. at 9. 
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The term “justifications” is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
it connotes the balancing of required elements or non-exclusive factors, 
much like the Turner guidelines. 
Like the Michigan Supreme Court in Foster, which revisited Turner some 
years after the original opinion was issued, the California Supreme Court 
referred to these three justifications as conditions, thus suggesting that 
they were essential elements under the product line exception.  Despite 
its name, the product line theory of successor liability appears only rarely, 
if at all, to have been applied in a reported decision to a successor that 
had acquired merely one of many product lines from the predecessor; in 
nearly all reported cases, it appears to have been applied to sales of 
substantially all of a predecessor’s assets.87  In fact, one court has 
emphasized that the “policy justifications for our adopting the product 
line rule require the transfer of substantially all of the predecessor’s 
assets to the successor corporation.”88 
The product line doctrine, where accepted, breaks into three 
distinct sub-species.  The first two differ only as to whether Ray’s “virtual 
destruction of the plaintiff’s [other] remedies”89 condition is strictly 
required in order to permit recovery.  The third type is too ambiguously 
defined to analyze. 
1. Type 1:  Causation By Destruction of Other Remedies Requirement 
Some courts include in the conditions in Ray, a requirement that 
“the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s remedies against the original 
manufacturer have been caused by the successor’s acquisition of the 
business.”90  This requirement is said to limit the product line doctrine to 
87 George W. Kuney & Donna C. Looper, Successor Liability in California, 20 CEB 
CAL. BUS. L. PRACT. 50 (2005). 
 
88 Hall, 692 P.2d at 791 n.1 (refusing to apply product line test to successor that 
purchased but one of many asbestos product lines). 
 
89 Ray, 560 P.2d at 9. 
 
90 Id.; see also Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, 
at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Garcia, 933 P.2d at 249; In re Seventh 
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situations where two sets of facts are present that justify application of 
the doctrine and imposition of successor liability.  First, the product line 
rule is said to be one of necessity and should only be applied when the 
successor is the only source of relief for the plaintiff.91  “Second, 
elemental fairness demands that there be a causal connection between 
the successor’s acquisition and the unavailability of the predecessor.”92  
A sale of substantially all the assets of a business satisfies these twin 
requirements; sale of a single product line of many may not.93  This 
approach to the product line doctrine renders it virtually identical to type 
1 element-based continuity of enterprise.94 
2. Type 2:  No Causation By Destruction of Other Remedies 
Requirement 
Other courts apply the conditions in Ray without requiring that 
the purchasing corporation cause the destruction of the plaintiff’s 
remedy.95  These courts focus on the necessity of providing recovery for 
imposing liability on the successor because of its “‘enjoyment of [the 
original manufacturer’s] trade name, good will, and the continuation of 
an established . . . enterprise.’”96  A Pennsylvania court, after examining 
Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); 
Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 249 (N.M. 1997); Hall, 692 P.2d at 790. 
 
91 Hall, 692 P.2d at 792. 
 
92 Id at 791. 
 
93 See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 249 (adopting Ray v. Alad and discussing justifications 
for product line and continuing enterprise liability). 
 
94 See Ray, 560 P.2d at 9. 
 
95 LeFever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 298–99 (N.J. 1999); 
Dewejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) 
(Pennsylvania courts consider the three Ray conditions as well as additional 
factors). 
 
96 LeFever, 734 A.2d at 299 (quoting Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 
709 A.2d 779, 785 (153 N.J. 371, 384 (N.J. 1988) (Pollock, J., dissenting) (other 
citations omitted)). 
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whether it was better to expand the mere continuation doctrine or adopt 
the product line doctrine, decided upon the latter course and deliberately 
chose to cast off any remnants of corporate formalism that would attend 
a required element based test: 
We also believe it better not to phrase the 
new exception too tightly.  Given its 
philosophical origin, it should be phrased 
in general terms, so that in any particular 
case the court may consider whether it is 
just to impose liability on the successor 
corporation.  The various factors 
identified in the several cases discussed 
above will always be pertinent – for 
example, whether the successor 
corporation advertised itself as an 
ongoing enterprise, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.; 
or whether it maintained the same 
product, name, personnel, property, and 
clients, Turner v. Bituminous casualty Co.; or 
whether it acquired the predecessor 
corporation’s name and good will, and 
required the predecessor to dissolve, 
Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp..  
Also, it will always be useful to consider 
whether the three-part test stated in Ray v. 
Alad Corp. has been met.  The exception 
will more likely realize its reason for 
being, however, if such details are not 
made part of its formulation.97  
 
 
3. Type 3:  Ambiguous 
97 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 106.  
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Georgia and Indiana have both commented upon the product 
line exception, arguably favorably, without expressly adopting it.98 
F. Commentary:  The Status of the Continuity Doctrines 
The continuity doctrines—continuity of enterprise, product line, 
and the expansive form of mere continuation—have much in common 
and some critical differences that are discussed below. 
1. Continuity of Enterprise Liability:  Must the Predecessor be 
Defunct? 
One of the main points of difference amount courts adopting 
continuity of enterprise is whether the predecessor must have become 
defunct, in some sense.  Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,99 is the ovular 
case for the continuity of enterprise theory and it includes dissolution of 
the predecessor as a factor, noting that if the predecessor “legally and/or 
practically becomes defunct. [The injured person] has no place to turn 
for relief except to the second corporation.”100  The court set forth the 
following as “guidelines”101 in determining whether there is sufficient 
continuity between the predecessor and the successor: 
(1) There is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations[;] 
98 See Farmex v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the 
product-line exception was not applicable because the purchaser did not 
continue to manufacture the product that injured the plaintiff after the asset 
purchase); Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., 725 N.E.2d 479, 483–87 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000) (declining to adopt the product line exception because it would not 
aid the plaintiff in that case because the predecessor corporation continued to 
exist). 
 
99 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). 
 
100 Id. at 878. 
 
101 Id. at 883. 
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(2) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary 
business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
soon as legally and practically possible[;] 
(3) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of the normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation[; and] 
(4) The purchasing corporation [holds] 
itself out to the world as the effective 
continuation of the seller corporation.102 
There is variation within the continuity of enterprise species of 
successor liability on the point of whether the predecessor entity must 
actually be dissolved for liability to attach and recovery against the 
predecessor to occur.  Some courts allow recovery against the successor 
without addressing whether or not the predecessor dissolved.103 
 At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have held there 
can be no successor liability unless the predecessor is completely 
102 Id. at 883–84 (emphasis added).  This presentation makes the continuity of 
enterprise exception appear extremely similar to the doctrines of de facto merger 
and the product line exception.  At least as originally conceived, the three 
species of successor liability, especially when one considers their local 
subspecies in various jurisdictions, may actually represent one broadly defined 
category of successor liability.  See supra note 94–96 and accompanying text 
regarding similarity of product line liability to the continuation of the business 
doctrines. 
 
103 See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 173, 175–76 (5th Cir. 
1985) (products liability action allowed to proceed against successor under 
continuity of enterprise theory where the successor “splitoff” from an extant 
predecessor; applying Mississippi law). See generally Holloway v. John E. Smith’s 
Sons, 432 F. Supp. 454, 454–56 (D.S.C. 1977) (unclear whether the predecessor 
ceased operations, liquidated or dissolved). 
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dissolved (regardless of whether or not it has merely ceased ordinary 
business operations and exists only as a legal, not a practical, matter).104 
 Other courts consider whether the predecessor remains a viable 
entity capable of providing relief—if it is, then there can be no recovery 
against the successor; if not, then successor liability will lie.105  While 
failure of the predecessor to dissolve may not be fatal in every action for 
continuity of enterprise successor liability, especially where the 
predecessor remains a viable source for recourse, this is generally fatal to 
the successor’s liability.106  This appears to be the most rational approach 
in terms of the policies underlying successor liability.107 
 Notably, some opinions that make strong statements regarding 
the requirement that the predecessor be dissolved—or that are cited by 
courts and commentators for that proposition—are based on cases in 
which the predecessor has not only failed to dissolve, but remained 
operating and viable.108  This being so, it is hard to conclude that 
104 See Asher v. KCS Int’l Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995) (citing Matrix-
Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1984) for the rule that “the 
corporation must cease ordinary business operations, liquidate, and dissolve.”).  
If this approach is taken, it is fairly easy for the asset sale transaction to be 
structured to avoid liability:  Simply require that the predecessor remain in 
existence, even as a corporate shell for some period of time such as ten or more 
years to provide protection for the successor and avoid application of the 
continuity of enterprise doctrine.  This would seem to elevate form over 
substance by providing a convenient bright-line rule. 
 
105 See Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Mich. 1999) 
(stating the thrust of Turner was “to provide a remedy to an injured plaintiff in 
those cases in which the first corporation ‘legally and/or practically becomes 
defunct.’”). 
 
106 See Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 
107 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976); Foster, 
597 N.W.2d at 511.   
 
108 See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 859, 862 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(applying New York law, the court stated that under Turner “the injured 
plaintiff must have been deprived by the asset transaction of an effective remedy 
against the predecessor corporation that actively manufactured the product 
causing the injury” (emphasis in original)—in that case, the predecessor 
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dissolution of the predecessor is, or should be, required.109  Rather, the 
focus should be upon whether the predecessor represents a meaningful 
or substantial source of payment or recovery. 
2. Continuity of Enterprise Does Liability Only Lie If There is No 
Available Remedy Against the Predecessory Entity? 
In a similar vein to whether dissolution of the predecessor is 
required for liability to attach to the successor, the availability of a 
remedy against the predecessor has also been held relevant to the 
continuity of enterprise species of successor liability—but it is not a 
required element.  It is the quality of the remedy available from the 
predecessor that should be evaluated and taken into consideration.  
Availability of relief against the predecessor is considered relevant 
because one of the rationales underlying the continuity of enterprise 
exception is that successor liability should lie where the predecessor 
becomes defunct, and the injured party “has no place to turn for relief 
except to the second corporation.”110  Moreover, federal courts, in 
continued to operate and “maintain[] a substantial ongoing sales and 
manufacturing presence . . . .”); Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97, 
102–03 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (court notes that continuity of enterprise exception 
applies, inter alia, where the “original entity ceased its ordinary business 
operation by dissolving promptly after the transaction” and holds the doctrine 
not available because the predecessor “remains in existence”—there, the 
predecessor sold its subsidiary and the subsidiary’s assets, and the court noted 
the plaintiff was not without a remedy against the predecessor); McCarthy v. 
Litton Indus., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Mass. 1991) (stating that even if the 
broader continuing enterprise exception were applied, there would be no 
successor liability because “dissolution of the predecessor [was] required” and 
not met—there, in that case the predecessor continued to operate and 
manufacture electrical components); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 
507 N.E.2d 331, 340 (Ohio 1987) (citing Turner and stating that cases applying 
the continuity of enterprise doctrine require the predecessor to be dissolved or 
liquidated soon after the transfer of assets—there, the predecessor continued 
after the sale “as an active, viable operation”). 
 
109 Judge Posner notes as much in Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. 
Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2005), in which the predecessor was being 
maintained as a “shell in good standing” by the successor precisely to attempt 
to afford protection from continuity liability. Brandon, 419 F.3d at 600. 
 
110 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878. 
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dealing with labor and CERCLA cases, apply the similar “substantial 
continuity” theory of successor liability and also hold that the ability of a 
creditor or plaintiff to recover against the predecessor is an important 
factor.111 
Finally, the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania district courts have 
held that under Pennsylvania’s product line continuation exception, there 
can be no successor liability remedy afforded by filing a claim in 
bankruptcy proceedings.112  There appear to be no cases outside of 
Pennsylvania or applying other than Pennsylvania law that hold the 
existence of any “potential” remedy, even if not actual or realized as a 
practical matter, is required for successor liability.  Moreover, it appears 
that the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania district courts are misconstruing 
Pennsylvania law.  This draconian rule is derived from Conway, a case in 
which the plaintiff had an effective remedy in the bankruptcy proceedings 
due to available insurance coverage and the existence of a special fund, 
but did not attempt to file even a late claim when he learned of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.  The Conway court held that “Pennsylvania law 
would preclude successor liability where the plaintiff failed to make any 
effort to assert his potentially available remedies in bankruptcy or in a 
 
111 See Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(successor liability for delinquent pension fund payments and withdrawal 
liability);  see also Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 
1996) (sexual harassment under Title VII); Central States, Se. and Sw. Areas 
Pension Fund v. Wiseway Motor Freight, No. 99 C 4202, 2000 WL 1409825, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2000) (pension withdrawal liability); Anderson v. J.A. 
Interior Applications, Inc., No. 97 C 4552, 1998 WL 708851, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 28, 1998) (successor liability for delinquent employee benefit 
contributions); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers, 195 B.R. 716, 
724, 726–27, 730–31 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (court held that the successor is not 
liable where the predecessor is a viable company capable of providing relief, 
and under section 363, the successor, whether viable or not, is not liable for any 
claim that could have been brought during the bankruptcy proceeding). 
 
112 Zerand-Bernal Group v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994); LaFountain 
v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1991); Forrest v. Beloit 
Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Shaffer v. South State Mach., 
Inc., 995 F. Supp. 584, 585–86 (W.D. Pa. 1998). 
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pending lawsuit against the original manufacturer.”113  However, in 
LaFountain v. Webb Industries Corporation,114 the court interpreted Conway to 
mean that the existence of the right to file a claim against the 
predecessor in bankruptcy precluded successor liability under 
Pennsylvania law,115 and subsequent courts have followed this seemingly 
erroneous interpretation.116 
The availability of a remedy against a successor has two disparate 
and competing components.  On the one hand, courts state that 
successor liability is available only where the predecessor cannot provide 
a remedy.117  On the other hand, courts have cautioned against 
“[i]mposing liability on a successor when a predecessor could have 
provided no relief whatsoever”.118 
In terms of required elements or factors for consideration, the 
better approach appears to be to look at the availability of relief against 
the predecessor as simply a factor, to be considered along with all the 
other factors and facts of the case.119  Courts frown on plaintiffs who 
pursue successor liability claims without attempting to pursue potential 
113 Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
 
114 951 F.2d 544. (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
115 Id. at 547. 
 
116 See, e.g., Keselyak v. Reach All, Inc., 660 A.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995) (citing Conway and LaFountain in affirming trial court holding that, “the 
continued existence of a viable cause of action against [the predecessors] 
precluded application of the product line exception so as to permit suit against 
[the successor].”); Kradel v. Fox River Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing Keselyak, which cited LaFountain, for the proposition that “[clearly 
the] inability to recover from an original manufacturer is a prerequisite in 
Pennsylvannia to the use of the product line exception.”).  
 
117 See, e.g., Foster v. Cone-Blanchard, 597 N.W.2d 506, 511. (Mich. 1999). 
 
118 Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750–51 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Unless 
extraordinary circumstances exist, an injured [party] should not be made worse 
off by a change in the business.  But neither should [he] be made better off.”). 
 
119 Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1995).  
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remedies against the predecessor and are likely not to apply the 
“equitable” successor liability doctrine in these circumstances.120  This is 
consistent with the origins of the doctrine as an escape valve for 
satisfaction of liability that would otherwise be suppressed by the general 
no-liability-for-asset-purchasers rule. 
Similarly, in rejecting the Products Liability Restatement’s 
restrictive approach to successor liability and adopting the continuity of 
enterprise species of successor liability, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
noted: 
[T]he Restatement analysis defeats the 
assumptions behind tort law.  We assume 
that meritorious claims will be paid; that 
they are sometimes not paid due to 
insolvency does not change that 
underlying assumption.  To characterize 
as a ‘windfall’ full recovery for losses 
caused by product defects unjustly 
challenges the legitimacy of the injuries 
suffered.121 
Thus, the majority—and probably the better—approach is that courts 
should treat the ability to recover against the predecessor as a factor,122 
not a bar to successor liability.  For example, in Anderson v. J.A. Interior 
Applications,123 a case in which the predecessor was a debtor in an 
ongoing Chapter 7 action, the court rejected the successor’s arguments 
120 See, e.g., Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989); Callahan & 
Sons v. Dykeman Elec. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 208, 226 (D. Mass. 2003) (failure 
to file a claim in a receivership); see also Central States, Se. & Sw. Pension Fund 
v. Wiseway Motor Freight, Inc., No. 99 C 4202, 2000 WL 1409825, at *8 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept 26, 2000). 
 
121 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 57 (Alaska 2001). 
 
122 See Chicago Truck Drivers, 59 F.3d at 51. 
 
123 Anderson v. J.A. Interior Applications, No. 97 C 4552, 1998 WL 708851 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1998). 
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that the successor liability doctrine did not apply because (1) the 
plaintiffs might still recover a portion of their claims in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, and (2) if plaintiffs could not recover anything in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, then allowing them to proceed against the 
successor would amount to a windfall.124  The court noted that the 
“‘continuity’ factors” were overwhelming, and, in light of the important 
“federal interest in ensuring that employers maintain properly funded 
pension plans[,]” successor liability was mandated.125  In other words, 
looking at the totality of the circumstances, including a number of factual 
findings and factors, and weighing the public policy concerns that were 
implicated, the court imposed liability.  This is the essence of the 
successor liability doctrine as originally conceived:  a safety valve that 
prevents an unjust result caused by the strict application of normal 
corporate law rules. 
3. Broad Contraction, Narrow Expansion of the Continuity Doctrines 
The continuity doctrines—continuity of enterprise, product line, 
and the expansive form of mere continuation—are under attack in a 
number of jurisdictions.  Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,126 a case that had 
supported continuity of enterprise’s validity in New Hampshire, is no 
longer good law.127  In Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc.,128 the court 
124 Id. at *6–7 (citing Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, 59 F.3d 48, 50–51 
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
 
125 Id. at *5, 7. 
 
126 501 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 
127 Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 93 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Cyr is no 
longer good law in light of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s express 
rejection of its reasoning.”); see also Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 
159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (under Pennsylvania law there is no successor liability 
where the plaintiff had any remedy against the predecessor, even the limited 
remedy of filing a claim in bankruptcy).   
 
Solely relating to 363(f) claims.  See In re Portrait Corp. of Am., Inc., 406 B.R. 
637, 641 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts in this circuit clearly view section 
363(f) to have a broader reach than Zerand did.”); see, e.g., In re Chrysler, 405 
B.R. at 98; In re Lawrence United Corp., 221 B.R. 661, 668 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1998) (“interests” under section 363(f) are not limited to in rem interests). 
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rejected the product line theory of successor liability129 because risk-
spreading was a primary justification for that theory.130  The court had 
denounced risk-spreading as a justification for imposing strict liability in 
an earlier decision, maintaining that “strict liability is not a no-fault 
system of compensation.”131  The court also stated “to the extent Cyr 
does suggest that we embrace risk-spreading, it is no longer a valid 
interpretation of New Hampshire law.”132  Then, in Bielagus v. EMRE,133 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court continued in this direction and also 
rejected the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability based 
upon its earlier rejection of risk spreading as a basis for imposing strict 
liability.134  This position is noteworthy not just because it states the law 
of New Hampshire, but also because Cyr was an important case and 
courts in twenty-seven other states either accepted it, considered it with 
ambivalence, or disapproved of it.135 
 
128 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988). 
 
129 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 
130 Simoneau, 543 A.2d at 408–09. 
 
131 Id. at 409 (quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845–46 
(N.H. 1978)). 
 
132 Id. at 409. 
 
133 826 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2003). 
 
134 Id. at 569.  In rejecting this position, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
denounced Cyr and Kleen Laundry and Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total Waste 
Mgmt. I (817 F. Supp. 225 (D.N.H. 1993)) & II (867 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.H. 
1994)) to the extent they are cited for the proposition that New Hampshire has 
adopted the continuing enterprise or substantial continuity theory of successor 
liability. 
 
135 Courts in twelve states have cited Cyr favorably, generally adopting either the 
product line or continuity of enterprise exceptions to successor liability.  
Alabama:  Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 786–87 (Ala. 1984) 
(noting that the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the continuity of enterprise 
doctrine in Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979)).  
California:  Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977) (creating the product 
                                                                                                                                        
 
796       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
line exception); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123–24 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1979);  Connecticut:  A.G. Assocs. v. Parafati, No. CVN0041808 NE, 
2002 WL 1162890, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2002) (applying the 
continuity of enterprise exception).  Delaware:  Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 
A.2d 521, 525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).  Georgia:  Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 501 
S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (implicitly adopting the product line exception).  
Kansas:  Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1298–99 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1984) (citing Cyr and performing a continuity of enterprise analysis).  
Massachusetts:  Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 819 
(Mass. 1997) (citing Cyr for the proposition that “there is no requirement that 
there be complete shareholder identity between the seller and a buyer before 
corporate successor liability will attach”).  Michigan:  Turner, v. Bitiminous Cas. 
Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976) (creating the continuity of enterprise 
exception).  New Jersey:  Ramirez, v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 816 
(N.J. 1981) (adopting the product line exception).  New Mexico:  Garcia v. Coe 
Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997) (discussing the underlying policies 
examined in Cyr before adopting the product line exception).  Pennsylvania:  
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 108–10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) 
(citing Cyr with approval and then adopting the product line exception).  
Washington:  Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 385–87 (Wash. 1984) (citing 
Cyr and adopting the product line exception). 
 
 Courts in six states have cited Cyr with ambivalence.  Indiana:  Lucas v. 
Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Cyr for the 
proposition that express rejection of a predecessor’s liability is not dispositive 
of successor liability issue).  New York:  Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 
N.Y.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. 1983) (citing Cyr for the proposition that predecessor 
corporation must “be extinguished” before liability will be imposed on a 
successor).  NOTE:  Other New York decisions not citing Cyr have adopted 
both the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions.  North Carolina:  
Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing Cyr for the proposition that “inadequate consideration for the purchase, 
or a lack of some of the elements of a good faith purchaser for value” is a 
separate exception to the general rule of successor non-liability, but not 
expressly rejecting or adopting this position).  South Dakota:  Groseth Int’l, Inc. 
v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 175 (S.D. 1987) (citing Cyr for the traditional 
exceptions).  Texas:  Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 556 
(Tex. 1981) (citing Cyr for the mere continuation exception without explaining 
the test.).  Wisconsin:  Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Wis. 
1982) (Callow, J. dissenting) (critiquing the Cyr rationale after the majority 
imposes liability under the traditional exceptions). 
 Courts in nine states, generally those adhering strictly to the traditional 
rule of successor non-liability, treat Cyr with disfavor.  Arizona:  Winsor v. 
Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (deferring 
to the legislature on successor liability).  Colorado:  Johnston  v. Amsted Indus., 
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 In opposition to this contracting trend in the spread of 
continuity of enterprise, Alaska fairly recently accepted and strongly 
endorsed the continuity of enterprise theory in the Savage Arms case: 
Thus, whereas the traditional “mere 
continuation” exception depends on the 
existence of identical shareholders, the 
“continuity of enterprise” looks beyond 
that formal requirement and considers the 
substance of the underlying transaction.  
The key factors under the “continuity of 
enterprise: exception, first articulated in 
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., are:  (1) 
continuity of key personnel, assets, and 
business operations; (2) speedy 
dissolution of the predecessor 
corporation; (3) assumption by the 
Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting both the product line 
and continuity of enterprise exceptions).  Florida:  Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 
So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (refusing to adopt the continuity of enterprise 
exception).  Illinois:  Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 895, 
899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that plaintiff’s reliance on Cyr was unfounded 
because continuation in Illinois requires continuity of stock ownership); State ex 
rel. Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980).  Iowa:  Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996) 
(citing Cyr and then holding that Iowa is a “traditional” state).  Maryland:  
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 571–72 (Md. 1991) (expressly rejecting 
any extension of the traditional rule).  New Hampshire:  Bielagus v. EMRE of 
New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 569 (N.H. 2003); Simoneau v. South 
Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988) (stating that, to the extent Cyr 
adopts risk spreading, it is not a valid interpretation of New Hampshire law).  
North Dakota:  Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 
124 (N.D. 1984) (citing Cyr for the proposition that costs from products 
liability should be “borne by those best able to gauge the risks of those costs, 
protect against them, and pass the costs on the consumer,” but holding that any 
extension of the traditional doctrine of successor liability should be undertaken 
by the legislature).  Ohio:  Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 
1133 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing that Ohio courts do not expand the traditional 
exceptions in tort or contract cases).  Virginia:  Harris v. T.I, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 
605, 609–10 (Va. 1992) (expressly rejecting the “product line exception” and 
the “expanded mere continuation exception”). 
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successor of those predecessor liabilities 
and obligations necessary for 
continuation of normal business 
operations; and (4) continuation of 
corporate identity.  This is a limited 
exception that looks past the identity of 
shareholders and directors, and focuses 
on whether the business itself has been 
transferred as an ongoing concern.   
…. 
We also note that permitting successor 
liability under the “continuity of 
enterprise” exception will not discourage 
large-scale transfers so long as anticipated 
successor liabilities do not exceed the 
value of the corporation’s accumulated 
goodwill.  Presumably, many corporations 
will continue to engage in efficient and 
productive transfers, with the purchasing 
firm merely factoring into the purchase 
price the cost of those successor 
liabilities.  When firms contract for an 
asset transfer where the basic enterprise is 
to be continued, they negotiate to a price 
that reflects the fair market value of the 
transfer, taking heed of the risk of future 
claims.  The purchasing firm will value 
any potential successor liability claims at 
least at the incremental cost of obtaining 
insurance coverage against successor 
liability for them.  Where that insurance is 
too expensive or is unavailable, 
negotiations could collapse, and the firm 
will either continue to exist (and be 
subject to liability claims) or liquidate (and 
future victims will receive no recovery).  
But in many cases, we would expect 
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selling and purchasing firms simply to 
negotiate to a rational price that takes 
account of these potential claims.  The 
posited negative effects on the overall 
economy are too indeterminate and 
speculative to outweigh the policy of 
compensating persons injured by product 
defects.136 
Commentators have noted that growth of the product line and 
continuity of enterprise theories began to wane in the 1980s.137  
Although some are optimistic that the expanded exceptions have 
recently received favorable treatment by some courts,138 others recognize 
that “a number of courts have recently refused to extend the traditional 
principles of successor liability in order to compensate plaintiffs.”139  
Regardless of the current state of the law, commentators routinely 
caution businesses to carefully structure asset sales because the law is not 
settled in many jurisdictions.140 
4. The Restatement as Misstatement 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability rejected 
the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.141  The Products 
136 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55, 56–57 (Alaska 
2001). 
 
137 Richard L. Cupp, Jr. Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 
850 (1999). 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 David W. Pollack, Successor Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 1376 PLI/CORP. 
255, 274 (2003). 
 
140 Id. at 288–89;  see also Jo Ann J. Brighton, How Free is “Free and Clear”? A 
Practical Guide to Protection against Successor Liability when Purchasing Assets Out of a 
Bankruptcy Estate, 21 SEP. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 42–43 (Sept. 2002). 
 
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS  LIABILITY § 12, cmts. b, g 
(1998). 
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Liability Restatement’s rejection of the theory—and the product line 
theory—appears premised on the ground that: 
 [a] successor is not within the basic 
liability rule in § 1 of this Restatement: 
‘one who sells or distributes a defective 
product is subject to liability for harm . . . 
caused by the defective product.’ . . .  
When the alleged successor receives value 
in the form of the transferor’s goodwill 
and continues to manufacture products of 
the same sort as manufactured earlier by 
the predecessor, and thus to some extent 
constitutes a continuation of the 
predecessor, the general rule of 
nonliability derives primarily from the law 
governing corporations, which favors the 
free alienability of corporate assets and 
limits shareholders’ exposures to liability 
in order to facilitate the formation and 
investment of capital.142 
Professor Owen has stated, “the Products Liability Restatement will play 
a significant role in helping shape the law of products liability for the 
twenty-first century” and that restatements “tend to influence 
significantly the development of the law, especially in states where the 
law is less developed.”143  However, in his treatise on products liability, 
Owen has also noted that “an increasing number of other courts [in 
addition to the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner . . .] have adopted the 
continuity of enterprise exception.”144  Moreover, Professor Cupp has 
pointed out that the Products Liability Restatement “overstates courts’ 
fondness for the traditional approach” to successor liability and 
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. a 
(1998). 
 
143 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 292 (1998). 
 
144 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19:6, n. 25. 
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understates the number of courts applying the broader continuity of 
enterprise theory (omitting Ohio and Mississippi).145  Indeed, the less 
restrictive continuity of enterprise theory and product line theories are 
applied in almost as many jurisdictions, and probably more actual 
lawsuits, than the traditional approach advocated by the Products 
Liability Restatement.146 
 The Products Liability Restatement appears to run counter to the 
approaches of many states at the time of its issuance.  Rather than 
“restating” the law, at least in this area, the Products Liability 
Restatement appears to have gone ahead of state courts and announced a 
position that was not reflective of the state of the law at the time it was 
adopted. It overstated the “trends” in applying the traditional approach 
over the less restrictive continuity exceptions of enterprise and product 
line theories, and it relied on corporate principles to the exclusion of 
principles underlying tort law.147  It was, however, cited and relied upon 
heavily in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon,148 in which the court states 
“Texas strongly embraces the non-liability rule.”149  On the other hand, 
145 Cupp, supra note 135 at 857; see also Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply 
Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56–58 (Alaska 2001).  Since then, South Carolina has rejected 
continuity of enterprise even while finding that Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) sales 
do not preempt state successor liability laws.  Simmons v. Mark-Lift Indus., 622 
S.E.2d 213, 223 (S.C. 2005).  
 
146 See Cupp, supra note 135, at 856–57, 894 (suggesting that the predictions of 
“serious future consequences” of the less restrictive approaches broadly applied 
are outdated).  
 
147 See, e.g., Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56–58 (Alaska 
2001); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976) 
(stating that successor liability cases should be “decided on products liability 
principles rather than simply by reexamining and adjusting corporate law 
principles”); Cupp, supra note 135, at 856–57, 894.  
 
148 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 
149 Id. at 139; cf. Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 825 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the “majority” of courts follow the traditional 
mere continuation rule and citing the Restatement section 12 and  Pearson v. 
Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (referring to “Restatement 
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the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the Restatement (Third) approach in 
Savage Arms.150 
G. Statutory Abolishment – One Last Approach 
Texas has adopted a statute that limits successor liability to 
express assumption and statutory mergers.151  The statute was passed 
expressly to legislatively overrule common law successor liability 
doctrine.152  While this standard is probably the most efficient to 
administer in terms of cost—“just say no”—it is inflexible and invites 
sharp drafting, thereby providing little or no recourse to involuntary 
creditors who have no place at the table when the transactional 
documents are being prepared. 
H. So What is Successor Liability, Really? 
1. Is it a Type of Fraudulent Conveyance Liability? 
In her article Making Sense of Successor Liability,153 Professor Reilly 
suggests that, except for express assumption, the basis of common law 
forms of the successor liability is to serve the same purpose as fraudulent 
transfer law:  protecting a predecessor’s creditors from the effect of a 
(Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 12 (1998) for a general review of 
successor-in-interest liability”)); New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 260 A.D.2d 
174, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (citing “Restatement 3d § 12 comment b and 
note thereto” and stating “[w]ere the question open, we would decline to adopt 
the “product line” approach as a radical change from existing law implicating 
complex economic considerations better left to be addressed by the 
legislature”). 
 
150 Savage Arms, Inc., 18 P.3d at 56–58; see Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter. 
Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 294–95 (N.J. 1999); Saez v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. 
Co., 695 A.2d 740, 746–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
 
151 TEX. BUS.  CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.254(b) (West 2007). 
 
152 See C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 768, 791–92 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 
153 Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 
748–49 (2003). 
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transfer that, in some sense, defrauds them.  In this, she tends toward 
general agreement with the premises of this article:  all forms of 
successor liability stem from circumstances when the corporate rule of 
no-liability-for-asset purchasers should not be honored because it is 
somehow wrong, unjust, or inequitable in a particular case;154 each 
individualized doctrine should thus, be comprised of a set of flexible 
factors that help to define the appropriate case for imposition of liability 
and prevent sharp lawyering and the draft around from defeating this 
purpose.  Her focus on fraud as the touchstone for liability, however, 
appears to be too limiting of a threshold.  Fraud is often alleged but is 
difficult to prove.  It is not the courts that must look for fraud, but for 
litigants to prove it.  This presents a higher costly barrier to recovery, 
especially for the class of creditors most in need of the protection of the 
doctrine:  involuntary tort creditors in general—specifically, future 
claimants who can take no action to protect themselves from the effects 
of the transfer.155 
 Further, if actual or constructive fraud is used as the criterion for 
imposing successor liability, haven’t we, in a roundabout way, merely 
changed the remedy for fraudulent transfers from avoidance of the 
transfer or recovery of the value transferred to open-ended liability 
limited only by the successor’s (and, importantly, its insurers’) ability to 
154 To be fair, Professor Reilly would probably not characterize herself as being 
in agreement with this premise, which is here stated more broadly than her 
position.  The author has corresponded about the matter with her.  In her 
article, she explains her view of why certain transfers under certain 
circumstances are “unfair” to the transferor’s creditors by reference to the 
traditional exceptions to protections for good faith purchasers based upon 
fraud.  She describes “fraud” as including the many ways that a transferee and 
transferor can collaborate to manipulate an asset transfer to deny creditors’ 
access to assets to satisfy their claims.  Her point is that unless the courts first 
determine the purpose of successor liability, they will not be able to articulate a 
test or tests that screens for the appropriate circumstances for imposition of 
liability.  In this, she and the author agree. 
   
155 Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the 
Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391, 433 (2015). 
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pay?156  If the remedy for fraudulent transfer liability is to be changed, it 
would be more appropriate to accomplish this directly by modification 
of the statutes of various jurisdictions (generally based upon the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act). Further, fraudulent transfer liability is 
susceptible to evaluation and elimination through careful structuring and 
documentation.  The use of solvency opinions, expert valuations, the 
business judgment rule, and, at least in the bankruptcy context, “creative 
findings of fact and conclusions of law” are enough to plan or draft 
around successor liability in many cases.157 
 If the goal is to promote economically efficient allocation of risk 
of loss between the transferee and transferor, then adopting a bright-line 
rule that allows both to structure the transaction and to avoid liability 
seems to fail the test.  Such a solution allows the parties to render unpaid 
claims against the predecessor—including the involuntary tort claims of 
future claimants—as externalities, to be born by society or the claimants.  
Absent some form of social insurance mechanism, which is likely to be 
politically infeasible, a better rule is a flexible standard that is resistant to 
the “draft around.”158  Such a standard leaves the risk where it belongs, 
on the transferee and transferor, and forces them to address and allocate 
it between them by contract, through the due diligence process, by 
obtaining private insurance or other credit support (guaranties, letters of 
credit, escrowed funds, etc.), and by adjusting the purchase price. 
 
 
156 Conversely, Professor Epstein has suggested capping successor liability by 
limiting it “to the extent of the liquidated firm’s assets (including, of course, any 
insurance)” that have been transferred.  He suggests that the value of these 
assets could be subjected to a multiplier or projected rate of return to determine 
the cap of liability in the future, and admits that “the entire matter is shrouded 
in difficulty.”  Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes:  Individual and 
Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1166–67 (2002). 
 
157 George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FL. ST. 
U. BUS. L. REV. 9, 53 (2007). 
 
158 Id. 
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2. Is it an In Rem Interest in Property? 
Successor liability may appear at first blush to be an interest in 
property.  Thus, it may appear to be solely and wholly derivative of the 
predecessor’s liability because the liability appears to merely follow the 
property to the purchaser, similar to the way in which servitudes running 
with the land will be enforceable against a successor because of the grant 
of servitude by the predecessor.  In the case of a traditional in rem 
interest that runs with the land, like a servitude, the successor is bound 
merely because it takes the property from the predecessor and is on 
actual or constructive notice of the interest.159  This view has been 
advanced to support the creation of a trust with the proceeds of the sale 
that is impressed with the successor claims that would otherwise follow 
the assets to the successor.160  It appears, however, that this is a minority 
position and an example of result-oriented jurisprudence based upon a 
legal fiction. 
 A review of the species of successor liability that act as 
exceptions to the general rule of no-liability-for-asset-purchasers reveals 
that an in rem characterization is incorrect.  Successor liability arises out 
of the liability of the predecessor—and is thus “derivative”—but at the 
same time requires certain actions on the part of the purchaser, not merely 
the purchaser’s acquisition of the property itself—thus it is not “solely 
derivative.”  For this reason, it is different from an in rem interest that 
passes automatically with the property. 
 For example, the successor liability doctrine of express or 
implied assumption of liability is rooted in the actions of the purchaser 
159 Conway v. White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 422 (M. D. Penn. 1988). 
 
160 David Grey Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy:  Some Unifying Themes of 
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and 
Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 121 (1987);  see also In re 
Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Conway v. 
White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 442, 455 n.9 (M.D. Penn. 1988) (barring non-future 
claimant successor liability suit for failure to file a claim and summarizing the 
Carlson’s position as arguing “Section 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Code should be read to permit the foreclosure of future claimants from 
proceeding against successor corporations where a fund is created to which the 
future Plaintiffs’ ratable share of a cash proceeds would be paid.”).  
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agreeing or appearing to agree to assume liability.  That is the additional 
element required from the successor in order to establish liability.  
Similarly, when a de facto merger is found, or when mere continuation of 
an enterprise justifies imposing successor liability, it is the purchaser’s 
post-sale conduct (in continuing the business in substantially the same 
form and manner) that is the necessary final element that gives rise to 
liability.161  The same is true for successor liability founded upon 
fraudulent transfer or continued manufacture of a product line.  All these 
successor liability doctrines are grounded upon a combination of the 
liability of the predecessor plus the acts or implications from acts of the 
purchaser. 
 Further revealing the in personam and not-solely-and-wholly-
derivative nature of successor liability, if the assets are not sold as a unit 
but are nonfraudulently sold to a variety of uses, successor liability will 
not lie.162  The necessary elements of continued operation of the business 
by the successor is missing.  In fact, those purchasers are not 
“successors” at all, they are merely purchasers. 
 An alternative that is consistent with the continuity of enterprise 
and product line species of successor liability as well as the more 
traditional de facto merger and mere continuation species is to view 
successor liability as arising out of the business that is conducted with the 
assets involved.163  Still, this is conduct of the purchaser.  The focus of 
the inquiry is, again, not solely on the assets themselves, but on what is 
being done with them and by whom.  This is the “take the good with the 
bad” argument, also phrased in terms of the successor bearing the 
burden of liability as a quid pro quo to enjoying the goodwill it acquired 
from the predecessor.164  Once the purchaser’s conduct or the use of the 
assets to operate a business matches one of the applicable species of 
161 See Kuney, supra note 155, at 55.  
 
162 Carlson, supra note 158, at 121. 
 
163 See Kuney, supra note 155, at 55. 
 
164 See Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 908 (1983). 
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successor liability, that liability is not capped at the value of the assets as 
they are in the case of an in rem interest like a lien securing a note or in 
the case of a fraudulent conveyable.  Rather, a successful plaintiff can 
pursue collection as to all of the successor’s non-exempt assets and 
insurance coverage. 
3. Successor Liability Evolved from the Collision of Corporate Law and 
Contracts and Tort Liability 
What, then, is the nature of successor liability?  If one steps back 
and looks at all the common-law doctrines from a bit of a distance, one 
common thread remains:  Each of the enunciated standards seeks to 
determine if the circumstances warrant overriding the normal, default 
rule of successor non-liability.  If the contract says the successor will be 
liable, it is fair to enforce the contract.  Likewise, if the successor’s 
conduct implies an assumption of the liability, it is fair to enforce the 
obligation.  If the successor was part of a fraudulent scheme to avoid 
liability, it is fair to allow recovery by the defrauded party by stripping it 
of the normal protections of corporate law.  And when there is a de facto 
merger, a consolidation, or a continuation of a business or when the 
product line exception’s requirements are met, it may be that the 
successor has to bear the bad with the good in order to enjoy the fruits 
of the business acquired.165 
Courts that embrace plaintiff’s entreaties to do substantial justice 
and engage in wide-ranging factual analysis as a test for whether to 
impose successor liability threaten to deprive the commercial world of 
the certainty it desires.  This is true especially with regard to the 
continuity doctrines (de facto merger, mere continuation, continuity of 
enterprise, and product line).  But, examining precedent for guidance, 
attempting to ferret out all claims that may exist in the due diligence 
process, and providing a contractual mechanism for their payment (a 
hold back or adjustment of the purchase price, an escrow, or insurance) 
seems a small price to pay to afford otherwise injured but 
165 George W. Kuney, Jerry Phillips’ Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation 
Liability:  Where are We Twenty Years Later?, 72 TENN. L. REV. 777 (2005). 
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uncompensated parties a means of recovery.166  This is especially so if a 
jurisdiction were to adopt a rule limiting or eliminating punitive damages 
or ensuring that the question of successor liability is a matter for the 
court, not the jury.167  As the old saying goes, “you pay your money and 
166 In a recent article, a commentator on successor liability notes: 
 
If the transferor is still around with sufficient assets to satisfy 
the claims, then the successor liability doctrine is unnecessary.  
Some courts and commentators contend that favoring 
successor liability claimants over general unsecured creditors 
in the bankruptcy sale context violates the priority scheme of 
the federal bankruptcy statute.  Yet, outside of bankruptcy, 
claimants seeking to impose successor liability frequently, if 
not usually, will be among the disfavored class of creditors of the 
transferor.  If a court is considering whether an asset 
purchaser expressly or impliedly agreed to assume certain 
debts, or whether there was a de facto consolidation or merger, 
or whether the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller 
or whether the assets were transferred fraudulently to escape 
liability, more likely than not certain favored creditors, such as 
trade creditors and others holding debts incurred in the 
ordinary course of business, will have been paid  to preserve 
the good will of the going concern.  Indeed, one of the four 
factors upon which the courts typically rely to determine that 
the transferee is “a continuation of the enterprise” of the 
transferor is the “assumption of the ordinary business 
obligations and liabilities by the successor.” 
 
Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales Revisited—New Paradigms, 
61 BUS. LAW. 179, 188 (2005) (emphasis in original) (internal footnotes and 
citations omitted). 
 
167 Although it may seem odd to assess punitive damages against a successor for 
the wrongs of the predecessor, courts have assessed such damages against 
successors, holding that if the successor is liable at all, it is liable for all types of 
damages.  See, e.g., Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Group, 918 F.2d 438, 455–56 
(4th Cir. 1990) (collecting authorities); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. 
M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 106–07 (D.S.C. 1979) (holding that 
the purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendants and others from similar 
conduct in the future).  A more moderate approach is not to impose punitive 
damages on a successor absent a finding of mere continuation, de facto merger, 
or, presumably, continuity of enterprise.  See Lloyds of London v. Pac. Sw. 
Airlines, 786 F. Supp. 867, 869 (C.D. Cal. 1992).  This subject, however, is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
                                                          
 
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   809 
you take your chances.”168  Why change that rule to benefit capital to the 
detriment of future claimants who, by their very nature, can do nothing 
to protect themselves? 
IV. LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY PROMOTES THE “DRAFT AROUND” 
Successor liability began as a narrow set of exceptions to the 
corporate rule of no-liability-in-asset-sale-transactions.  The exceptions 
were extremely fact-specific and generally the result of a flexible, multi-
factor analysis.  Even when the modern continuity doctrines (continuity 
of enterprise and product line) were developed, their initial phrasing was 
in terms of a flexible multi-factor analysis or a set of considerations of 
principles. 
In those jurisdictions that have, by intent or chance, restated or 
interpreted the doctrines in terms of one or more required elements, 
competent counsel can often avoid a later finding of successor liability 
by structuring the transaction so that one or more of the elements is 
missing.  On the mundane level, to avoid a finding that any liabilities 
have been expressly or impliedly assumed, the purchase documentation 
would specify exactly what liabilities were being assumed and expressly 
disclaim assumption of every other liability.  Additionally, all purchaser 
conduct and communications would be screened and, if needed, a 
boilerplate disclaimer added to make sure that they could not be used to 
prove an intent to assume liabilities. 
But on a more sophisticated level, if the predecessor must be 
dissolved in order for the mere continuation form of successor liability 
to lie, then the well-advised purchaser has an incentive to bargain for the 
 
168 Gardener v. Zulu Soc. Aid & Pleasure Club, Inc., 729 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct. 
App. 1999) (The court affirmed a judgment granting defendant’s exception of 
no cause of action in plaintiffs’ suit seeking damages for breach of a contract to 
ride on a float in a Mardi Gras parade.  The float became disabled, and 
plaintiffs took shelter in a church as unruly spectators surrounded the float in 
search of “throw” (prizes).  The court sympathized with plaintiffs’ 
disappointment, but, under the Mardi Gras Parade immunity statute, when it 
came to Mardi Gras parading, plaintiffs paid their money and they took their 
chances.  Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.). 
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seller to remain in existence for some predetermined time period.  The 
purchasers should also provide the proper or other consideration to 
assure that it will.169  If necessary, the successor could require the 
predecessor to remain in some sort of active business using the proceeds 
of sale rather than distributing the proceeds to equity after paying 
existing creditors.  Similarly, if a jurisdiction adheres to the continuity 
doctrine, then the well-advised purchaser has an incentive to characterize 
equity’s share in the new entity as debt, perhaps even convertible debt, 
and to make appropriate changes in management structure.  This model 
can be followed for almost any of the facts that must be shown in 
jurisdictions that have adopted a required elements approach for 
successor liability doctrines.170 
Erecting barriers to a flexible examination of the totality of the 
circumstances within a multi-factor framework when a claim is later 
asserted invites structuring transactions in form, rather than substance, 
169 This appears to be exactly what had occurred in Brandon v. Anesthesia & 
Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 419 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 
170 In fact, merger and acquisition professionals have gone farther than this by 
developing the section 363(f) sale practice in bankruptcy courts.  Briefly, the 
selling company is placed in bankruptcy and an offer to purchase, usually in the 
form of a fully negotiated purchase agreement, is presented to the debtor and 
then to creditors, parties in interest, and the court.  Notice and an opportunity 
for another party (which is generally far behind on the learning curve and facing 
high transaction costs to get up to speed) to overbid is provided.  When the 
sale is approved, counsel for the purchaser (with the cooperation of other 
represented parties) presents the court with a proposed sale order and a set of 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Those documents are signed, 
with or without modification, by the court.  Generally, the proposed 
conclusions of law state that the purchaser is not a successor to the debtor for 
purposes of successor liability doctrines.  This order, if entered without 
modification, becomes final after a 10-day-notice-of-appeal period and is 
binding on all parties in interest nationwide due to the supremacy clause of the 
federal Constitution.  At least one bankruptcy attorney called it “putting the 
business through the shower” to wash off the undisputed so that it can emerge 
clean on the other side.  See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code 
Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 
(2002) (describing the process and practice). 
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to avoid successor liability.171  These structural barriers, then, in turn, 
foreclose recovery by some deserving plaintiffs that would have 
benefited from the use of a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis.  It also hampers reasoned development of the law as the 
structure of transactions changes.  In essence, it allows the transferee and 
transferor to avoid the liability, rendering it an externality to be borne by 
the creditor or society. 
Consider, for example, the commonality of control element of 
the mere continuation species of successor liability.  It is generally 
expressed in terms of a requirement that some or all of the successor’s 
171 Yet arms-length 11 U.S.C. § 363 sales should not bring with them the 
specter of successor liability at all. 
In an article currently being prepared for publication, 
Professor George Kuney will contend that if a bankruptcy sale 
is at arms-length and properly conducted, the purchaser 
should not be subject to successor liability under non-
bankruptcy law.  With regard to certain categories of successor 
liability, that is undoubtedly the case.  If (1) a bankruptcy sale 
to an independent purchaser is adequately documented from 
the purchaser’s perspective (i.e., the asset purchase agreement 
contains language expressly excluding any assumption of 
liability and the bankruptcy court order expressly determines 
that the sale shall be free and clear of successor liability), (2) an 
appropriate evidentiary record is made and (3) the sale is 
otherwise proper under the Code and the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, there would appear to be little risk that 
(a) the purchaser would be found to have assumed successor 
liability, (b) the transaction would be deemed a de facto 
consolidation or merger, or (c) the transaction would be found 
to have been entered into fraudulently to escape liability.  
Thus, in most cases, the primary risk of common law successor 
liability (as distinguished from successor liability predicated 
upon a statute) would appear to be instances where, 
notwithstanding the bankruptcy proceedings, the purchaser 
later is found to be a “mere continuation” of the seller or the 
purchaser is found to have “continued the product line” of the 
seller. 
 
Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability Revisited – New Paridigms, 61 BUS. 
LAW. 179, 188 (2005) (emphasis added, internal footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
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officers, directors, or shareholders have been officers, directors, or 
shareholders to predecessor.172  If this requirement is applied rigidly, it 
will foreclose liability when, for instance, an insolvent business’ secured 
creditors arrange a sale to a captive acquisition subsidiary in which they 
hold an ownership interest, directly or indirectly, because, although they 
controlled the business and the sale, they were “debt holders” of the 
predecessor and “shareholders” of the successor.173  But, as the last 
priority of claimants that were “in the money” in terms of the going 
concern value of the predecessor, their relationship to the business was 
more like that of shareholders rather than debt holders, and a well-
reasoned argument can be made that they should be treated as such.174  
Further, what if, as part of a relationship with others in their industry, 
they arrange to trade off the opportunity to acquire and harvest the value 
from businesses in this situation, by arranging for the sale to take place 
to an acquisition subsidiary owned and controlled by a colleague, in 
exchange for the right to acquire one of the colleague’s distressed 
business/borrowers in the future subject to some “netting” of revenues 
in the future?  Is this the sort of indirect retention of the benefits of a 
business that could, arguably, provide the basis for imposing successor 
liability?  Under a rigid element-based text, or under Professor Reilly’s 
actual fraud standard, no one will bring cases like this.  The transaction 
can be structured to avoid the appearance of a qualifying transaction 
under either rule. 
172 Generally, continuity of enterprise only treats this fact as one of many 
factors to be considered. See supra notes 63–85 and accompanying text. 
 
173 See, e.g., In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(purchaser of secured debt controlled the debtor and caused it to commence a 
Chapter 11 case and move for approval of a chief reorganization officer and a 
usurious DIP financing package that would all but ensure it of successful bidder 
status at planned § 363(f) sale of all assets). 
 
174 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twighlight, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 696 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Natural and Effect of 
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).  
But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner:  An Empirical Study, 82 
WASH. U. L. Q. 1341 (2004). 
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Adoption of rigid standards or preemptive litigation practices like 
those discussed in the bankruptcy court context has a powerful 
narrowing and hampering effect upon the development of successor 
liability and its evolution to confront new and different transactions and 
transactional structures.  It paves the way for dismissal with prejudice 
under a defendant’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion 
before there can be development of the facts—facts that might indicate 
successor liability should lie if a flexible, totality of the circumstances 
analysis were performed.  Whether this is good or bad depends on your 
attitude toward successor liability plaintiffs’ relative rights vis-à-vis 
successor entities, and reasonable minds can differ.  Sunlight, however, 
“is the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman.”175  
Developments that foreclose examination are likely to be breeding 
grounds for fraud and other inequitable conduct.  The apparent 
narrowing of successor liability applicability even as the number of 
successor liability species expands should not pass unnoticed, however. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to detail some of the history and the 
current condition of successor liability law in the United States.  It 
concludes that the purpose of the doctrines was to provide contract and 
tort creditors with an avenue of recovery against a successor entity in 
appropriate cases, such as when the predecessor that contracted with 
them or committed the tort or the action that later gave rise to the tort 
had sold substantially all of its assets and was no longer a viable source 
of recovery.  Its various species acted as a pressure relief valve on the 
strict limitation of liability created by corporate law.  The doctrine is in 
the nature of an “equitable” doctrine insofar as it is invoked when strict 
application of corporate law would offend the conscience of the court.  
In large part, the doctrine remains intact and still serves that purpose. 
 The doctrine has eroded, however, in jurisdictions that have 
adopted tests containing required elements or that have rejected the 
“continuity” doctrines of successor liability.  While failing to adopt the 
“continuity” doctrines may be a laudable example of judicial restraint and 
175 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS 
USE IT 62 (Harper Torchbooks 1967). 
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deference to the legislature’s role as the primary law maker, the courts’ 
conversion of flexible factors to rigid, required elements in generally 
accepted judge-made doctrine does not appear to serve the aims of 
equity or justice.  Rather, it promotes sharp lawyering based upon an 
elevation of form over substance to protect asset purchasers. 
Pacific Gaming Technologies (PGT) 
places VendaTel vending machines in bus 
stations, truck stops, and other places 
where people are likely to buy prepaid 
telephone calling cards.  Unlike ordinary 
vending machines, the VendaTel has a 
“sweepstakes” feature that pays out 
money.  The VendaTel looks like a slot 
machine.  It acts like a slot machine.  It 
sounds like a slot machine.  The trial 
court nevertheless said that it is not a slot 
machine.  In our view, if it looks like a 
duck, walked like a duck, and sounds like 
a duck, it is a duck.  And so it is with this 
duck.  We reverse.176 
Better, it would appear, is a test that recognizes a duck in whatever 
disguise its keepers dress it. 
176 People v. Pac. Gaming Techs., 82 Cal. App. 4th 699, 700 (2004);  see also 
Provost v. Unger, 752 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1990) (“if it looks like a 
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck”); In re North, 128 
B.R. 592, 594 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) (“if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, 
and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck.”); Strength v. Alabama Dept. of 
Finance, 622 So. 2d 1283, 1289 (Ala. 1993) (“if it looks like a duck, walks like a 
duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck.”); Pieper v. Commercial 
Underwrites Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1014 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“‘if it 
looks like a duck, walked like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck’ – not a 
platypus”); cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Humboldt Loaders, Inc., 249 Cal. 
Rptr. 175, 180 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“respondents advanced . . . the 
argument that, ‘if it looks like a duck, if it walks like a duck and if it quacks like 
a duck, it should be treated as a duck.’  [In the context of pleadings,] the 
Legislature has quite clearly stated that no such ‘ducks’ are permitted . . .”); 
Perry v. Robertson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“the tort-
contract action” could be seen as “either as a duck or as a rabbit, . . . depending 
on the will of the viewer.”) 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix to George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of 
Successor Liability, 6 FLA. ST. BUS. L. REV. 9 (2007), last update 
completed June 31, 2013. 
This appendix represents the author’s attempt to explain the 
characteristics of each of the judge-made forms of successor liability in 
the 50 states and other jurisdictions listed.  These presentations should 
be thought of as a set of “field notes” as they are often based on sketchy, 
brief observations of the doctrines in jurisdictions where the reported 
case law is thin or where the state supreme court has not spoken.  As the 
story of Cyr v. Offen in New Hampshire shows, at times, long standing 
assumptions about the doctrine can be quickly reversed or undermined. 
This appendix is updated regularly to track the state of the law in 
this field. Please note that while the author and editors are cognizant of 
the formalities of the blue-book form, we have chosen to abandon the 
use of “Id.” in this appendix in order to avoid confusion between 
multiple layers of citation.  
Comments are welcome and will be incorporated into future 
editions of this document, which can also be found at 
http://www.law.utk.edu/people/george-w-kuney/, under “publications” 
following the article listing for the original article. 
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Alabama 
Alabama recognizes the four traditional exceptions and the 
continuity of enterprise exception to the general rule of successor non-
liability in asset purchases.177  The general rule and traditional exceptions 
are described as follows:   
As a general rule, where one company 
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to 
another company, the transferee is not 
liable for the debts and liabilities of the 
transferor unless (1) there is an express 
agreement to assume the obligations of 
the transferor, (2) the transaction 
amounts to a de facto merger or 
consolidation of the two companies, (3) 
the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to 
escape liability, or (4) the transferee 
corporation is a mere continuation of the 
transferor.178 
In MPI Acquisitions, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the 
state’s successor liability laws were preempted by an order from the 
United States Bankruptcy Court declaring a successor's purchase of the 
177 Prattville Mem’l Chapel & Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 
555–56 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 
781, 785 (Ala. 1979)). But see Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners, 
LLC), No. 11-00049-CG-C, 2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011) 
(“Liability will be imposed on a successor only where: (1) the successor 
expressly or impliedly assumes obligations of the predecessor, (2) the 
transaction is a de facto facto merger, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of 
the predecessor, or (4) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid the 
liabilities of the predecessor.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citing Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).  The 331 Partners case reinforces Alabama’s recognition 
of the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of non-liability as stated in 
the Prattville case.   
  
178 Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 555 (quoting Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785). 
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predecessor's assets to be free and clear of liability for any claims 
involving products manufactured and sold by the predecessor.179 
Alabama:  The Express Assumption Exception 
Unlike many states which include implied assumption in the 
traditional exceptions, Alabama requires “an express agreement to assume 
the obligations of the transferor.”180   In Watts v. TI, Inc., for example, the 
plaintiff argued that a paragraph of the asset purchase agreement entitled 
“Indemnification” constituted an express agreement to assume.171.1  The 
court rejected this argument, stating:  “After reviewing the 
indemnification portion of the asset purchase agreement, we conclude 
that that document, while indicating an agreement to assume some 
existing contractual obligations, does not amount to an express 
agreement to assume future claims in tort.”181  Alabama courts have also 
rejected an implied assumption exception to the extent that a successor 
could be held liable for the predecessor’s liabilities where “the 
purchasing corporation purchased unfilled customer orders, purchase 
orders, and vendor commitments from the selling corporation.”182   
Of note is that courts appear to have confused the application of 
the mere continuation or continuity of enterprise exception with the 
express assumption exception, treating express assumption as merely a 
179 MPI Acquisition, LLC v. Northcutt, 14 So. 3d 126, 128–30 (Ala. 2009) 
(overturning Glenn v. Steelox Bldg. Systems, Inc. 698 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1997)). 
 
180 Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 555 (emphasis added) (quoting Andrews, 
369 So. 2d at 785).  
 
171.1 Watts v. TI, Inc., 561 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala. 1990). 
 
181 Watts, 561 So. 2d at 1060. 
 
182 Asher v. KCS Int’l, 659 So. 2d 598, 600–01 (Ala. 1994) (citing Brown v. 
Econ. Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1992); Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 
So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 1988). 
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factor in analyzing the continuation or continuity of enterprise 
exceptions.183   
Alabama:  The Fraud Exception 
Alabama courts will review the record for evidence of fraud, 
without applying any specific test.184  
Alabama:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Alabama has not developed a specific test for the de facto merger 
exception, and its courts have somewhat combined the de facto merger 
exception with the continuity of enterprise exception.185  In Matrix-
Churchill v. Springsteen, for example, the court stated in finding that an 
asset purchase was a de facto merger that “the trial court doubtless was 
183 Turner v. Wean United, 531 So. 2d at 831(stating in applying the continuity 
of enterprise exception: “The third factor to be considered is whether [the 
successor] expressly assumed the liabilities of [the predecessor] . . . . The 
motives behind the sale of assets in 1961 are not relevant to the question of 
whether there was an express assumption of liability for damages in products 
liability actions.  An assumption of liability would be a strong indicator of 
continuity of enterprise, and its absence here tends to indicate the contrary.”); 
Matrix–Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788 (Ala. 1984) (noting in 
applying the mere continuation exception that “the record does not disclose 
any express agreement between [the successor and predecessor] whereby the 
former was to assume the obligations of [the latter] . . .”); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 
434 So. 2d 766, 772 (Ala. 1983) (applying the continuity of enterprise exception, 
the court stated: “Another factor . . . militates in favor of the imposition of 
liability on Stihl, Inc. [the successor].  Here, Stihl, Inc. expressly assumed 
liability for damages in products liability actions arising out of sales of Stihl 
products by [the predecessor].”); see also Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 556 
(“This Court [in Rivers v. Stihl, Inc.] never stated the four factors of the 
continuation [sic] exception, but based its finding on several ‘factors’ from 
Andrews and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., including an express assumption of 
liabilities.”) (emphasis added).   
184 See Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 788 (“[T]he record does not disclose . . . 
any facts justifying the conclusion that [the successor’s] purchase of [the 
predecessor’s] stock was ‘a fraudulent attempt to escape liability.’”). 
185 See, e.g., Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 786–88 (applying guidelines for 
determining continuity of enterprise to resolve whether there was a de facto 
merger between a predecessor and a successor). 
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applying the ‘basic continuity of enterprise’ test adopted by the Court in 
Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979), 
derived from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 
N.W.2d 873 ([Mich.] 1976) . . . .”186  The court then cited Turner’s three 
“guidelines” for continuity of enterprise in resolving whether the “trial 
court’s finding of a de facto merger between [the predecessor] and [the 
successorwas] supported by the facts[.]”187  After applying the three 
Turner guidelines, the court further blurred the distinction between the 
exceptions: 
Accordingly, there was no "continuity of 
enterprise" by [the successor] in its 
purchase of [the predecessor] in 1969, 
under Andrews, supra, and Rivers, supra.  
What is shown by the record is that [the 
successor] purchased 99.7% of [the 
predecessor’s] stock in 1969 and 
continued to operate it as a separate 
company.  By purchasing substantially all 
of that stock, [the successor] did not 
effect a consolidation or merger which 
could be construed as an implied 
assumption of [the predecessor’s] 
obligations.188 
In Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners, LLC), the federal district 
court recited its restatement of Alabama law on de facto merger: 
 “To find a de facto merger there must be 
continuity of the selling corporation 
evidenced by the same management, 
personnel, assets and physical location; a 
continuity of the stockholders, 
186 Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 786.  
 
187 Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787. 
 
188 Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787–88. 
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accomplished by paying for the acquired 
corporation with shares of stock; a 
dissolution of the selling corporation; and 
assumption of the liabilities.189 The 
bottom line question is whether each 
entity has run its own race, or whether 
there has been a relay-style passing of the 
baton from one to another.”190 
This summary is, of course, from a federal court and should not be 
dispositive as to Alabama state law. 
Alabama:  The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
The Alabama Supreme court explicitly adopted the continuity of 
enterprise exception in Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co.191 Later, 
however, Alabama adopted the Turner v. Bituminous Casualty factors as a 
set of required elements holding that there must be “substantial 
evidence” of each in order to impose successor liability: 
1) There was a basic continuity of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, 
including, apparently, a retention of key 
personnel, assets, general business 
operations and even the [seller’s] name. 
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary 
business operations, liquidated, and 
dissolved soon after distribution of 
189 Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners, LLC), No. 11-00049-CG-C, 
2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (citing Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787). 
 
190 In re 331 Partners, LLC, 2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (quoting 300 Pine Island 
Assocs., LTD v. Steven L. Cohen & Assocs., P.A., 547 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted)).  
 
191 Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979).  
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consideration received from the buying 
corporation. 
3) The purchasing corporation assumed 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
continuation of the normal business of 
the seller corporation. 
4) The purchasing corporation held itself 
out to the world as the effective 
continuation of the seller corporation.192 
Alabama:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Alabama courts have blurred the distinction between the mere 
continuation exception and continuity of enterprise exception, using the 
terms interchangeably and applying the same test for both.  In order to 
show that a successor is a mere continuation of its predecessor, the 
plaintiff must prove that there is substantial evidence of each of the 
continuity of enterprise factors.193  
As the Supreme Court of Alabama explained in Brown v. Economy 
Baler Co.: 
In Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So.2d 
827, 830–31 (Ala.1988) . . . this Court 
addressed [whether] “the transferee 
corporation is a mere continuation of the 
192 Prattville Mem’l Chapel & Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 
555–57 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599–600 
(Ala. 1995) ((quoting Brown v. Econ. Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1992) 
(quoting Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 
1976)) (citing Pietz v. Orthopedic Equipment Co., 562 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1989)) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Alabama cases supported a totality of the 
circumstances test for mere continuation and requiring substantial evidence 
supporting each Turner criterion). 
 
193 Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., 989 So. 2d 513, 519–20 
(Ala. 2008) (citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3); Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 
598, 599–600 (Ala. 1995)  (citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3).  
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transferor”[;] there we referred to it as the 
“continuity of the enterprise test.”  Under 
that test, [transferee] would be a mere 
continuation of [the transferor] if there is 
substantial evidence of each of the 
following factors: 
“1) There was basic continuity of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, 
including, apparently, a retention of key 
personnel, assets, general business 
operations and even the [seller's] name. 
“2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary 
business operations, liquidated, and 
dissolved soon after distribution of 
consideration received from the buying 
corporation. 
“3) The purchasing corporation assumed 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
continuation of the normal business 
operations of the seller corporation. 
“4) The purchasing corporation held itself 
out to the world as the effective 
continuation of the seller corporation.”194 
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has introduced its test by 
stating:  “This court has adopted a four-factor test for determining 
whether a purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling 
corporation.  If there is substantial evidence of each of the four factors, 
194 Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3 (quoting Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827, 
830 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 
244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976) (citations omitted) and citing Pietz v. 
Orthopedic Equipment Co., 562 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1989)). 
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then [the purchasing corporation] may be held liable as a successor 
corporation.”195 
 In a 2010 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of Alabama, 
the court stated that “[t]he indices of a continuation are, at a minimum, 
continuity of directors, officers, and stockholders, and the continued 
existence of only one corporation after the sale of assets”196 and ruled 
“[i]n this case, the minimum indices of continuation are not met.”197  
 In Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., the Alabama 
Supreme Court elucidated the prong of the mere continuation exception 
which requires that the predecessor corporation be dissolved, holding 
the predecessor must be absolutely dissolved in order to satisfy this 
requirement of the test.198 Previously, the trial court had held that where 
a predecessor corporation had no remaining assets, did not pay any 
taxes, and was in the process of dissolution but still made filings with the 
Alabama secretary of state as required by law, the predecessor had 
“effectively dissolved.”199  The Supreme Court reversed, stating “[t]hat 
[though the predecessor] is ‘for all practical purposes dissolved,’ as 
[plaintiff] states in its brief, or ‘effectively dissolved,’ as the trial court 
found in its order, [this] is insufficient.  There must be evidence of 
dissolution.”200 
195 Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 519–20 (quoting Asher, 659 So. 2d at 599) 
(citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 1). 
 
196 In re 331 Partners, LLC, No. 10-00846-MAM, 2010 WL 4676621, at *6 
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2010) (citing Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 
887 N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 2008)).  
 
197 In re 331 Partners, LLC, 2010 WL 4676621, at *6. 
 
198 Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 520–21 (finding that testimony that the 
predecessor may have been dissolved to be insufficient and holding instead that 
“[t]here must be evidence of dissolution”). 
 
199 Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 520–21. 
 
200 Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 521; see also Prattville Mem’l Chapel & 
Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 557–58 (Ala. 2008) (“Although 
the evidence clearly shows that PMG no longer operated the cemetery after it 
was purchased by Jefferson and that Jefferson no longer operated the cemetery 
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Alaska 
In the 2001 Savage Arms case, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
adopted two species of successor liability:  mere continuation and 
continuity of enterprise.201 
In 2002 the Alaska legislature passed a bill (CSHB 499(JUD)) 
that would have expressly overturned the portion of Savage Arms that 
adopted the continuity of enterprise exception; the bill, however, was 
vetoed by the governor.202  Alaska’s attorney general recommended that 
the bill be vetoed, stating, inter alia, “while this bill may be legally 
defensible, we anticipate lengthy and costly litigation to challenge the bill.  
Additionally, we believe that the Alaska Supreme Court properly decided 
the case.”203 
Alaska:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Savage Arms, the court adopted the “traditional” mere 
continuation exception.204   The court stated, “[t]he primary elements of 
the ‘mere continuation’ exception include use by the buyer of the seller’s 
name, location, and employees, and a common identity of stockholders 
and directors.”205    
 
after it was purchased by Memorial Chapel, no evidence shows whether 
Jefferson and PMG dissolved soon after those sales.”). 
 
201 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55–58 (Alaska 2001). 
202 H.B. 499, 22ND LEG., 3RD SPEC. SESS. (Alaska 2002) (vetoed by the 
Governor). 
 
203 Office of the Attorney Gen., Re:  CSHB 499(JUD)—declaring legislative 
intent to reject the continuity of enterprise exception to the doctrine of 
successor liability adopted in Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49 
(Alaska 2001), as it relates to products liability, 2002 WL 32388334, Alaska 
Att’y Gen. (Jun. 11, 2002). 
 
204 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55. 
205 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55. 
                                                                                                                                        
826       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
Alaska:  The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
The Savage Arms court listed the “key factors” under the 
continuity of enterprise exception:  “(1) continuity of key personnel, 
assets, and business operations; (2) speedy dissolution of the predecessor 
corporation; (3) assumption by the successor of those predecessor 
liabilities and obligations necessary for continuation of normal business 
operations; and (4) continuation of corporate identity.”206  The court 
then stated:  “[t]his is a limited exception that looks past the identity of 
shareholders and directors, and focuses on whether the business itself 
has been transferred as an ongoing concern.”207    
Before expressly adopting the continuity of the enterprise 
exception, the court reviewed multiple policy considerations that 
weighed against the exception, ultimately discounting each.208  The court 
then stated, “this new rule will also have the effect of encouraging 
existing corporations to produce safer products, in keeping with the 
public policy goals that underlie product liability law generally.”209  The 
court was also concerned that the traditional exceptions did not 
encourage the shareholders of the predecessor firm to manufacture safe 
products:  
Without successor liability, the original 
shareholders can receive full 
compensation for the current value of the 
firm, without sharing the burden caused 
by any defective products manufactured 
before the sale.  The rule we announce 
today will give manufacturing 
corporations additional incentives to 
market non-defective products, in order 
206 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55–56 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 
N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976)); David W. Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset 
Acquisitions, 1126 PLI/CORP. 85, 103 (1999); 63 AM. JUR. 2d Prod. Liab. § 132). 
 
207 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 56. 
 
208 Id. at 56–58. 
 
209 Id. at 58. 
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to maximize the corporations’ market 
value in event of sale.210 
Arizona 
In Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., the Arizona appellate court 
expressly recognized the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of 
successor non-liability and expressly rejected the continuity of enterprise 
and product line exceptions.211  Thus, the Arizona courts impose liability 
on a successor corporation for the predecessor’s defective product 
where: 
(1) there is an express or implied 
agreement of assumption, 
(2) the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the two 
corporations, 
(3) the purchasing corporation is a mere 
continuation [or reincarnation] of the 
seller, or 
(4) the transfer of assets to the purchaser 
is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping 
liability for the seller’s debts.212 
 After the court listed the various policy considerations in favor 
of and in opposition to the continuity of enterprise and product line 
exceptions, it deferred to the legislature to address and enact either 
exception:  
210 Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
 
211 Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003).  
 
212 Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1044 (quoting A.R. Teeters & Assocs., Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)); see also Warne Invs., 
Ltd. v. Higgins, 195 P.3d 645, 650 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that Arizona 
courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor 
non-liability) (citing Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1039). 
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We find it unnecessary to discuss in detail 
the competing policy concerns involved 
in modifying Arizona’s successor liability 
laws.  It is clear to us, regardless of the 
relative merits of both the present rule 
and the proposed exceptions, that this 
issue is best left to the legislature.213  
The court reasoned that it would “defer to the legislature in its 
representative capacity, because (i) the core issue is one of policy for the 
legislature, (ii) predictability in our commerce should be encouraged, (iii) 
the proposed exceptions modify or minimize fundamental principles of 
tort liability, and (iv) our present rule already allows for liability against 
certain successor corporations.”214   
 The Arizona courts have not developed any tests for the 
express/implied assumption, de facto merger, or fraud exceptions.  As the 
court recently explained in Beals v. Moore, successor liability applies in 
Arizona “only when ‘[a] corporation goes through a mere change in 
form without a significant change in substance[.]’”215  Limits in Arizona 
also ensure that liability is not extended “beyond those entities who are 
causally linked to the defective product by having placed it into the 
stream of commerce.”216 
Arizona:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
“A crucial factor in determining if a successor corporation is a 
mere continuation or reincarnation of a predecessor corporation is 
whether there is a substantial similarity in the ownership and control of 
the two corporations (e.g., identical directors, officers, stockholders, 
213 Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1047. 
 
214 Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1047–50.  
 
215 Beals v. Moore, No. 2 CA-CV 2008-0090, 2009 WL 499531, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Feb. 27, 2009) (quoting Warne Invs., 195 P.3d at 645 (quoting Gladstone v. 
Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 222–23 (Vt. 2005)). 
 
216 Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto Auction, Inc., 155 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2007) (citing Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1048–49). 
 
                                                          
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   829 
goods and services, and location).”217  Arizona, like California, also 
requires proof of “insufficient consideration running from the new 
company to the old.”218  Successor liability in Arizona based on the mere 
continuation exception can be found even if the only assets transferred 
are intangible—e.g. goodwill.219  If mere continuation is found, the 
successor corporation may be held liable for all debts of the 
predecessor.220 
Arkansas 
The Arkansas courts recognize the general rule of successor non-
liability in asset purchases221 and the four traditional exceptions.222  In 
addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court appears to have recognized a 
continuity of enterprise theory without actually using the term.223  In Ford 
217 Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1039–40. (citing Culinary Workers & Bartneders Union 
No. 596 Health & Welfare Tr. v. Gateway Cafe, 91 588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (Wash. 
1979)).  
 
218 Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1040 (quoting Maloney v. Am. Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 
1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (“[B]efore one corporation can be said to be a mere 
continuation or reincarnation of another it is required that there be insufficient 
consideration running from the new company to the old.”); see also Warne Invs., 
195 P.3d at 651 (stating that there must be proof of “insufficient consideration 
running from the new company to the old” to find that a corporation is a mere 
continuation of a predessor) (quoting Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1040). 
 
219 Warne Invs., 195 P.3d at 651–653.  
 
220 Id. at 657. 
 
221 Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995) (citing Fort 
Smith Refrigeration & Equip. Co. v. Ferguson, 230 S.W.2d 943 (Ark. 1950)); 
Granjas Aquanova S.A. de C.V. v. House Mfg., Co., No. 3:07CV00168 BSM, 
2010 WL 2243673, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Jun. 4, 2010) (“The general rule in 
Arkansas is that a purchaser corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of 
the selling corporation.”) (citing Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 903). 
 
222 Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 903 (citing Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. 
Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Ark. 1988)).  
 
223 See Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904 (finding that a common identity of 
managers and employees and a continuity in good production between the 
selling and purchasing corporations was sufficient evidence for a jury to 
consider the continuation exception or the express assumption exception). 
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Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, the court held that the evidence presented was 
sufficient to warrant jury instructions on the “continuation exception or 
the express assumption exception[.]”224  The court noted that although 
the successor’s new owner “was in charge after the purchase, [he] relied 
on employees of the [successor] . . . to continue the day-to-day operation 
of the company.”225 Moreover, the successor’s president and “[o]ther 
managers and employees testified as to their continued employment and 
the continuity in production of goods after the . . . purchase.”226  
California 
 California courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the 
general rule of successor non-liability in asset purchases.227  Importantly, 
the California Supreme Court is also responsible for creating the product 
line exception to non-liability.228     
 
224 Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d. at 904. 
 
225 Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d. at 904. 
226 Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904; see also Granjas Aquanova, 2010 WL 2243673, 
at *3 (“[M]ost jurisdictions that recognize the “mere continuation” doctrine 
emphasize a common identity of officers, directors, and stock between the 
selling and purchasing corporations.”) (citing Swayze, 694 F. Supp. at 622).  In 
addition to these factors, Arkansas courts have applied the exception where 
there is a continuation of management. See Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904 
(considering the common identity of managers between the selling and 
purchasing corporations in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for a 
jury to consider the continuation exception). 
 
227 Daniell v. Riverside Partners I, L.P., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012) (citing,  inter alia, Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)) (noting that 
successor liability would also entitle the purported successor to the defenses of 
the predecessor, including anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation) protection); see In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 
527 F. Supp. 2d, 1011, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Ray, 560 P.2d at 7); 
Orthotec, LLC v. REO Spineline, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) (quoting Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001)); Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 
2003); CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 218 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 
1063  (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 7). 
 
228 Ray, 560 P.2d at 11.  
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California:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
 In determining whether there was an express or implied 
assumption of liability, courts will examine the language of the asset 
purchase agreement or other document governing the transaction as well 
as consider extrinsic evidence if there are alleged ambiguities in the 
contract language.229  
California:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The California Supreme Court noted the situations in which the 
de facto merger exception generally applies: 
 [The de facto merger exception] has been 
invoked where one corporation takes all 
of another’s assets without providing any 
consideration that could be made 
available to meet claims of the other’s 
creditors . . . or where the consideration 
consists wholly of shares of the 
purchaser’s stock which are promptly 
distributed to the seller’s shareholders in 
conjunction with the seller’s liquidation . . 
. .230 
 In Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., the Court of Appeal of 
California set out a five factor test to determine “whether a transaction 
cast in the form of an asset sale actually achieves the same practical result 
as a merger:”231  (1) [W]as the consideration paid for the assets solely 
 
229 See Fisher v. Allis–Chalmers Corp. Product Liability Trust, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
310, 315–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding an assumption of successor liability 
based on the language of a transfer agreement and extrinisic evidence 
concerning the transfer agreement). 
 
230 Ray, 560 P.2d at 7 (citations omitted) (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston 
Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Malone v. Red Top Cab Co. of 
Los Angeles, 60 P.2d 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)). 
 
231 Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (Ct. App. 
1986) (citing Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801; Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. 
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stock of the purchaser or its parent; (2) did the purchaser continue the 
same enterprise after the sale; (3) did the shareholders of the seller 
become shareholders of the purchaser; (4) did the seller liquidate; and (5) 
did the buyer assume the liabilities necessary to carry on the business of 
the seller?232 
 The Court of Appeal addressed the de facto merger exception at 
length in CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court and appeared to combine 
the standards applying to mere continuation and de facto merger.  First, 
the court stated that to prevail on a either a de facto merger or mere 
continuation theory:  
[The] plaintiff would have to demonstrate 
(1) no adequate consideration was given 
for the predecessor corporation's assets 
and made available for meeting the claims 
of its unsecured creditors; (2) one or 
more persons were officers, directors, or 
stockholders of both corporations . . . .   
However, it is not dispositive that some 
of the same persons may serve as officers 
or directors of the two corporations.The 
relevant inquiries are whether the two 
corporations have preserved their 
Supp. 817, 821–822 (D. Colo. 1968); 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 
7165.5, pp. 188–90, 339–40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)). 
 
232 Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598 (citing Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801; Kloberdanz 
v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821–822 (Colo. 1968); 15 WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 7165.5, pp. 188–90, 339–40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)); see 
also Leve v. Patient Safety Techs., Inc., No. B220274, 2011 WL 2347578, at *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 15, 2011) (quoting Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598) (stating that 
the five factors enumerated in Marks are “pertinent to a determination of 
whether an asset sale achieves the same practical result as a merger[.]”). 
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separate identities and whether recourse 
to the debtor corporation is available. 233 
To constitute a valid reorganization that 
results in two separate entities, a 
corporate transaction must meet certain 
standards:  An asset acquisition can 
amount to a de facto merger.  This may 
occur where the purchaser acquires all 
assets, including choses in action, and also 
assumes all liabilities of the seller; the 
purchaser continues to operate the 
business and the seller dissolves.  The 
crucial factor in determining whether a 
corporate acquisition constitutes either a 
de facto merger or a mere continuation is 
the same: whether adequate cash 
consideration was paid for the 
predecessor corporation's assets.234 
 The CenterPoint court then set out the five de facto merger factors 
articulated in Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., referring to them as 
“a checklist for determining whether a de facto merger had taken place 
that would render the successor company liable for the plaintiff's 
product liability claim[.]”235 
The California Supreme Court has not recently addressed the 
applicable tests for de facto merger, although the court of appeal, in Ibanez 
v. S&S Worldwide, Inc., No. B238269, 2013 WL 2243841 (Cal. Ct. App. 
233 CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (citations and quotations omitted) 
(quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 3; Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d 
683, 690 (Cal. 1993)). 
 
234 CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (citations and quotations omitted) 
(quoting Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 
235 CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (quoting Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 
598). 
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May 20, 2013), recent as of this writing, relied on the “adequate 
consideration” test.236 
In 625 3rd St. Assoc., L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union the district court 
held that California’s de facto merger doctrine was barred in that case by 
federal preemption because it conflicted with the National Credit Union 
Administration’s authority to repudiate a lease.237  
California:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
 In Ray v. Alad, the California Supreme Court stated: 
California decisions holding that a 
corporation acquiring the assets of 
another corporation is the latter’s mere 
continuation and therefore liable for its 
debts have imposed such liability only 
upon a showing of one or both of the 
following factual elements:  (1) no 
adequate consideration was given for the 
predecessor corporation’s assets and 
made available for meeting the claims of 
its unsecured creditors; (2) one or more 
persons were officers, directors, or 
stockholders of both corporations.238 
236 Ibanez v. S&S Worldwide, Inc., No. B238269, 2013 WL 2243841, at *4 (Cal. 
Ct. App. May 20, 2013) (quoting Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19). 
 
237 625 3rd St. Assocs., L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047 
(N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 
238 Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal. 1977) (citing Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. 
Schwind Co. 181 P. 780 (Cal. 1919); Higgins v. Cal. Petroleum & Asphalt Co. 
55 P. 155 (Cal. 1898); Econ. Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat’l Bank of New York, 
97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1971); Blank v. Olcovich Shoe Corp. 67 P.2d 376 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Malone v. Red Top Cab Co. of Los Angeles, 60 P.2d 543 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1936)); accord Daniell v. Riverside Partners I, L.P., 142 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 717, 722–723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that successor entity can invoke 
SLAPP Act protection when the predecessor entity would have been able to do 
so if the first three forms of successor liability are present).  
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 Subsequent California decisions have held, however, that these 
two elements must be present to impose liability239 even when a 
successor holds itself out as being a continuation of the predecessor.240  
Indeed, ‘“[t]he crucial factor in determining whether a corporate 
acquisition constitutes either a de facto merger or a mere continuation is 
the same: whether adequate cash consideration was paid for the 
predecessor corporation's assets.’”241 
 Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“[the mere continuation] doctrine does not apply ‘when recourse to the 
debtor corporation is available and the two corporations have separate 
identities.’”242 
California:  The Product Line Exception 
In 1977 in Ray v. Alad, the Supreme Court of California imposed 
liability on a successor corporation for an injury sustained by a plaintiff 
239 See Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d 683, 690–91 (Cal. 
1993) (holding that the predecessor could “not rely on a suggestion that 
because the second element is present here, [the successor] was liable for the 
liabilies covered by the assumption agreement”); Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
18–19 (noting that all of the opinions cited in Ray in support of its test for mere 
continuation “involved the payment of inadequate cash consideration, and 
some also involved near complete identity of ownership, management or 
directorship after the transfer”); Bradford v. Winter, 2d Civil No. B216235, 
2010 WL 3260011, *1–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2010) (following Franklin v. 
USX); accord Orthotec, LLC v. REO Spineline, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1122 
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d 3) (citing Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
11).  
240 Maloney v. Am. Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Ray, 560 P.2d 3; Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975)); see Annuityzone.com, Inc., v. Indep. Advantage Fin. & Ins. Serv., Inc., 
No. D045176, 2005 WL 1745393, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Maloney 
in holding that mere continuation liability did not exist for a successor 
corporation despite the successor holding itself out as a continuation of the 
predecessor because there was adequate consideration). 
 
241 Center Point Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (quoting Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 17) (other citations omitted). 
 
242 Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003) 
(quoting Beatrice, 863 P.2d at 690). 
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who fell from a ladder manufactured by the predecessor corporation.243  
The court imposed liability under a new species of successor liability:  the 
“product line” exception.244  The California product line exception is 
based upon the following justifications set forth in Ray: 
Justification for imposing strict liability 
upon a Successor to a manufacturer 
under the circumstances here presented 
rests upon (1) the virtual destruction of 
the plaintiff’s remedies against the original 
manufacturer caused by the successor’s 
acquisition of the business, (2) the 
successor’s ability to assume the original 
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and 
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor 
to assume a responsibility for defective 
products that was a burden necessarily 
attached to the original manufacturer’s 
good will being enjoyed by the successor 
in the continued operation of the 
business.245 
These justifications have generally been treated by California 
courts as elements, i.e., requirements.246  In 2003, the California Supreme 
Court implicitly affirmed this treatment by the lower courts, referring to 
the “conditions” of Ray v. Alad.247   
243 See Ray, 560 P.2d at 10–11 (imposing liability for a product defect on a 
successor corporation that acquired a manufacturing business and continued 
producing the line of products previously distributed by the acquired 
manufacturing business).  
 
244  Ray, 560 P.2d at 11. 
 
245 Id. at 8–9. 
 
246 See, e.g., Chaknova v. Wilbur–Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 876 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999) (referring to the “three criteria” of Ray); Stewart v. Telex 
Commc’ns., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 672–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to 
the Ray “considerations”); Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 
73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to Ray’s “three-prong test”). 
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1.  The First Condition of Ray v. Alad 
Under the first condition of Ray v. Alad, the successor’s 
acquisition of the business must cause the virtual destruction of the 
plaintiff’s remedies against the predecessor.248  Courts applying the first 
condition consistently require some level of causation.249  In Henkel, the 
California Supreme Court concluded the first condition is not met 
when “there are no grounds for claiming that [the predecessor] was 
destroyed by the . . . sale of its . . . business to [the successor].”250  In 
Kaminski, a successor corporation exercised complete control over the 
predecessor and “could have at any time forced [the predecessor] into 
bankruptcy;” the California Court of Appeal held that the causation 
element was satisfied, despite the fact that the successor did not 
expressly require the dissolution of the predecessor.251   The court held 
that the successor’s financial and managerial control over the 
predecessor “at least substantially contributed to the absence of [the 
predecessor] from the recovery pool of product liability plaintiffs[.]”252  
For example, where a corporation bought an asbestos product line from 
a predecessor, the predecessor remained in business for fifteen months 
after the sale, and the successor played no role in the predecessor’s 
decision to dissolve, the causation or substantial contribution 
requirement was not met.253   “[T]o be liable, [the successor] must have 
‘played some role in curtailing or destroying the [plaintiff’s] remedies.’”254 
247 Henkel Corp., 62 P.3d at 73 (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 9).  
 
248 Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.  
 
249 See, e.g., Stewart, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674 (“[S]ome causual connection between 
the succession and the destruction of the plaintiff’s remedy must be shown.”). 
250 Henkel Corp., 62 P.3d at 74 (citing Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871). 
251 Kaminski v. W. MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 902–03 (Ct. App. 1985); 
see Phillips v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) 
(relying on the Kaminski rationale for the first condition of Ray).  
 
 252 Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
 
253 Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876–77. 
  
254 Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 902); see also Kline v. Johns-Mansville, 745 
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The causation requirement in the first condition of Ray v. Alad 
has been analyzed several times in the context of bankruptcy sales.  In 
the bankruptcy context, a successor who purchases assets at a 
bankruptcy sale is not considered the cause of a plaintiff’s lack of remedy 
against the predecessor.255  The Ninth Circuit articulated this general 
principle in Nelson v. Tiffany Industries, Inc.256  In Nelson, the predecessor 
manufactured grain augers.257  Four years after manufacturing the auger 
at issue, the predecessor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11.258 
The successor purchased all of the predecessor’s assets in a bankruptcy 
court-approved sale.259  The court stated: 
It is our view that the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ray does not apply 
where there is a good faith dissolution in 
bankruptcy which is not intended to 
avoid future tort claims against the 
predecessor.  Under such circumstances, 
the successor corporation has not 
contributed to or caused the destruction 
of the plaintiff’s remedies.260 
The court remanded the case to the district court because the record did 
not specify whether the court “considered the evidence offered by the 
plaintiff for the purpose of showing that [the predecessor] filed its 
F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Ray “require[s] that the asset 
sale contribute to the destruction of the plaintiffs’ remedies”).  
255 See Nelson v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“[W]here there is a good faith dissolution in bankruptcy which is not intended 
to avoid future tort claims against the predecessor[,] . . . the successor 
corporation has not contributed to or caused the destruction of the plaintiff’s 
remedies.”).  
 
256 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538. 
 
257 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537. 
 
258 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537. 
 
259 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537. 
 
260  Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538. 
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petition pursuant to a collusive agreement with [the successor].”261   The 
Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]f the evidence shows that [the successor] 
induced [the predecessor] to file for bankruptcy to avoid future tort 
liability, the Ray exception to the general rule would be applicable.”262   
In Stewart v. Telex Commc’ns, Inc., the California Court of Appeal 
addressed successor liability relating to a predecessor’s manufacture of a 
defective antenna design.263  The court noted that “the sole distinction 
between Alad and the present case is that [the successor] purchased [the 
predecessor] assets through the intermediary of the bankruptcy courts[ ] 
rather than directly.”264  This court noted that the Kaminski court found 
successor liability where a successor “substantially contributed” to the 
demise of the predecessor but stated, “[n]evertheless, some causal 
connection between the succession and the destruction of the plaintiff’s 
remedy must be shown.”265  The court discussed the balance between 
products liability policy and corporate needs of limiting risk exposure, 
concluding: 
It is the element of causation, however, 
that tips the balance in favor of imposing 
successor liability.  The traditional 
corporate rule of nonliability is only 
counterbalanced by the policies of strict 
liability when acquisition by the successor, 
and not some [other] event or act, 
virtually destroys the ability of the 
plaintiff to seek redress from the 
manufacturer of the defective product.266   
261 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538. 
 
262 Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538. 
 
263 Stewart v. Telex Commc’ns, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991).  
 
264 Id. at 673. 
 
265 Id. at 674–75.  
 
 266 Id. at 675 (quoting Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 792 (Wash. 
1984).  
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 The Stewart court held the product line exception did not apply, 
finding “no showing of causation here in the voluntary bankruptcy of 
[the predecessor], nor any showing it was a mere subterfuge to avoid the 
holding of Alad[.]”267   
Thus, both California and Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrate a 
continued causation requirement in applying the first condition of Ray.  
Cases addressing successor liability following a bankruptcy sale suggest 
that a successor who buys assets from a predecessor in a bankruptcy sale 
will not be liable for the predecessor’s products liability absent collusion 
or subterfuge.268   
2. The Second Condition of Ray v. Alad 
Under the second condition from Ray v. Alad, the court must 
consider “the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s 
risk-spreading role[.]”269  In Ray, this condition was met because both 
physical assets as well as “know-how” in the form of manufacturing 
designs, continuing personnel, and consulting services from the 
predecessor’s general manager gave the successor “virtually the same 
capacity as [the predecessor] to estimate the risks of claims for injuries 
from defects in previously manufactured ladders for purposes of 
obtaining insurance coverage or planning self-insurance.”270  
3. The Third Condition of Ray v. Alad 
The third condition of Ray v. Alad requires the court to consider 
“the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for 
defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original 
manufacturer’s good will being enjoyed by the successor in the 
continued operation of the business.”271  The court noted the successor’s 
267 Id. at 676. 
268 See PATRICK A. MURPHY, CREDITOR’S RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY 7:5 (2d ed. 
2004) (citing the following cases applying California law:  Nelson v. Tiffany 
Indust., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Telax 
Commc’ns., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). 
 
269 Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).  
 
270 Id. at 10 (citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
 
271 Id. at 9.  
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“deliberate albeit legitimate exploitation of [the predecessor’s] established 
reputation as a going concern manufacturing a specific product line,” the 
substantial benefit the successor received from this, and the fundamental 
fairness of requiring the burden of potential liability to pass along with 
the benefits exploited.272  The court further stated that the imposition of 
liability served the dual goals of requiring the one who receives the 
benefit to take the burden and precluding a windfall to a predecessor 
who was paid more by a successor to avoid successor liability and then 
promptly liquidated.273  This final condition of fundamental fairness 
results in a very fact specific analysis.   
 California: Personal Jurisdiction of Successor Corporations 
 “In a case raising liability issues, a California court will have 
personal jurisdiction over a successor company if: (1) the court would 
have had personal jurisdiction over the predecessor, and (2) the 
successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of the 
predecessor.”274   
Colorado 
Colorado courts recognize the general rule of successor non-
liability and the four traditional exceptions.275  In Johnston v. Amstead the 
Colorado Court of Appeals expressly rejected the product-line and 
continuity of enterprise exceptions after examining the relevant public 
272 Id. at 10–11. 
 
273 Id. at 11.  
274 CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 218 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Co., 927 F.2d 
1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991); Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 
918 F.2d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 1990); Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Sanders 
v. CEG Corp., 157 Cal. Rptr 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 9 WITKIN, SUMMARY 
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CORPORATIONS § 17 796–98 (10th ed. 2005).  
 
275 Johnston v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. App. 
1992) (citing Ruiz v. ExCello Corp., 653 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1982)); CMCB 
Enters. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90, 93 (Colo. App. 2005) (citing Alcan Aluminum 
Corp. v. Elec. Metal Prods., Inc., 837 P.2d 282, 283 (Colo. App. 1992); Baca v. 
Depot Sales, LLC, 2007 WL 988061, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2007) (citations 
omitted). 
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policy issues espoused by other courts that have adopted one or both of 
the exceptions.276 At least one Colorado court has found that the indirect 
transfer of assets from a predecessor to a purported successor will not, 
by itself, bar a claim of successor liability.277  
Colorado:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
 In Alcan Aluminum Corp., Metal Goods Division v. Electronic Metal 
Products, the Colorado Court of Appeals set out the test for the mere 
continuation exception: 
The “mere continuation exception” 
applies when there is a continuation of 
directors and management, shareholder 
interest, and, in some cases, inadequate 
consideration. . . . Thus, the test for 
determining whether this exception 
applies focuses on whether the 
purchasing corporation is, in effect, a 
continuation of the selling corporation, 
and not whether there is a continuation of 
the seller’s business operation.278   
In CMCB Enterprises, Inc. v. Ferguson, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
noted: 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that under Oklahoma law, a 
prerequisite for the imposition of liability 
against a corporation as a mere 
continuation of a predecessor is a sale or 
276 Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1143–47.  
277 Id. at 1146–47. 
 
278 Alcan Aluminum Corp., 837 P.2d at 283 (citing Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 
A,2d 564 (Md. 1991); see Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451 
(11th Cir. 1985) (purchasing corporation); Martin v. Abbot Labs., 689 P.2d 368 
(Wash. 1984) (discussing distinction in applying the successor liability doctrine 
in products liability, as opposed to commercial, context)). 
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transfer of all or substantially all the assets 
of the latter to the former. However, 
another federal circuit court of appeals 
has held that the plaintiff need only 
demonstrate a transfer of corporate 
assets, and it is not necessary, as a matter 
of law, that a single corporation acquire 
all the divesting corporation's assets, 
though that may be a pertinent factor. 
Here, even if we assume, without 
deciding, that a transfer of substantially all 
the assets is a factor in imposing liability, 
such a transfer in effect occurred.279 
Colorado:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Colorado courts have not set out a test for the de facto merger 
exception.  The Johnston court, in discussing the merits of the continuity 
of enterprise exception, stated that continuity of shareholders is probably 
the most essential element of the de facto merger exception test.280  
Thereafter, in Cohig & Assocs. v. Stamm, an unpublished opinion, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Colorado law, stated that 
Colorado applied the following de facto merger test: 
Under Colorado law, a de facto merger may 
exist if there is evidence suggesting (1) 
continuity of management, personnel, 
physical location, assets, and business 
operations; (2) continuity of shareholders; 
(3) cessation of the seller's business and 
279 CMCB Enters. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90, 93–94 (citing Williams v. Bowman 
Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991); Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. 
C & J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1997); Patin v. Thoroughbred Power 
Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp., 837 P.2d at 
283; Ed Peters Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d at 252)).   
 
280 Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1146–47 (citing Nguyen v. Johnson Machine & Press 
Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). 
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liquidation of its assets; (4) assumption by 
the purchaser of those liabilities of the 
seller necessary to continue uninterrupted 
the seller's former business operations.281 
Furthermore, “[t]he absorbing corporation receives the added capital and 
franchise of the merged corporation and holds itself out to the world as 
continuing the business of the seller.”282    
Colorado:  The Express/Implied Assumption and Fraud Exceptions 
Colorado courts have not yet articulated tests for the 
express/implied assumption or fraud exceptions. 
Connecticut 
In Chamlink Corp. v. Merritt Extruder Corp.,283 the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals adopted the four exceptions to the traditional rule of 
non-liability following a corporate asset purchase: 
The mere transfer of the assets of one 
corporation to another corporation or 
individual generally does not make the 
latter liable for the debts or liabilities of 
the first corporation except where the 
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to 
assume the obligations, the purchaser is 
merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation, the companies merged or the 
281 Cohig & Assocs. v. Stamm, No. 97-1119, 149 F.3d 1190 (unpublished table 
decision), 1998 WL 339472, at *4 (10th Cir. June 10, 1998); see Johnston, 830 
P.2d at 1146–47; cf Ekotek Site PRP Comm. V. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. 
Utah 1996); V.C. Video, Inc. v. National Video, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D 
Kan. 1990).   
 
282 Cohig & Assocs., 149 F.3d at 1190, at *4.  
 
283 Chamlink Corp. v. Merritt Extruder Corp., 899 A.2d 90, 93 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006).   
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transaction is entered into fraudulently to 
escape liability.284 
In doing so, it followed the holding of Ricciardello v. J.W. Gant & Co., in 
which the federal district court had preceded and predicted this same 
holding seventeen years earlier.285  
 The Chamlink court also considered the continuity of enterprise 
exception as an alternative to the common law mere continuation 
exception, but it did not expressly accept the doctrine because it was not 
applicable to the facts of the case.286  In Kendall v. Amster, the appellate 
court, following Chamlink, upheld the imposition of successor liability 
based on the continuity of enterprise exception. 287  One unpublished 
superior court decision prior to Chamlink recognized the product line 
exception.288   
Connecticut:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
The one Connecticut decision that specifically addressed the 
express/implied assumption exception looked to the language of the 
asset purchase agreement to determine if the successor assumed the 
predecessor’s liabilities.289  That court did not articulate a specific test.  
284 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93 (quoting 19 C.J.S. 314, Corporations § 657 (1990) 
(citing LiButti v. United States, 178 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 
285 Ricciardello v. J.W. Gant & Co., 717 F. Supp. 56, 59–60 (D. Conn. 1989). 
 
286 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93. 
 
287 Kendall v. Amster, 948 A.2d 1041, 1051 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); see also 
Altman v. Motion Water Sports, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242–43 (D. Conn. 
2010) (“In Kendall the Appellate Court makes it plain that ‘continuity of 
enterprise’ is not just a theory of successor liability, it is a recognized principle 
of Connecticut law.”). 
 
288 Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *8 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); see also Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Systems, 
2009 WL 2450773 at *5 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 7, 2009) (noting that the 
Superior Court had accepted the product line exception in Chamlink). 
289 Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. 
CV020813164S, 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002). 
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Connecticut:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Chamlink290 court set forth a simple test for the mere 
continuation exception: “Under the common law mere continuation 
theory, successor liability attaches when the plaintiff demonstrates the 
existence of a single corporation after the transfer of assets, with an 
identity of stock, stockholders, and directors between the successor and 
predecessor corporations.”291  According to a 2009 Superior Court case, 
factors considered in determining if this test has been met include:  
 [C]ontinuity of management; continuity 
of personnel; continuity of physical 
location, assets and general business 
operations; and cessation of the prior 
business shortly after the new entity is 
formed. Also relevant is the extent to 
which the successor intended to 
incorporate the predecessor into its 
system with as much the same structure 
and operation as possible.292   
Further, although not mentioned in Chamlink, at least one court 
of appeals has found that a threshold requirement for mere continuation 
liability is that the predecessor “no longer represents a viable source of 
relief.”293    
 
 
 
 
290 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93. 
 
291 Id. (quoting Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 
292 Robbins v. Physicians for Women, No. CV065002633, 2009 WL 1218818, at 
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 16, 2009). 
 
293 Robbins v. Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, 133 Conn. App. 577, 587 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
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 Connecticut: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
 The court in Chamlink294 discussed the continuity of enterprise 
exception as a potential alternative to the traditional test for mere 
continuation.  The court noted that under the “continuity of enterprise” 
theory, a mere continuation exists “if the successor maintains the same 
business, with the same employees doing the same jobs, under the same 
supervisors, working conditions, and production processes, and 
produces the same products for the same customers.”295  The court 
stated, however, that “[b]ecause it is clear under both [the traditional 
mere continuation theory and the continuity of enterprise theory] that 
Merritt Extruder Connecticut is not a mere continuation of Merritt 
Davis, we need not adopt one theory over the other at this time.”296   
 In Kendall v. Amster, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court, 
following Chamlink, upheld the imposition of successor liability based on 
the continuity of enterprise exception where  the successor “was in the 
same business [as the predecessor], restoring rare, expensive, vintage 
automobiles; used the same personnel[;] . . . and had the same 
customers.” 297  Moreover, a federal district court in Connecticut recently 
stated:  “In Kendall the Appellate Court makes it plain that ‘continuity of 
enterprise’ is not just a theory of successor liability, it is a recognized 
principle of Connecticut law.”298  As with mere continuation, a threshold 
294 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93. 
 
295 Id.; Robbins, 2009 WL 1218818, at *3 (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 
F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 
296 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93 n.3.  
 
297 Kendall v. Amster, 948 A.2d 1041, 1051 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).  
 
298 Altman v. Motion Water Sports, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242–43 (D. 
Conn. 2010); accord Call Ctr. Techs., Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel 
Publ’g Corp., 635 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2011); Garcia v. Serpe, No. 3:08cv1662, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14026, at *38. 
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requirement for continuity of enterprise liability is that the predecessor is 
not a viable source of liability.299 
Connecticut:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The courts have not developed a test for de facto merger that 
differs from the factor-based mere continuation test used by Connecticut 
superior courts prior to the Chamlink decision.300  The factor based 
balancing test consists of four non-dispositive factors: 
 (1) whether there is a continuity of 
management, personnel, physical location, 
assets and general business operations; (2) 
whether there is a continuity of 
shareholders; (3) whether the 
[predecessor] ceased its ordinary business 
operations, liquidates, and dissolves; and 
(4) whether [the successor] assumed those 
liabilities and obligations of [the 
predecessor] ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of [the 
predecessor].301 
The court goes on to say that “[n]ot every one of these indicia must be 
established, however, . . . the court should apply a balancing test.”302 
299 Robbins v. Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, 133 Conn. App. 577, 587 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
 
300 Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. 
CV020813164S, 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002). 
 
301 Sav. Bank of Manchester v. Daly, No. CV020813164S, 2004 WL 3130581, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2004) (citing Peglar & Assocs., Inc., 2002 WL 
1610037, at *7); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Konover, No. 3:05–cv–1924, 
2011 WL 1225986, at *18– 19 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2011); Collins v. Olin 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D. Conn. 2006). 
302 Sav. Bank of Manchester, 2004 WL 3130581, at *1 (citing Peglar & Associates, 
Inc., 2002 WL 1610037, at *7; Collins, 434 F. Supp. 2d, at 103); see also Cargill, 
Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1997).  
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Connecticut:  The Fraud Exception 
The fraud exception is governed by Connecticut’s Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfers Act found at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552(e) 
(2005).303   
Connecticut:  The Product Line Exception 
The Sullivan v. A.W. Flint304 decision provides the only insight 
into Connecticut’s version of the product line exception, as no other 
Connecticut court has discussed or applied the product line exception; 
however, a 2009 Superior Court decision stated that it has been 
accepted.305  The Sullivan court listed the following requirements needed 
in order to establish the product line exception: 
 (1) the transferee has acquired 
substantially all the transferor’s assets, 
leaving no more than a corporate shell, 
(2) the transferee is holding itself out to 
the general public as a continuation of the 
transferor by producing the same product 
line under a similar name, and (3) the 
transferee is benefiting from the goodwill 
of the transferor.306 
303 S. Conn. Gas Co. v. Waterview of Bridgeport Ass'n., No. CV054005335, 
2006 WL 1681005, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 1, 2006); see also Pirrotti v. 
Respironics, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–00439, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99775, at *9 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 6, 2011). 
  
304 Sullivan v. A.W. Flint, No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *161 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1996)).) 
 
305 Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Sys., No. CV054006895, 2009 WL 2450773, 
at *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 7, 2009) (noting that the superiorSuperior 
Csuperior ourt had accepted the product line exception). 
 
 306 Sullivan, 1996 WL 469716 at *6; see Ramirez v. Amsted Indust., Inc., 431 
A.2d 811, 825 (N.J 2011); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9–11 (Cal. 1977); 
Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 387 (Wash. 1984).  
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 The court agreed with the policy justifications of the product line 
exception but stated,  “[T]he acceptance of the product line theory in 
order to effectuate the goals sought to be achieved by the imposition of 
strict liability in the first place does not mean it should be liberally 
applied.”307  In support of its view that the product line exception should 
be narrowly applied, the court recognized the requirement that the 
successor corporation must cause the destruction of the plaintiff’s 
remedy.308  If the plaintiff can proceed against the predecessor, then the 
product line exception does not apply.309     
Delaware 
A federal district court decision provides the most 
comprehensive discussion of Delaware successor liability law.  In Elmer 
v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., the District Court of Delaware adopted the 
traditional exceptions to successor non-liability and then discussed the 
express/implied assumption and mere continuation exceptions.310  Elmer 
v. Tenneco Resins has been cited with approval in unreported decisions by 
the Delaware Superior Court.311  
Delaware:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
Based on Elmer, the Delaware courts will review the language of 
the asset purchase agreement to determine if there was an express or 
implied assumption of liabilities.312  In the Elmer case, the purchasing 
corporation expressly assumed, subject to certain conditions, all liabilities 
307 Sullivan, 1996 WL 469716 at *8. 
308 Id.  
309 Id. 
310 Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988); see also 
In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 558 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Safety-Kleen 
Corp., 380 B.R. 716, 739–40 (Bankr. D. Del., 2008). 
 311 Ross v. Desa Holdings Corp., No. 05C-05-013, 2008 WL 4899226, at *4 
n.11 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 30, 2008); In re Asbestos Litig. v. Haveg Indust., Inc., 
C.A., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994). 
312 In re Safety-Kleen Corp., 380 B.R. at 735. 
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of the seller that existed at the closing date.313 “One of the conditions 
was that [the seller] provide a complete listing of its absolute or 
contingent liabilities and pending or threatened claims or litigation.”314  
The purchaser/successor argued that it was not liable to the plaintiff 
because the schedules attached to the asset purchase did not list the 
seller’s potential liability for the manufacture of the product that injured 
the plaintiff.315     
The court, in denying summary judgment to the purchaser, 
stated, “While it seems clear that there was no express assumption of this 
liability, the Court finds that there is a question whether [the purchaser] 
impliedly assumed any [product] liability of [the seller].”316  The court 
based its conclusion on the fact that “[the purchaser] agreed to assume 
‘all . . . liabilities of [the seller] . . . whether accrued . . . contingent or 
otherwise . . . exist[ing] at the Closing Date.’”317  The court reasoned that 
the asset purchase agreement was contradictory, as one section expressly 
rejected all liabilities not listed, while another expressly assumed all 
liabilities.318 
Delaware:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Delaware employs a narrow mere continuation exception.  The 
test is whether the former corporation is “the same legal entity” as the 
latter corporation: 
In order to recover under this theory in 
Delaware, it must appear that the former 
313 Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 541.  
314 Id.  
315 Id.  
316 Id. at 541; see Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tenneci 
documents reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations); Bouley v. 
American Cyanamid, 1987 WL 18738 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 1987) (reasonable 
persons may differ as to meaning of 1963 contract).  
317 Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 541. 
318 Id. 
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corporation is the same legal entity as the 
latter; that is, “it must be the same legal 
person, having a continued existence 
under a new name.”  The test is not the 
continuation of the business operation, 
but rather the continuation of the 
corporate entity.319 
 The Asbestos Litigation decision also indicates that continuity of 
ownership may be a threshold requirement for a finding of mere 
continuation: “[U]nder this theory, it must be established that the 
transaction . . . was an arm’s length transaction and not simply a change 
of corporate name and that [the successor] has different owners than 
[the predecessor].”320  
Delaware:  The De Facto Merger and Fraud Exceptions 
There are currently no cases employing Delaware law that 
explain the de facto merger or fraud exceptions. 
District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia recognizes the four traditional 
exceptions to the general rule of successor non-liability.321  In Bingham v. 
Goldberg, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated 
on the mere continuation exception but did not address the other 
319 Id. at 542 (quoting Fountain v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., No. 86C–JA–117, 
1988 WL 40019, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1988)); see also Ross v. Desa 
Holdings Corp., 2008 WL 4899226, at *4 n. 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008). 
    
320 In re Asbestos Litig. v. Haveg Indust., Inc., C.A., No. 92C–10–100, 1994 WL 
89643, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994). 
321 Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc. v. Bingham, 637 A.2d 81, 89–90 
(D.C. Cir. Ct. 1994); Reese Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 477 F. Supp. 2d 31, 
40–41 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 
1327, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 
A.2d 1286, 1289–90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), cert denied, 568 A.2d 28 (Md. 
1990); Brockman, 565 S.W.2d at 798.  
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three.322  In Debnam v. Crane Co., the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that summary judgment was improper where the 
purchase agreement was ambiguous and susceptible to the reasonable 
interpretation that the defendants expressly or impliedly assumed the 
liability at issue.323  In Reese Brothers, Inc., the federal district court held 
that a claim for successor liability shall go to trial unless the defendant 
“can show beyond doubt” that the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in 
support of its claims.”324 
District of Columbia: The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Bingham court did not apply a specific test for the mere 
continuation exception.  The court analyzed the facts of the case 
according to a non-exclusive list of factors.325  Although the court stated 
that a “common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders in the 
purchasing and selling corporations” is “a key element,” the existence of 
common directors did not dispose of the issue.326  The court did note, 
however, that the key inquiry is whether or not there is a continuation of 
the entity, rather than the business operations of the predecessor.327  
Florida 
Florida courts have adopted the four traditional exceptions to the 
general rule of successor non-liability and expressly rejected the 
continuity of enterprise and product-line exceptions.328  In Laboratory 
322 Bingham, 637 A.2d at 90. 
 
323 Debnam v. Crane Co., 976 A.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. 2009). 
 
324 Reese Bros., 477 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
 
325 Bingham, 637 A.2d at 91–92. 
 
326 Bingham, 637 A.2d at 91 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 
F.2d 1451, 1458–59 (11th Cir. 1985). 
327 Bingham, 637 A.2d at 92 (citing Bud Antle, 758 F.2d at 1458). 
328 Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049–51 (Fla. 1982); Graef 
v. Hegedus, 698 So. 2d 655, 655–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see Gary Brown 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 F. App’x Appx837, 842–84343 (11th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Orlando Light Bulb Serv. v. Laser Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc, 
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Corporation, the appellate court appeared to collapse the de facto merger 
and mere continuation exceptions, setting out the same test for both:  
whether “one corporation is absorbed by another, i.e., there is a 
continuity of the selling corporation evidenced by such things as the 
same management, personnel, assets, location, and stockholders.”329   
Florida:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Florida courts have applied the following test for a de facto 
merger, requiring continuity of ownership: 
A de facto merger occurs where one 
corporation is absorbed by another, but 
without compliance with the statutory 
requirements for a merger.  To find a de 
facto merger there must be continuity of 
the selling corporation evidenced by the 
same management, personnel, assets and 
physical location; a continuity of the 
stockholders, accomplished by paying for 
the acquired corporation with shares of 
stock; a dissolution of the selling 
corporation; and assumption of the 
liabilities.330  
523 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); Miller v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. v. 
Prof’l Recovery Network, 813 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)); Jones 
v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re 
Metro Sewer Servs., Inc., 374 B.R. 316, 322–23 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Orlando Light Bulb Serv., 523 So. 2d at 742 (citing Bernard, 409 So. 2d at 
1049)); Reina v. Gingerale Corp., 472 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf 
Kelly v. American Precision Indust., 438 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
329 Lab. Corp., 813 So. 2d at 270. 
330 Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (citing Arnold Graphics Indus. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., 775 F.2d 38 
(2d Cir. 1985)) (other citations omitted); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, 
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)); see Carnes v. Fender, 936 So. 2d 
11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Lab. Corp., 813 So. 2d at 270; Chicago Title 
Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Florida, Inc., 832 So. 2d 810, 814 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
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In Florio v. Manitex Skycrane, LLC, the federal district court 
collected cases to summarize the de facto merger doctrine as applied in 
Florida and noted that the state has not adopted the continuity of 
enterprise exception: 
In applying the de facto merger doctrine, 
Florida courts have uniformly required a 
finding of substantial continuity of 
ownership. Compare Bernard, 409 So.2d at 
1049 (declining to “delet[e] a historical 
requirement of substantial identity of 
ownership”), and Viking Acoustical, 767 
So.2d at 636 (de facto merger did not 
occur when there was no identity of 
officers, directors, or shareholders), with 
Kelly v. Am. Precision Indus., 438 So.2d 29 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (successor 
corporation was responsible for liability 
of predecessor corporation in delivering 
allegedly defective garbage truck where 
successor purchased all of predecessor's 
stock and stripped it of all its assets, with 
the benefit thereof going solely to 
successor), and Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Prof'l 
Recovery Network, 813 So.2d 266, 269-70 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (fact questions 
remained as to whether a de facto merger 
occurred where the owner was the sole 
officer and shareholder in both 
corporations).  Although a minority of 
jurisdictions have expanded corporate 
successor liability by adopting the 
“continuity of enterprise” exception, 
which eliminates the necessity of proving 
a common identity of officers, directors, 
and shareholders, see, e.g., Turner v. 
Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 
N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), Florida has not 
done so.331 
331 Florio v. Manitex Skycrane, LLC, No. 6:07-cv-1700-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL 
5137626, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2010). 
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Florida:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Florida, the mere continuation exception is based primarily on 
continuity of officers, directors, and stockholders in the selling and 
purchasing corporations.  The “change is in form, but not in 
substance.”332 
 In Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, the court 
stated that a successor is a continuation of the predecessor when it has 
“the same assets, management, personnel, stockholders, location, 
equipment, and clients.”333  In Azar, the court found sufficient evidence 
to impose liability based on the mere continuation exception where the 
following facts were present: 
The old [Professional Association] ceased 
rendering medical services shortly after 
the judgment was entered against it.  The 
next day the baton was passed to the new 
P.A. which commenced full operations.  
It provided the same type of medical 
services in the same office with the same 
files, patients, nurses, clerical help, office 
manager and the same major player, Dr. 
Munim-the sole stockholder in and 
president of each P.A.334   
Florida:  The Fraud Exception 
Florida courts have not developed or adopted a test for fraud 
that is specific to the issue of successor liability.  The court in Azar, 
however, imposed liability on a successor corporation based on the 
doctrine of fraudulent transfers but then continued its analysis, holding 
that the successor was also liable under common law successor liability 
 
332 Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 
1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), reh’g denied, 765 F.2d 154 (1985) (citations 
omitted).  
 333 Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d 958, 960 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154. 
334 Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   857 
principles.335  In Florida, therefore, the fraud exception may not have 
utility based on the fact that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
already governs fraudulent contractual obligations, thus, such an 
exception may be redundant. 
Florida:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
There are few Florida cases that directly address the express or 
implied assumption exceptions; one, however, expressly recognized the 
effectiveness of disclaimers of successor liability in an asset purchase 
agreement.336  Another, from the Federal District Court, indicates that a 
purported successor’s preferential assumption of some but not all of a 
predecessor’s liabilities is not fraudulent and provides no basis for 
imposing successor liability, generally, to benefit the non-preferred 
creditors of the predecessor.337   
Georgia 
Georgia courts have expressly adopted the traditional exceptions 
to the general rule of successor non-liability and have declined to adopt 
the continuity of enterprise and product line exceptions based on 
particular facts at issue in each respective case.338  
 
335 Id. at 152–55. 
336 Krogen Express Yachts, LLC v. Nobili, 947 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
337 Mitutoyo Am. Corp. v. Suncoast Precision, Inc., No. 8:08-MC-36-T-TBM, 
2011 WL 2802938, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2011)). 
  
338 See Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (holding that 
the continuity of enterprise exception set out in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) and the product line exception set out in Ray v. Alad, 
560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) were not applicable because the purchaser did not 
continue to manufacture the product that injured the plaintiff after the asset 
purchase); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726, 728 (Ga. 1985) 
(declining to adopt the continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions 
because the facts presented would not satisfy either, since the successor did not 
manufacture or sell the same type of product (table saws) that injured the 
plaintiff).  Note that in 1987, the Georgia State Legislature amended its strict 
liability laws to limit the imposition of strict liability only on manufacturers, 
rather than mere sellers, of defective products.  See Ga. Code Ann., § 51-1-11.1.  
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Georgia:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Under Georgia law, the following four elements must be present 
for the de facto merger exception to apply: 
 (1) There is continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation.  
(3) The seller corporation ceases its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates, 
and dissolves as soon as legally and 
practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation.339 
Georgia:  Mere Continuation 
Under Georgia law, the mere continuation exception to non-
liability applies when “‘there is a substantial identity of ownership and a 
complete identity of the objects, assets, shareholders, and directors’ as 
between the purchasing corporation and the selling company.” 340  Note 
that complete identity of ownership is not required.341  
339 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 533 S.E.2d 136, 145–46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 
(citing Howard v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1989)); see also Douglas v. Bigley, 628 S.E.2d 199, 208 n.27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
340 Perimeter Realty, 533 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Davis v. Concord Commercial 
Corp., 434 S.E.2d 571, 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding no successor liability 
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Georgia:  The Fraud Exception 
There are no cases employing Georgia law that explain the 
current state of the fraud exception. 
Georgia:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
Whether a successor corporation assumed the liabilities of the 
predecessor corporation depends on the language of the parties’ asset 
purchase agreement.342  In Gwinnett, the successor had expressly assumed 
all liabilities of the predecessor.  The court noted: “Had [the successor] 
wished to limit its liabilities to certain types of claims, or to those 
occurring within a certain time period, it could have done so in the 
agreement.”343 
Hawaii 
Hawaii is one of several jurisdictions that includes a fifth 
exception in its formulation of the traditional exceptions to the general 
rule of successor non-liability: 
The [successor] corporation may be held liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the [predecessor] corporation when[:]  
where there was not identity of assets); see also Ney-Copeland & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 862, 862–63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).   
341 Pet Care Prof’l Ctr., Inc. v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g. Corp., 464 S.E.2d 
249, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (successor liability established where both 
businesses used the same name, operated from the same location, used the 
same telephone service and accounts, and three of four partners in predecessor 
corporation became stockholders in new corporation; the court noted that 
“[a]lthough less than a complete identity of ownership between Center and Pet 
Care resulted, only some identity of ownership was required.” (quoting 
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Cilurso v. 
Premier Crown Corp., 769 F. Supp. 372, 374 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
 
342 See Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Massey, 469 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1996).  
343 Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 469 S.E.2d at 731 (buyer agreed to assume liabilities and 
obligations ‘only as of and with respect to periods following the [c]losing [d]ate’ 
(quoting Blum v. RES Assoc., 439 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
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(1) there is an express or implied 
assumption of liability;  
(2) the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger;  
(3) the transaction was fraudulent;  
(4) some of the elements of a purchase in good 
faith were lacking, as where the transfer was 
without consideration; or  
(5) the transferee corporation was a mere 
continuation or reincarnation of the old 
corporation. 344 
 The Hawaii courts have not articulated or applied tests for any of 
these exceptions.  However, in Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., 345 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a transfer of all the 
predecessor’s assets and liabilities to the successor did not include an 
assignment of the predecessor’s rights under insurance policies where 
the policies contained a no assignment clause.  The court explained:  
Because Hawaii law requires every 
insurance policy to be subject to the 
general rules of contract construction, see 
HRS § 431:10-237, and an assignment by 
operation of law is merely an extension of 
the common-law tort rule of successor 
liability, see Northern Insurance, 955 F.2d at 
1358, we hold the circuit court erred 
when it concluded that an assignment by 
operation of law is consistent with 
Hawaii's rules governing construction of 
insurance policies.346 
344 Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 294 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989) 
(emphasis added) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS §2704 at 513 
(1986)). 
345 Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 183 P.3d 734, 
745 (Haw. 2007). 
 
346 Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 183 P.3d at 745. 
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Idaho 
Idaho courts have recognized assumption of liabilities and fraud 
as exceptions to the general rule of successor non-liability in asset 
purchasers.347  Courts have also recognized successor liability in the case 
of a “reorganization,” which appears to be a fusion of the mere 
continuation, continuity of enterprise, and de facto merger exceptions.348  
There are few modern Idaho cases in this area, and it is uncertain how 
the Idaho courts would define the current state of successor liability law. 
 Idaho has a state constitutional provision that prevents the 
legislature from allowing “the leasing or alienation of any franchise so as 
to release or relieve the franchise or property held thereunder from any 
of the liabilities of the lessor or grantor . . . .”349 This would seem to limit 
the legislature’s ability to pass anti-successor liability laws.350    
 
 
 
 
 
347 Anderson v. War Eagle Consol. Min. Co., 72 P. 671, 673, 675 (Idaho 1903) 
(rejecting a rough continuity theory premised on commonality of management 
and stock ownership in successor and predecessor). 
348 Seymour v. Boise Co., Ltd., 132 P. 427, 430–31 (Idaho 1913) (“The 
organization of the Boise Railroad Company and the transfer of all the property 
and franchises of the Boise Traction Company to the railroad company was in 
fact and law only a reorganization of the old company; the new corporation 
having a board of directors who composed a majority of the board of directors 
of the old corporation, and more than 98 percent of the subscribed stock of the 
new corporation being held by the same stockholders who held the stock of the 
old corporation”); see Moore v. Boise Land & Orchard Co., 173 P. 117, 118 
(Idaho 1918); Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce & Labor, 162 
P.3d 765, 771 (Idaho 2007)).) 
349  IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 15. 
 
350 Towle v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 232 F. 733, 738 
(D. Idaho 1916), aff’d sub nom., Am. Waterworks & Elec. Co. v. Towle, 245 F. 
706, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1917) (personal injury judgment against predecessor 
becomes a lien against the franchise and property of the corporation in the 
hands of a successor). 
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Illinois 
Illinois courts recognize only the four traditional exceptions to 
the general rule of successor non-liability of asset purchasers.351  The 
Illinois courts “have consistently rejected taking a product line approach 
to successor liability.”352  
Illinois:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Under Illinois law, a “common identity of ownership” is an 
essential requirement of the mere continuation exception.353  In Vernon v. 
Schuster, the Illinois Supreme Court explained the mere continuation 
exception as follows:  
The continuation exception to the rule of 
successor corporate nonliability applies 
351 Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Ill. 1997) (citing Steel Co. v. 
Morgan Marshall Indust., Inc., 662 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)); Green v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (quoting 
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)); see 
Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 
2005) (citing North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir. 
1998)); GMAC, LLC v. Hillquist, 652 F. Supp. 2d 908, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2009); 
DeGuilio v. Goss Int'l Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); 
Consol. Servs. and Const., Inc. v. S.R. McGuire, 854 N.E.2d 715, 720 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2006); Flanders v. Cal. Coastal Cmtys., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005). 
 
352 Diguilio v. Goss Int'l Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see 
Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Gonzales 
v. Rock Wool Engineering & Equip. Co., 453N.E.2d 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); 
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); 
Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Hernandez, 
N.E.2d at 778; Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co. 384 N.E.2d 141 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1978)); see Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 
353 Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176 (quoting Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 
620, 625–26 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing, inter alia, Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 
F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)); see also Diguilio v. Goss Int’l., 906 N.E.2d at 
1277 (citing Nilsson, 621 N.E.2d at 1032; Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 10321275 
Joseph Huber Brewing Co., Inc. v. Pamado, Inc., 2006 WL 2583719, at *11–13 
(N.D. Ill. 2006); see, e.g., Park v. Townson & Alexander, 679 N.E.2d 107, 110 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
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when the purchasing corporation is 
merely a continuation or reincarnation of 
the selling corporation. In other words, 
the purchasing corporation maintains the 
same or similar management and 
ownership, but merely wears different 
clothes. . . .  [T]he majority of courts 
considering this exception emphasize a 
common identity of officers, directors, 
and stock between the selling and 
purchasing corporation as the key 
element of a continuation. In accord with 
the majority view, our appellate court has 
“consistently required identity of 
ownership before imposing successor 
liability under the continuation 
exception.354    
The court rejected the dissent’s argument that continuity of 
ownership should be one of several factors that the court considers 
under a totality of circumstances evaluation.355  This approach has been 
mirrored in the Courts of Appeal.  Since Vernon, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has held that the continuation exception cannot apply without 
commonality of ownership, regardless of what other facts may apply.  In 
Dearborn Maple Venture, LLC v. Sci Illinois Services, Inc.356 the court of 
appeals noted: 
The test used to determine whether one 
corporate entity is a continuation of 
another is “whether there is a 
continuation of the corporate entity of the 
seller—not whether there is a continuation 
of the seller’s business operations.”  A 
common identity of officers, directors, 
ownership and stocks between the selling 
and purchasing corporation is a key 
354 Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176 (quoting Nilsson, 621 N.E. at 1032) (other 
citations omitted). 
 
355 Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176, 1178. 
356 968 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), reh'g denied, (May 29, 2012). 
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element of what constitutes a 
“continuation.”  However, “the 
continuity of shareholders necessary to 
finding of mere continuation does not 
require complete identity between the 
shareholders of the former and successor 
corporations.”357     
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Vernon v. Schuster, 
has held that successor liability may lie under the mere continuation 
exception even if the predecessor has not been dissolved.358   
Illinois:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that, like the mere 
continuation exception, a prerequisite for imposing liability under the de 
facto merger exception is continuity of ownership.359  The court noted 
that the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions are similar but 
apply in different circumstances:  the former applies where no 
corporation existed before the asset purchase and the latter involves the 
combination of two existing corporations.360  Aside from stating this 
obvious difference between the exceptions, the Nilsson court provided no 
further guidance on the contours of the de facto merger exception. 
357 Id. at 1234 (emphasis added) (quoting Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176; Park v. 
Townson & Alexander, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)) (other 
citations omitted); accord Workforces Solutions v. Urban Servs. Of Am. Inc., 
Nos. 1-11-1410 and 1-11-3046 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); 
Conser FS, Inc. v. Von Bergen Trucking, Inc., No. 2-10-1225, 2011 Ill. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 2165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (the supreme court has hinted that the 
common identity of officers, directors, and shareholders between the selling 
and purchasing corporations need not be exact). 
 
358 Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs.,  419 F.3d 594, 598–99 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that the predecessor was being preserved in a “ghostly 
existence” by the successor precisely to defeat a finding of continuity of 
ownership for successor liability purposes). 
359 Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993).  
360 Nilsson, 621 N.E.2d at 1034.  
                                                          
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   865 
In another decision by the Illinois Court of Appeals, the court 
stated the following elements of a de facto merger: 
 (1) There is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets and 
general business operations. 
(2) There is continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation. 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates 
and dissolves as soon as legally and 
practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation.361 
 A later decision by the Court of Appeals affirmed that all four 
elements are required for a showing of a de facto merger.362  Recently, a 
federal district court in Baxi v. Ennis Knupp & Assocs.,363 as well as the 
361 Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(citations omitted); see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 
594 (7th Cir. 2005); Gray v. Mundelein Coll., 695 N.E.2d 1379, 1388 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1998). 
362 Gray, 695 N.E.2d at 1388. 
 
363 Baxi v. Ennis Knupp & Assocs., No. 10-CV-6346, 2011 WL 3898034, at *17 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011). 
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Illinois Court of Appeals in Diguilio v. Goss Int’l. Corp. have indicated that 
“the most important factor” in determining whether de facto merger has 
occurred is the identity of the ownership of both the new and the prior 
corporations.364   Both courts treated identity of ownership as a 
requirement—an “element” rather than a “factor” to be considered—
holding that neither the de facto merger or the mere continuation 
exception applied because there was no common identity of 
ownership.365   
Illinois:  The Express/Implied Assumption Exception 
In determining whether the successor corporation assumed the 
liabilities of the predecessor, the Illinois courts are “governed by the 
express provisions of the written document which dictates the agreement 
between the parties.”366  
Illinois:  The Fraud Exception 
Illinois courts have not developed a specific test for the fraud 
exception.  However, the court in Putzmeister concluded that there was no 
evidence of fraud in the transaction “notwithstanding the disparity 
between the value of the predecessor’s debts and assets.”367  The Seventh 
Circuit held in Brandon, that, under Illinois law, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate the existence of a majority of the eleven “badges of fraud” 
listed in the fraudulent conveyance statute.368   
 
 
 
 
 
364 Diguilio v. Goss Int’l. Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 
365 Baxi, 2011 WL 3898034, at *17; Diguilio, 906 N.E.2d at 1277–78. 
 
366 Putzmeister, 596 N.E.2d at 756. 
367 Id. at 756. 
368 Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 599–600 (7th 
Cir. 2005).  
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Indiana 
Indiana courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the 
general rule of successor non-liability.369  Indiana courts have also 
required that the predecessor corporation dissolve before a court can 
impose liability on the successor under any of the exceptions.370   
Although the Indiana courts have not expressly adopted either 
the continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions, the court in 
Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., after discussing the supporting and 
opposing policies of the product line exception, stated:  
The product line exception may be an 
appropriate means by which to balance 
the seemingly juxtaposed concepts of 
strict liability under the Indiana Product 
Liability Act, and freedom of contract - 
long supported by common law, as well 
as both state and federal constitutions.371   
The Guerrero court did not adopt the product line exception based on the 
facts presented because the successor corporation did not cause the 
destruction of the plaintiffs remedy—the predecessor was still in 
existence at the time of the suit.372  The court stated “the inequities which 
would warrant our full consideration of this proposed fifth exception to 
successor non-liability under Indiana law are not present.”373  Based on 
369 Cooper Indust., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1287–91 (Ind. 2009); 
Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994); 
Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp., 824 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005); see U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co., 719 
F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1028 (S.D. Ind.  2010); see also Glentel v. Wireless Ventures 
LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that asset sale conducted 
as UCC foreclosure does not insulate purchaser from successor liability). 
  
370 Ziese & Sons Excavating, Inc. v. Boyer Constr. Corp., 965 N.E. 2d. 713 
(2012) (citing Sorenson v. Allied Prods. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1999)); Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., 725 N.E.2d 479, 483 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 
371 Guerrero, 725 N.E.2d at 487 (emphasis in original).  
 
372 Id. 
 
373 Id. 
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the Guerrero court’s favorable treatment of the product-line exception, an 
Indiana appellate court may adopt the product line exception if it is 
presented with the appropriate factual record.  Note that the Guerrero 
court’s approval of the product line exception directly contradicts 
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp.,374 a 1979 case in which an Illinois 
Appellate Court applying Indiana law expressly rejected the product line 
exception on the theory that the legislature, not the court, is the 
appropriate forum to resolve policy concerns related to expanded 
successor liability.375  In U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic 
Sprinkler Co., the federal district court declined to apply the product line 
exception in a commercial dispute.  The court stated, citing Guerrero, 
“this exception applies only when the claim is one for product liability 
involving personal injury.”376  
In cases involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Indiana courts will impose 
liability under CERCLA upon a successor corporation without regard to 
contract or merger.377  CERCLA is the federal “catch-all environmental 
statute” that applies to cases where “environmental legal action” is 
possible.378  In P.R. Mallory, the court stated that under CERCLA:  
“Kraft is considered a corporate successor to Mallory because there is 
sufficient corporate succession to support the transfer of Mallory's 
liability and rights to coverage to Kraft by operation of law.”379 
 
 
 
 
374 Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
 
375 Hernandez, 388 N.E.2d at 780.   
 
376 U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co.,719 F. 
Supp. 2d 1020, 1031  (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Guerrero, 725 N.E.2d at 480). 
 
377 P.R. Mallory & Co., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP-00156, 
2004 WL 1737489, at *10 (Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004); see also Terra Products, 
Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89, 90–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
 
378 Cooper Indus., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–81 (Ind. 2009). 
 
379 P.R. Mallory, 2004 WL 1737489, at *10.  
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Indiana:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
No Indiana decision has defined a particular test for the express 
or implied assumption exception.  The courts look to the language of the 
applicable contract.380   
Indiana:  The Fraud Exception 
In Indiana the fraud exception is based on evidence of “a 
fraudulent sale of assets done for the purposes of escaping liability.”381  
In Gorski v. DRR, Inc., the court noted:  
Gorski filed his wrongful death action on 
March 6, 1998, and LMB, Birk, and 
Oliphant entered into their agreement on 
August 26, 1998.  Although this does not 
definitively prove that DRR transferred 
its assets to LMB and Birk due to 
Gorski's complaint, it is sufficient 
evidence to survive a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) 
challenge.  Therefore, the trial court erred 
in granting LMB's and Birk's Motion to 
Dismiss on the fraudulent transfer of 
assets claim.382 
In Ziese & Sons Excavating Inc. v. Boyer Constr. Corp.,383 the court evaluated 
the existence of fraud by examining eight “badges of fraud,” which 
include: 
1) the transfer of property by a debtor 
during the pendency of a suit;  
2) a transfer of property that renders the 
debtor insolvent or greatly reduces his 
380 See, e.g., Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 
1994).  
 
381 Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1233. 
 
382 Gorski v. DRR, Inc., 801 N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
383 Ziese & Sons Excavating Inc. v. Boyer Construction Corp., 965 N.E.2d 713, 
722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
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estate;  
3) a series of contemporaneous 
transactions which strip the debtor of all 
property available for execution;  
4) secret or hurried transactions not in the 
usual mode of doing business;  
5) any transaction conducted in a manner 
differing from customary methods;  
6) a transaction whereby the debtor 
retains benefits over the transferred 
property;  
7) little or no consideration in return for 
the transfer; and  
8) a transfer of property between family 
members.384 
The court goes on to state, “When the facts of a case implicate several 
badges of fraud, an inference of fraudulent intent may be warranted.”385 
Indiana:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
 In Cooper Industries, LLC v. South Bend., a 2009 case, the Indiana 
Supreme Court set out several non-exclusive factors for determining if 
there was a de facto merger, stating: “Some pertinent findings might 
include continuity of the predecessor corporation's business enterprise as 
to management, location, and business lines; prompt liquidation of the 
seller corporation; and assumption of the debts of the seller necessary to 
the ongoing operation of the business.”386 
384 Id. at 722 (quoting Lee's Ready Mix and Trucking, Inc. v. Creech, 660 
N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
 
385 Id.  
 
386 Cooper Indus., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Ind. 2009); see also 
Sorenson v. Allied Prod. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).  
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The court further noted, “To be sure, Delaware's version of de 
facto merger is far more restrictive, . . .  Focused as it is on shareholder 
rights, Delaware may be something of an outlier on this subject, though 
obviously a very influential one.”387   
 In a 2005 case, Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp.,388 the court of 
appeals generally stated that “‘[a s]uccessor in assets liability, under these 
exceptions, takes place only when the predecessor corporation no longer 
exists, such as when a corporation dissolves or liquidates in 
bankruptcy.’”389  
Indiana:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth that:  
The doctrine of “mere continuation” has 
a slightly different focus [than de facto 
merger].  [The doctrine of mere 
continuation] asks whether the 
predecessor corporation should be 
deemed simply to have re-incarnated 
itself, largely aside of the business 
operations.  Factors pertinent to this 
determination include whether there is a 
continuation of shareholders, directors, 
and officers into the new entity.390 
 
 
 
 
387 Cooper, 899 N.E.2d at 1288 n.10. 
 
388 Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp., 824 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005). 
  
389 Id. (quoting Markham v. Prutsman Mirror Co., 565 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991)).  
 
390 Cooper, 899 N.E. 2d at 1290 (citing Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alday–Donalson 
Title Co., 832 So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). 
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Iowa 
Iowa courts recognize four exceptions to the general rule of 
successor non-liability:  express or implied assumption or liabilities, 
fraud, consolidation or merger, and mere continuation.391  The Iowa 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the product line exception, stating:  
We believe the product-line theory is 
inconsistent and, as the law currently 
stands, theoretically irreconcilable with 
our law of strict liability in tort as well as 
with our law of corporate liability.  We 
find the logic of those courts which have 
rejected the doctrine more persuasive 
than the logic of those courts which have 
adopted it.  Accordingly, we decline to 
adopt the doctrine as the law of this state. 
If the law is to be changed, the legislature 
is the appropriate forum for action.392   
 The Iowa Supreme Court also expressly declined to expand the 
mere continuation exception based on the Cyr and Turner decisions.393  
391 Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002) 
(citing Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391–92 (Iowa 1975); 
Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1996)); Lumley v. 
Advanced Data-Comm, Inc., 773 N.W.2d 562 (Table), No. 09–0224, 2009 WL 
2514084, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009). 
392 Delapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 222–23 (Iowa 1987) (citing Fish 
v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 311, 376 N.W.2d 820, 828–29 (1985); 
Grand Labs., Inc. v. Midcon Labs of Iowa, 32 F.3d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
393 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (“We have never applied the mere continuation 
exception where the buying and selling corporations had different owners . . . .  
Moreover, we made plain in Delapp that we did not believe strict liability 
policies would be furthered by imposing liability on a successor corporation 
that was without fault in creating the defective product . . . .  Such a radical 
departure from traditional corporate principles, we observed, should be left to 
the legislature . . . . ”);  Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1281; Oeltjenbrun v. CSA 
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Iowa:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
Where a corporation purchases some of the seller’s assets and 
assumes only limited liabilities, “[the Iowa courts] have said there is no 
successor-in-interest liability.”394  In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Eco, Inc., 
the federal district court stated, “[a]n implied agreement is one in which 
the agreement is inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties, instead 
of being expressed by them in written or spoken words.”395  The district 
court then went on to apply five factors to determine if an implied 
agreement to assume liability had taken place:  
1) whether the successor used the same 
name as the predecessor;  
2) whether the successor took credit for 
the predecessor's work;  
3) whether the successor assumed 
responsibility for completing a project;  
4) whether the successor made efforts to 
collect money on a project; and  
5) whether a successor participated in 
repairs to the predecessor's work.396 
 
Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1048–49 (N.D.  Iowa 1998) (quoting 
Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (“Although the Iowa Supreme Court noted that 
there were more expansive formulations of the [mere continuation] rule, which 
examine the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ it reaffirmed Iowa's adherence to 
the ‘traditional’ formulation of the rule.”)). 
 
394 Grundmeyer, 649 N.W.2d at 751 (citing Delapp, 417 N.W.2d at 220).  
 
395 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Eco, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1101 (S.D. 
Iowa 2011) (citing Ambrose v. Southworth Prods. Corp., 953 F.Supp. 728, 735 
(W.D.Va.1997)). 
396 Archer, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (citing Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Grp., 
Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 450–51 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
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Iowa:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Under Iowa’s mere continuation exception, “the controlling 
factor is whether the transferor continues to own and control the new 
corporation.”397  In Pancratz, the court stated, “The mere continuation 
exception, as traditionally applied, focuses on continuation of the 
corporate entity.”398  Furthermore, “[t]he exception has no application 
without proof of continuity of management and ownership between the 
predecessor and successor corporations.  Thus, [t]he key element of a 
continuation is a common identity of the officers, directors and 
stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporations.”399   The 
Pancratz court also examined the new and expanded versions of the 
continuation exception that originated in the Cyr and Turner decisions.400  
In response to the plaintiff’s request that the court adopt one of the 
“totality of the circumstances” approaches to the continuation exception, 
the court stated, “[w]e, however, find no departure in our cases from the 
traditional formulation of the rule.  Nor do we believe public policy 
would be served by such an expansion of the ‘mere continuation’ 
exception.”401  
Iowa:  The Fraud Exception 
The court in Pancratz stated that “‘parties cannot circumvent the 
mere continuation exception by inserting relatives as sham owners and 
directors of a new company that is in substance the predecessor.’”402   In 
397 Grundmeyer, 649 N.W.2d at 752 (citing Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 
N.W.2d 383, 392–93 (Iowa 1975)).  
398 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (emphasis in original) (citing Grand Labs., Inc. 
v. Midcon Labs of Iowa, 32 F.3d 1277, 1283 (8th Cir. 1994)).  
 
399 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Leannais 
v. Cincinatti, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)) (citing Weaver v. Nash 
Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 
F.2d 620, 625–26 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
 
400 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201. 
 
401 Id. at 201; see also Lumley, 2009 WL 2514084 at *3–4. 
 
402 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 202 (quoting Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283); see also C. 
Mac Chambers v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Acad., 412 N.W.2d 593 (Iowa 1987). 
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Chambers a father, the sole owner of a corporation, formed a new 
corporation and transferred all of his businesses’ assets to the newly-
formed corporation.  His son was the sole shareholder and director, but 
the father continued to manage the business.403  The Pancratz court stated 
that, although the Chambers court imposed liability on a successor 
corporation under the mere continuation exception, “in retrospect the 
holding perhaps better exemplifies the fraud exception, not the mere 
continuation exception, to the general rule of nonliability.”404  The 
Pancratz court held that the Chambers decision does not indicate that Iowa 
courts do not require continuity of ownership under the mere 
continuation exception.405  In Lumley v. Advanced Data-Comm, Inc., the 
court applied the traditional elements of fraud in determining that the 
fraud exception did not apply, noting:  “The elements of fraud are: (1) 
representation, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) scienter, (5) intent to 
deceive, (6) reliance, (7) resulting injury and damage.”406 
Kansas 
Kansas courts apply the four traditional exceptions to the general 
rule of successor non-liability.407  However, unlike other traditional rule 
jurisdictions, Kansas does not require continuity of ownership under the 
mere continuation exception.408  
  
403 Chambers, 412 N.W.2d at 595. 
 
404 Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 202. 
 
405 Id. 
 
406 Lumley, 2009 WL 2514084, at *4 (citing Wilden Clinic, Inc. v. Des Moines, 
229 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Iowa 1975). 
 
407 Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 199–200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308 (Kan. 1972)); Equity 
Asset Corp. v. B/E Aero., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Kan. 2005); see also 
YRC, Inc. v. Magla Prods, L.L.C., No. 12-2179-SAC, 2012 WL 2045954 (D. 
Kan. June 6, 2012); Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1298 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1984) (discussing the merits of the product-line exception but refusing to 
apply it because “Kansas adheres to the traditional majority rule of successor 
nonliability.”).  
 
 408 Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1299 (quoting Tift v. Forage King Indust., Inc., 322 
N.W.2d 14 (1982) (“A court merely need determine that the defendant, despite 
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In Avery v. Safeway Transfer & Storage, Co., the Supreme Court of 
Kansas applied a narrow form of the mere continuation exception as 
early as 1938, though it did not classify it as such.409  Although the court 
did not name the exception explicitly, the Kansas Supreme Court 
adopted the “traditional rule” two years earlier in Mank v. S. Kansas Stage 
Lines Co.410  The Avery court held that where certain facts were presented, 
the effect of a transaction was fraudulent, regardless of the intent of the 
parties involved. 
Sometimes this sort of conduct on the 
part of corporations whereby one 
acquires all the assets of another is 
characterized as fraudulent.  But it may 
not be intentionally so; perhaps no 
intentional fraud inhered in this transfer.  
But where the transfer of assets strips a 
debtor corporation of all its assets, and 
disables the corporation from earning 
money to pay its debts, resources to 
which they may look for the payment of 
their due, the net result is in legal effect a 
fraud; and the courts will subject the 
transferee to liability for the satisfaction 
of claims against the corporation whose 
assets it has absorbed.411 
 The Avery court, therefore, subjected the transferee to liability 
based on the going concern value of the purchased assets.  Unlike other 
jurisdictions that have imposed liability under similar circumstances, 
limiting a creditor’s recovery to the liquidation value of the predecessor’s 
assets at the time of the transfer (e.g., California), Kansas courts imposed 
business transformations, is substantially the same as the original 
manufacturer”)). 
 
409 Avery v. Safeway Transfer & Storage, Co., 80 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Kan. 1938).  
 
410 Mank v. S. Kansas Stage Lines Co., 56 P.2d 71 (Kan. 1936). 
  
411 Avery, 80 P.2d at 1101. 
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liability based on the asset’s going concern value and held the successor 
liable for the predecessor’s debts without limitation. 
Kansas:  The Express or Implied Assumption Liability 
Currently, there do not appear to be any Kansas cases that define 
a test for or discuss the contours of the express or implied assumption of 
liabilities exception. 
Kansas:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Kansas courts use a five element test in finding a mere 
continuation:   
 (1) [The] transfer of corporate assets (2) 
for less than adequate consideration (3) to 
another corporation which continued the 
business operation of the transferor (4) 
when both corporations had at least one 
common officer or director who was in 
fact instrumental in the transfer . . . and 
(5) the transfer rendered the transferor 
incapable for paying its creditor’s claims 
because it was dissolved in either fact or 
law.”412 
Note, if there is a party whom the creditor can sue, then the 
mere continuation exception does not apply, even if the party is 
judgment proof.413   
Kansas:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
In Comstock v. Great Lakes Distributing Company, the Kansas 
Supreme Court defined the consolidation or merger exception by 
412 Gillespie, 876 P.2d at 200 (quoting Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1298–99); see also 
Crane Const. Co. v. Klaus Masonry, LLC, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (D. Kan. 
2000). 
 
413 Gillespie, 876 P.2d at 200 (citing Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1297–98) (refusing to 
impose successor liability against the successor because the claimant sued a 
partner of the predecessor). 
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reference to Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, 
stating: 
Strictly speaking, a consolidation signifies 
such a union as necessarily results in the 
creation of a new corporation and the 
termination of the constituent ones, 
whereas a merger signifies the absorption 
of one corporation by another, which 
retains its name and corporate identity 
with the added capital, franchises and 
powers of a merged corporation.414  
The court held the continuation or merger exception did not 
apply because there was no evidence of direct dealing between the 
successor and the predecessor; rather, the successor acquired its interest 
from intervening purchasers of the predecessor’s assets.415  
Kansas:  The Fraud Exception 
In Comstock, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he incorporation of 
[the successor] in 1965, and the subsequent bona fide acquisition of 
some [of the predecessor’s] property after foreclosure and sale, cannot 
serve as a premise for a claim of fraud.”416   
In Moore v. Pyrotech,417 the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas law, 
upheld a finding of successor liability based on the fraud exception.   In 
that case, the trial court had found:  
[The predecessor] entered into the share 
exchange agreement about a month after 
 414 Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Kan. 1972) 
(quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)). 
 
415 Comstock, 496 P.2d at 1311; 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 
(rev. vol. Sept. 2008). 
 
416 Comstock, 496 P.2d at 1312.  
 
417 Moore v. Pyrotech, 13 F.3d 406 (Table), No. 92-3404, 1993 WL 513834 
(10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993). 
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signing the letter of intent with plaintiffs, 
but did not inform plaintiffs.  Lee Derr, 
president of [the predecessor] and [the 
successor], testified that the 
[predecessor’s] shareholders were getting 
restless, and the reverse takeover was 
designed to provide them some 
immediate return on their investment.  
But by this time, [the predecessor] was 
contractually obliged to reimburse 
plaintiffs for their costs of investigating 
the project. . . .  [T]he net result was in 
legal effect a fraud.  The plaintiffs 
negotiated in good faith while [the 
predecessor] and its principals secretly 
created an intricate web of self-dealing to 
create a business successor for [the 
predecessor].  As Derr testified, this was 
designed to give the investors a return on 
their investment, not in and of itself 
improper, but clearly so if done at 
plaintiffs' expense.418 
The Tenth Circuit also noted: “Kansas cases finding successor liability 
have found fraud, see Avery, 80 P.2d at 1101, whereas those finding no 
liability have generally specifically indicated there was no fraud.”419 
Kentucky 
Kentucky recognizes the general rule of successor non-liability 
and the four traditional exceptions.420  Also, while not using the term, 
418 Moore, 1993 WL 513834 at *6 (quoting Moore v. Pyrotech Corp., No. 90-
2178-0, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 1992)). 
 
419 Moore, 1993 WL 513834 at *6 (citing Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1299; Comstock, 496 
P.2d at 1312).    
 
420 Pearson v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002) (citing Am. 
Ry. Express Co. v. Kentucky, 228 S.W. 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920); see also Excel 
Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 F. App'x 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2009); 
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Kentucky appears to have recognized the continuity of enterprise 
exception or seems to employ a more expansive mere continuation 
exception.  For example, in Parker, the appellate court stated: 
In Kentucky, a determination of the 
continuity of a corporation after a sale 
depends on examining the sale agreement 
to determine continuity of shareholders or 
management. Even where an adequate 
consideration was paid for the assets, a 
successor company which continues with 
the same business, by the same officers 
and personnel, in the same location with 
only a slight change in name will be 
considered liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the selling company. 421  
However, in Pearson, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the product-line exception.422  
Kentucky:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
In Pearson, the court reviewed the language of the relevant asset 
purchase agreement and concluded that the successor did not assume the 
predecessor’s pre-closing tort liabilities.423  Even though the successor 
expressly assumed certain liabilities that existed on the closing date, and 
the contract did not specifically address pre-closing tort liabilities, the 
court found that the successor did not impliedly assume pre-closing tort 
liabilities.424    
Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., 165 S.W.3d 474, 478–79 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2005).  
 
421 Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Core 
Med., LLC v. Schroeder, No. 2009-CA-000670-MR, 2010 WL 2867820, at *3 
(Ky. Ct. App. Jul 23, 2010). 
 
422 Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 53. 
 
423 Id. at 50. 
 
424 Id. 
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Kentucky:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Without defining a specific test for the de facto merger exception, 
the Pearson court held that liability would not be imposed on a successor 
that purchases assets “essentially” through a bankruptcy sale.425  The 
court indicated that continuity of shareholders, management, or other 
indicia of merger or consolidation is necessary before the de facto merger 
exception will apply.426   
In Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc., the federal district 
court noted that Kentucky recognizes the four traditional exceptions and 
states:  
The following factors guide the Court in 
its determination whether to apply the de 
facto merger doctrine:  
(1) continuity of management, personnel, 
location, assets, and general business 
operations; (2) continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporations paying for the acquired 
assets with shares of its own stock; (3) 
whether the seller corporation ceases 
business operation and liquidates or 
dissolves as soon as is legally or practically 
possible; (4) whether the purchasing 
corporation assumes the obligations of 
the sellers which are ordinarily necessary 
for the continuation of the seller's normal 
business; and (5) adequacy of the 
consideration received by the selling 
corporation. 427 
425 Id. at 51.  
 
426 Id. 
 
427 Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 906, 926 
(E.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting Ogle v. U.S. Shelter Corp., No. 95–51, 1996 WL 
380707, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 1996)). 
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 Kentucky:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
Based on the Pearson court’s interpretation of the mere 
continuation exception, there must be “continuity of shareholders or 
management” in order to create a continuation sufficient to impose 
liability on the purchasing corporation.428  The court, however, did not 
specify if continuity of ownership and control is necessary.  The court did 
not define a specific test for the exception.  The court relied on “a 
reading of the purchase and sale agreement, together with the fact that 
the sale was essentially a bankruptcy sale” in finding that the purchaser 
did not assume the liabilities of the seller.429   
In Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., the court held:  “Even 
where an adequate consideration was paid for the assets, a successor 
company which continues with the same business, by the same officers 
and personnel, in the same location with only a slight change in name 
will be considered liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling 
company.”430  However, in that case the court held that there was no 
“continuation” or “continuity of a corporation,” as the ownership, 
management, and business practices of the successor differed 
substantially from its predecessor.431   In Competitive Auto Ramp Services v. 
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance, the court stated that “merely continuing 
the same business, even in the same location, is not, by itself, sufficient 
to impose successor liability.”432     
 
 
 
 
428 Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51; Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., 165 S.W.3d 
474, 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
 
429 Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51; Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479. 
 
430 Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479; see also Core Med., LLC v. Schroeder, 2010 WL 
2867820, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jul 23, 2010). 
 
431 Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479–80. 
 
432 Competitive Auto Ramp Serv. v. Ky. Unemployment Ins., 222 S.W.3d 249, 
253 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 
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Kentucky:  The Fraud Exception 
The court in Pearson did not address the fraud exception because 
the plaintiff in Pearson conceded that “no fraud exists in this case.”433  
There does yet not appear to be a subsequent case addressing this 
specific exception.    
Louisiana 
 In Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, a 2010 case, a Louisiana appellate 
court set out what it referred to as the “basic principle of corporate 
successor liability[:]”   
The general rule of corporate liability is 
that, when a corporation sells all of its 
assets to another, the latter is not 
responsible for the seller's debts or 
liabilities, except where (1) the purchaser 
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume 
the obligations; (2) the purchaser is 
merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation; or (3) the transaction is 
entered into to escape liability.434 
In Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., the court stated that the second 
exception to non-liability, mere continuation, “would include the 
surviving corporation in most mergers” as well as “some non-merger 
sales in which one corporation or other business entity sells all its assets 
to another legal entity.” 435  In discussing the third exception—entering 
into a transaction in order to escape liability—the court used the term 
433 Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51 (stating that the holding in American Railway still 
governs successor non-liability in the state of Kentucky); Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 
479. 
 
434 Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, 52 So. 3d 240, 243 (La. Ct. App. 2010) 
(quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 
182 n. 5 (1973). 
 
435 Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1125, 1126–27 (La. Ct. App. 
1985). 
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“defraud.” 436  The fraud exception is also found in long standing 
Louisiana precedent.437   
Finally, Louisiana courts have not adopted, or expressly rejected, 
the product line theory of California’s Ray v. Alad.438  Most recently, the 
court in Pichon stated the exception did not apply to the facts before it 
because the predecessor was a “viable defendant” when the suit was filed 
and, in fact, was named as a defendant.439  The court added:  “The fact 
that [the predecessor] subsequently filed for bankruptcy (but has not 
been dissolved) is irrelevant to the determination of the legal question 
presented here.”440 
Louisiana:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exceptions 
In discussing the express or implied assumption form of 
successor liability in the context of a tort claim for injuries from a 
defective lathe, the Bourque court stated that this form of successor 
liability: 
 [I]s premised upon the concept that a 
voluntary sale of all assets includes, or 
should include, negotiations as to the 
transfer of all aspects of the corporate 
balance sheet.  The parties to the sale are 
free to bargain, and potential liability is 
certainly one of the factors that rational 
businessmen include in the negotiations 
of such sales.441 
436 Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127; see also Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789 (La. 
1916) (successor liability imposed based on fraudulent schemes to escape 
liability through sale of a company’s assets to a newly formed corporation 
following an explosion). 
 
437 Wolff, 70 So. at 794–95. 
 
438 Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 244–45; Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1128. 
 
439 Id. at 245. 
 
440 Id. at 245, n. 5. 
 
441 Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127. 
                                                          
 
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   885 
The court noted that “[q]uite obviously, an auction pursuant to 
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings is not a voluntary transaction in 
which both parties negotiate terms of sale.”442 
 Biller v. Snug Harbor Jazz Bistro of Louisiana, L.L.C., 443 deserves 
mention.  The case involved a restaurant that was transferred from a 
deceased uncle (Mr. Brumat) to his living niece (Ms. Brumat) and an 
injury that occurred at the restaurant while the deceased was still living.  
Upon receiving her inheritance, Ms. Brumat formed Snug Harbor L.L.C. 
with Mr. Schmidt, the former manager of Snug Harbor.  The question 
for the court was whether Snug Harbor, L.L.C. was a mere continuation 
of Snug Harbor: 
A newly organized corporation would be 
liable as the successor of the old upon a 
showing that the transaction was entered 
into in fraud of the creditors of the old 
corporation or when the circumstances 
attending the creation of the new and its 
succession to the business and property 
of the old were of such a character as to 
warrant a finding the new corporation 
was merely a continuation of the old.444 
Ultimately, the court held that “Snug Harbor, L.L.C., is a separate, 
distinct entity from the late Mr. Brumat and his estate, and therefore, not 
liable for the debts of the succession . . . . Snug Harbor, L.L.C., did not 
exist at the time of Mr. Biller’s accident and was formed after Mr. 
Brumat’s death.”445 
 
 
442 Id.  
 
443 Biller v. Snug Harbor Jazz Bistro of Louisiana, L.L.C., 99 So. 3d 730, 733 
(La. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, (Sept. 20, 2012), writ denied, 2012–2151 (La. 
Nov. 21, 2012), 102 So. 3d 60. 
 
444 Snug Harbor, 99 So. 3d at 732 (citing Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789, 
794 (La. 1916)). 
 
445 Id. at 733. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
886       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
 Louisiana:  The Fraud or To Escape Liability Exception 
Based on Wolff v. Shreveport Gas,446 a 1916 case from the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, courts will impose successor liability when there is 
evidence of fraud in the transaction.447  The Wolff court relied on the 
trust fund doctrine, which holds that a surviving corporation is liable to 
the predecessor’s creditors if the transaction was entered into 
fraudulently.448  The court in Wolff stated: 
 [A] newly organized corporation is liable 
for the debts of an old one . . . where it is 
shown that the succession was the result 
of a transaction entered into in fraud of 
the creditors of the old corporation, or 
that the circumstances attending the 
creation of the new . . . were of such a 
character as to warrant the finding that 
the new, is merely a continuation of the 
old, corporation.449 
 A “transaction . . . entered into to escape liability” is also an 
enumerated exception to the general rule of non-successor liability.450  
Although, on its face, this exception appears to be potentially broad, the 
court in Bourque, limits this exception to one involving fraud.451  Also, in 
446 Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789 (La. 1916).  
   
447 See Roddy v. NORCO Local 4-750, Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l 
Union, 359 So. 2d 957, 960 (La. 1978) (quoting Wolff, 70 So. at 794; see also 
Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing the difference between the fraud exception and the mere 
continuation exception).  
 
448 Wolff, 70 So. at 794. 
 
449 Id.  
 
450 Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, 52 So. 3d 240, 243 (La. Ct. App. 2010) 
(quoting 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973); Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So. 
2d 1125, 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1985)). 
 
451 Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127. 
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Pichon, the court indicated the exception applies only to “transaction[s] 
entered into for the sole purpose of escaping liability.”452 
Louisiana:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
 Although Louisiana courts do not use the term “de facto” 
merger in discussing exceptions to the general rule of non-successor 
liability, the Wolff court’s description of transactions that may give rise to 
liability in part resembles the traditional de facto merger doctrine.453   
 The Wolff court summarized the four general categories of 
business reorganizations that may produce a “continuation” resulting in 
successor liability—consolidations, mergers, continuations, and de 
facto mergers:  
The first of such groups comprehends 
consolidations proper, where all the 
constituent companies cease to exist and 
a new one comes into being; the second, 
cases of merger proper, in which one of 
the corporate parties ceases to exist while 
the other continues.  The third group 
comprehends cases where a new 
corporation is, either in law or in point of 
fact, the reincarnation of an old one.  To 
the fourth group belong those 
transactions whereby a corporation, 
although continuing to exist de jure, is in 
fact merged in another, which, by 
acquiring its assets and business, has left 
of the other only its corporate shell.454 
 
 
452 Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 244 (emphasis added).   
 
453 Wolff, 70 So. at 794. 
  
454 Id.  
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Louisiana:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
The court in Bourque explained the rationale for imposing liability 
under the mere continuation exception, listing the following factors to be 
considered:  
 [T]his rationale for liability would include 
some non-merger sales in which one 
corporation or other business entity sells 
all its assets to another legal entity.  The 
key consideration is whether the 
successor is, in fact, a “continuation” of 
the predecessor.  The extent to which 
predecessor and successor have common 
shareholders, directors, officers, or even 
employees are pertinent considerations.  
Further, prior business relationships 
should be considered, as should the 
continuity of the identity of the business 
in the eyes of the public.455 
 Recently, the appellate court ruled that the sale of all of a 
predecessor’s assets to a successor is a threshold requirement.456  In 
Pichon, on appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the 
defendants, a successor purchased a division of General Motors (“GM”), 
known as Detroit Diesel Allison Division.  The sales agreement provided 
that the successor would not assume or be liable for “any liabilities, 
obligations or commitments of GM or of any of its Affiliates, . . .”457  
The court first noted: 
In the absence of a transaction entered 
into for the sole purpose of escaping 
liability, which is covered by exception # 
3 above, we believe the facts showing one 
corporation to be merely a continuation 
455 Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127. 
 
456 Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 240. 
 
457 Id. at 243. 
 
                                                          
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   889 
of the other would have to be especially 
compelling to impose liability upon a 
corporation that has expressly contracted 
out of such liability.458 
The court did reach that issue, however, as it held that the plaintiff failed 
to satisfy a threshold element.  The court stated specifically that “[a] 
threshold requirement to trigger a determination of whether successor 
liability is applicable under the ‘continuation’ exception is that one 
corporation must have purchased ‘all’ the assets of another.”459  
 The dissent disagreed and maintained that summary judgment 
was improper because the inquiry was factually intensive and required a 
balancing and examination of the eight factors set forth in Hollowell v. 
Orleans Regional Hospital LLC;460 the factors are as follows:  
(1) retention of the same employees;  
(2) retention of the same supervisory 
personnel;  
(3) retention of the same production 
facility in the same physical location;  
(4) production of the same product;  
(5) retention of the same name;  
(6) continuity of assets;  
(7) continuity of general business 
operations; and  
458 Id. at 244 (citation omitted). 
  
459 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5 (1973)); National Sur. Corp. v. Pope Park, 
Inc., 121 So. 2d 240 (La. 1960); Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & 
Power Co., 70 So. 789 (La. 1916). 
  
460 217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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(8) whether the successor holds itself out 
as the continuation of the previous 
enterprise.461 
 Note that the majority did not address Hollowell or its eight factor 
test associated with the continuity of enterprise doctrine.    
 In Russell v. SunAmerica Securities., Inc.,462a 1992 case, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the eight factor 
continuity of enterprise test found in Mozingo v. Correct Manufacturing 
Corp.463 as its test for the Louisiana continuation exception; this is the 
same test employed in Hollowell (2000) as well as in the precedential Cyr.  
Federal district courts in Louisiana have followed Russell in using this 
test, referring to it as “mere continuation,” rather than “continuity of 
enterprise.”464  It appears though that this test was, at least implicitly, 
rejected by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in the 2010 Pichon case.465   
 Also note that in a 1960 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
explained that under Wolff, that, in order for a continuation to be found, 
there must be continuity of ownership between the selling and 
purchasing corporations:  
[T]he “continuation” doctrine of 
the Wolff case can be invoked only when 
it is shown that the major stockholders of 
the selling corporation also have a 
substantial or almost identical interest in 
the purchasing corporation, for, 
otherwise, there would be no premise for 
461 Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 246–47 (Belsome, J., dissenting) (quoting Hollowell, 217 
F.3d at 390). 
 
462 962 F.2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Monzingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 
752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 
463 752 F.2d at 175 (applying Mississippi law). 
  
464 Hollowell, 217 F.3d at 390. 
 
465 52 So. 3d at 240. 
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concluding that the new corporation is a 
reincarnation of the old.466  
However, more recent cases indicate that the key requirement is that all 
of a predecessor’s assets be sold to the successor rather than merely just 
identity of ownership.467 
 Finally, in more recent cases involving contract-based or tax 
claims, Louisiana appellate courts have not imposed successor liability 
based on the perceived separate nature of the defendants involved.468 
Maine 
In Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc., a 
case involving liability for severance pay under M.R.S.A. § 625-B, the 
Supreme Court of Maine stated: 
 [A]bsent a contrary agreement by the 
parties, or an explicit statutory provision 
in derogation of the established common 
law rule, a corporation that purchases the 
assets of another corporation in a bona 
fide, arm’s-length transaction is not liable 
for the debts or liabilities of the transferor 
corporation.469 
466 Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Pope Park, Inc., 121 So. 2d 240, 243 (La. 1960). 
 
467 Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 243; Bourque, v. Lehmann Lathe Inc.,476 So. 2d 1125, 
1127 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 
468 See TLC Novelty Company, Inc. v. Perino’s Inc., 881 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004) (contract claim for breach of video game contracts with the first 
Perino’s bar could not be asserted against the second and third bars of the same 
name, each of which was separately incorporated by the same owner and each 
managed by her son); see also Morrison v. C.A. Guidry Produce, 856 So. 2d 1222 
(La. Ct. App. 2003) (state’s tax claim could not be asserted against company not 
found to be a successor of the taxpayer under Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Electric 
Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789 (La. 1916)); Cent. Bus. Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure 
Sys., Inc., 540 So. 2d. 1029 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 
469 Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc., 588 A.2d 734, 
736 (Me. 1991) (citation omitted) (citing Whiting v. Malden & Melrose R.R., 88 
N.E. 907, 910 (Mass. 1909); 8 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 
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  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant 
was liable as a successor because it was a mere continuation of the seller 
on the ground that plaintiff had not established facts on this issue.  
However, the court did not explicitly state that the mere continuation 
exception was not recognized as a successor liability doctrine in Maine.470   
Maine state courts do not appear to have addressed successor 
liability in the tort context, and federal court cases provide mixed 
guidance as to how state courts might approach successor liability in this 
area.471   
Maryland 
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
(Maryland’s highest court) adopted “the general rule of nonliability of a 
successor corporation, with its four traditional exceptions.”472  The 
Nissen court recognized that the express assumption and de facto merger 
exceptions were codified in Maryland’s Corporations Statutes, and the 
fraud exception was codified in Maryland’s Fraudulent Conveyance 
163.02(2)(c) (1990); 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 
1983).   
 
 470 Diamond Brands, 588 A.2d at 737. But see Janet M. Sing, Inc. v. Maine Dept. of 
Labor, 492 A.2d 892 (Me. 1985) (discussing statutory employer continuation 
liability under M.R.S.A. Title 26, § 1228).  
 
471 Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp., 62 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining 
to rule whether Maine would adopt the “majority rule” with the four traditional 
exceptions, but stating the product line doctrine “is at most a minority rule 
which has plainly not been adopted by Maine”); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 
F.R.D. 348, 366 n.33 (D. Me. 2000) (citing Diamond Brands, 588 A.2d at 736 n.5) 
(“Under Maine’s common law, a corporation may be liable for the debts of its 
predecessor if the new corporation is a ‘mere continuation’ of the predecessor 
or if the transaction was undertaken with a fraudulent intent to escape 
liability.”); Saco River Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Shooshan Jackson, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 
580, 583 (D. Me. 1993) (stating Maine did not appear to recognize the de facto 
merger and continuity of enterprise “exceptions to the common law rule”). 
 
472 Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 565 (Md. 1991); see also Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. Coach Works Auto Collision Repair Ctr., Inc., No. WMN–07–
2918, 2011 WL 709714, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2011); Charter Oak Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Marlow Liquors, LLC, No. JKS 09–1894, 2010 WL 2245039, at *3–4 (D. 
Md. June 1, 2010).   
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Act.473  The court also concluded that the mere continuation exception is 
based on sound policy.474  Importantly though, the Nissen court expressly 
rejected the continuity of enterprise exception.475   
Maryland:  The Express and Implied Assumption Exceptions 
Maryland courts look to the language of the asset purchase 
agreement to determine if the purchasing corporation expressly assumed 
the liabilities of the seller.476  Unlike most jurisdictions, Maryland has 
articulated a more narrow, totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine 
whether the purchaser impliedly assumed the liabilities of the seller:  
In order for a promise to be implied on 
the part of a corporation to pay the debts 
of another corporation, the conduct or 
representations relied upon by the party 
asserting liability must indicate an 
intention of the buyer to pay the debts of 
the seller.  The presence of such an 
intention depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.477 
 The Baltimore Luggage court, applying the preceding standard, held 
that a purchasing corporation did not impliedly assume an employment 
contract where the purchaser continued to pay the employee salary and 
report his earnings on a W-2 because the purchaser deducted these 
473 Nissen, 594 A.2d at 566.  
 
474 Id. (citing Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Md. 1989)). 
 
475 Id. at 570–74; see also Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc., 
687 A.2d 669, 678–79 (Md. 1997) (quoting Nissen, 594 A.2d at 567 (“The 
gravamen of the traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception is the continuation of 
the corporate entity rather than continuation of the business operation.”)); EHA 
Consulting Group v. Hardin & Assoc., No. RDB 09–2859, P.C., 2010 WL 
1137514, at *3 (D. Md. March 19, 2010).  
 
476 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1286. 
 
477 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1292. (citing 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER 
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 
7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)). 
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payments from the amount that the purchaser paid for the seller’s 
assets.478  In contrast, the purchaser was held liable in Ramlall v. MobilPro 
Corp.479 in which a reverse triangular merger agreement contained a 
clause expressly assuming the seller’s liabilities.    
Maryland:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Baltimore Luggage court also provided a test for whether a 
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the seller; in order for 
a purchasing corporation to be liable for the debts of it predecessor, the 
successor corporation must meet certain “indicia of continuation,” 
which are: 
 [C]ommon officers, directors, and 
stockholders[] and only one corporation 
in existence after the completion of the 
sale of assets.  While the two foregoing 
factors are traditionally indications of a 
continuing corporation, neither is 
essential.  Other factors such as 
continuation of the seller's business 
practices and policies and the sufficiency 
of consideration running to the seller 
corporation in light of the assets being 
sold may also be considered.  To find that 
continuity exists merely because there was 
common management and ownership 
without considering other factors is to 
disregard the separate identities of the 
corporation without the necessary 
considerations that justify such an 
action.480  
478 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1286. 
 
479 202 Md. App. 20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
 
480 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293 (quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER 
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 
7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).  
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 In Baltimore Luggage, the trial court held that the purchaser was a 
mere continuation of the seller based on evidence that the purchaser 
continued to use the trade name of the seller, holding itself out as the 
same entity so that customers would not know that the ownership had in 
fact changed.481  The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed because there 
was no continuity of ownership between the corporations, the seller 
remained in existence, and there was sufficient consideration given for 
the assets.482  
In a later Court of Special Appeals decision, the court analyzed 
the facts in front of them using a continuation test adopted by Rhode 
Island—though they did not expressly endorse the test.483  The Rhode 
Island test was based on five non-dispositive factors: 
 “(1) there is a transfer of corporate 
assets; (2) there is less than adequate 
consideration; (3) the new company 
continues the business of the transferor; 
(4) both companies have at least one 
common officer or director who is 
instrumental in the transfer; (5) the 
transfer renders the transferor incapable 
of paying its creditors because it is 
dissolved either in fact or by law.”484 
 “[T]he ‘mere continuation’ exception is ‘designed to prevent a situation 
whereby the specific purpose of acquiring assets is to place those assets 
out of reach of [a] predecessor’s creditors.’”485 
481 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293.  
 
482 Id. at 1294. 
 
483 Acad. of IRM v. LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc., 687 A.2d 669, 680 (Md. 1997).  
  
484 IRM, 687 A.2d at 680 (quoting H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 
554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989)).  
  
485 Progressive Septic, Inc. v. SeptiTech, LLC, No. ELH-09-03446, 2011 WL 
939022, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2011) (quoting Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 
1293). 
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It is important to note that neither mere continuation test applied 
by the Maryland courts requires continuity of ownership.  The Baltimore 
Luggage court, however, noted that the mere continuation exception 
applies where “the purchasing corporation maintains the same or similar 
management and ownership but wears a ‘new hat.’”486  In discussing the 
four traditional exceptions, the Nissen court cited this quote from 
Baltimore Luggage with approval.487  In 2010, the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, stated: 
In Maryland, jurisdiction based upon a 
theory of continuity of the entity is a basis 
for successor liability, whereas jurisdiction 
based upon continuity of the enterprise is 
not a basis for successor liability . . . .  As 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in 
Nissen, “The mere continuation or 
continuity of entity exception applies 
where there is a continuation of directors 
and management, shareholder interest 
and, in some cases, inadequate 
consideration.  The gravamen of the 
traditional mere continuation exception is 
the continuation of the corporate entity 
rather than continuation of the business 
operation.” . . .  In comparison, “[A] 
continuity of enterprise analysis seeks to 
establish whether there is substantial 
continuity of pretransaction and 
posttransaction business activities 
resulting from the use of the acquired 
assets. . . .”488  
486 Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293. (quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern 
Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1985).  
 
487 Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 566 (Md. 1991) (citing Baltimore 
Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293). 
  
488 EHA Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Hardin & Assocs., P.C., No. CIV.A RDB 09-
2859, 2010 WL 1137514, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2010) (emphasis in original) 
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Based on the current case law, it is difficult to tell what degree of 
continuity is actually required before a court will impose liability based 
on the mere continuation exception. 
Maryland:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
As the Nissen court indicated, the de facto merger exception is 
codified in Maryland’s Corporation Statute.  Although the statute does 
not use the term “de facto merger,” it provides that the surviving entity in 
a merger situation is liable for the debts of the predecessor and does not 
specify that such liability extends only to statutory mergers.489  Maryland 
courts have not yet articulated a test for what constitutes a de facto 
merger. 
Maryland:  The Fraud Exception 
In discussing the fraud exception, the Nissen court noted that 
“the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 15-201 et seq., 
Commercial Law Article, Maryland Annotated Code, protects the rights 
of creditors of a corporation which transfers its assets with an intent to 
defraud or without fair consideration in a manner similar to the fourth 
[fraud] exception noted above.”490 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts courts:  
“follow the traditional corporate law 
principle that the liabilities of a selling 
predecessor corporation are not imposed 
upon the successor corporation which 
purchases its assets, unless (1) the 
successor expressly or impliedly assumes 
liability of the predecessor, (2) the 
transaction is a de facto merger or 
(citations omitted) (quoting Nissen, 594 A.2d at 564 & n.1; and citing IRM, 687 
A.2d 669).  
 
489 MD. CODE ANN. § 3-114(e)(1) (1998).  
 
490 594 A.2d at 566 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Navistar 
Intern. Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201, republished as corrected, 737 F. Supp. 
1446, 1449 (D. Md.1988)).  
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consolidation, (3) the successor is a mere 
continuation of the predecessor, or (4) 
the transaction is a fraudulent effort to 
avoid liabilities of the predecessor.’” 491   
The court in Guzman v. MRM/Elgin also expressly rejected the 
product line exception, deferring to the legislature on this “matter[] of 
social policy.”492  
 Massachusetts:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
Courts determine whether a purchasing corporation expressly or 
impliedly assumed the liabilities of the selling corporation by looking at 
the language of the relevant contract documents.493   
 Massachusetts:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
In Massachusetts “[t]he ‘de facto merger’ theory of successor 
liability ‘has usually been applied to situations in which the ownership, 
assets and management of one corporation are combined with those of 
another, preexisting entity.’”494 
In Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts outlined a factor-based test for the de facto merger 
exception: 
The factors that courts generally consider 
in determining whether to characterize an 
asset sale as a de facto merger are whether 
491 Milliken Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 N.E.2d 244, 254–55 (Mass. 2008) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 931 
(Mass. 1991)); Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill and Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443, 1447 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); JSB Indus., Inc. v. Nexus Payroll Servs., Inc., 463 
F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931). 
  
492 Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 933 (quoting Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490 
N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1986)). 
 
493 Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 981, 992 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006), rev’d, 
450 Mass. 760 (2008); Goguen v. Textron Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D. Mass. 
2007).  
 
494 Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 255 (quoting National Gypsum Co. v. Cont’l Brands 
Corp., 895 F. Supp. 328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995)).  
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(1) there is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation so that 
there is continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations; whether (2) 
there is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation; whether (3) the 
seller corporation ceases its ordinary 
business operations, liquidates, and 
dissolves as soon as legally and practically 
possible; and whether (4) the purchasing 
corporation assumes those obligations of 
the seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation . . . . No single factor is 
necessary or sufficient to establish a de 
facto merger . . . .495 
 Thus, under Massachusetts law, continuity of ownership is not a 
threshold requirement for finding a de facto merger; however, “[i]n 
determining whether a de facto merger has occurred, courts pay particular 
attention to the continuation of management, officers, directors and 
shareholders.”496  “[I]mposition of successor liability does not depend on 
the status of a particular creditor as secured or unsecured” or on the 
solvency or insolvency of the predecessor; “rather, the analysis focuses 
495 Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1997) 
(citations omitted) (citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor 
Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D.  Mass. 
1989)); see also Milliken,  887 N.E.2d at 255; Gregorio v. Excelergy Corp., No. 
07-2754BLS2, 2008 WL 2875430, at *4 (Mass. Super. 2008); Goguen, 476 F. 
Supp. 2d at 12–14; JSB Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d at 109–10; (quoting Acushnet, 
712 F. Supp. at 1015); Scott, 854 N.E.2d at 991; Am. Paper Recycling Corp. v. 
IHC Corp., 707 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119–20 (D. Mass.  2010) (citations omitted). 
 
496 Cargill, 676 N.E.2d at 819. 
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on whether one company has become another for purposes of its 
corporate debt.”497   
 In Massachusetts there is also no requirement that the 
predecessor be formally dissolved.498  “Rather, the principles of 
successor liability will be imposed where a corporation ceases all of its 
ordinary business operations, which are assumed by another corporation, 
and liquidates its assets.  When this occurs, the predecessor corporation, 
for all practical purposes, has ceased to exist.”499  In addition, Cargill 
allows for the finding of a de facto merger when stock is only part of the 
value exchanged in the deal, though the court noted that “[w]here no 
stock is exchanged, corporate successor liability has more frequently 
been imposed on a theory of ‘continuity of enterprise.’”500 
 In ruling that successor liability could be imposed under the de 
facto merger and mere continuation exceptions, the Massachusetts 
Supreme court in Milliken explained:  
Here, it was undisputed that Old Duro 
ceased its ordinary business operations 
following the foreclosure sale, it currently 
has no offices or employees, and the 
former chief executive officer of Old 
Duro is now the chief executive officer of 
New Duro. Fundamentally, Old Duro, as 
a dyer, printer, finisher, and distributor of 
textile products, no longer exists.  It sold 
its operating assets to New Duro, thereby 
enabling New Duro to maintain the same 
production capabilities and sell the same 
goods without any interruption to the 
business.  We recognize that Old Duro 
did not legally dissolve as a corporate 
entity.  Instead, it changed its name and 
now rents to New Duro the real estate 
497 Milliken Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, No. BRCV2002-1364, 2005 WL 
1791562, at *8 (Mass. Super. June 10, 2005). 
 
498 Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 256. 
 
499 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
500 Cargill, 676 N.E.2d at 819 n.8. 
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that it still owns in Fall River and recovers 
tax refunds.  Notwithstanding this 
particular fact, only one among several 
for consideration, we decline to elevate 
form over substance by concluding that 
the nature of Old Duro's corporate 
existence as Chace Street trumps the 
existence of New Duro as the successor 
corporation on whom liability properly 
should be imposed.  The existence of 
Chace Street simply does not undermine 
the nonexistence of Old Duro as a going 
concern.501  
 Massachusetts:  The Mere Continuation Exception  
In Milliken the supreme court described the mere continuation 
exception as consisting of “minimal indices” as well as flexible factors:   
The “mere continuation” theory of 
successor liability “envisions a 
reorganization transforming a single 
company from one corporate entity into 
another . . . .”  “[T]he indices of a 
continuation are, at a minimum: 
continuity of directors, officers, and 
stockholders; and the continued existence 
of only one corporation after the sale of 
assets . . . .”  In essence, the purchasing 
corporation “is merely a ‘new hat’ for the 
seller.” . . .  Similar to the considerations 
underlying a finding of a “de facto 
merger,” the factors characterizing a 
continuing corporation are traditional 
indicators, but no single factor is 
dispositive, and the facts of each case 
must be examined independently . . . . 502 
501 Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 256 (footnote omitted). 
 
502 Id. at 255–56 (citations omitted) (quoting McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 
570 N.E.2d 1008, 1013); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 
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 Massachusetts:  The Fraud Exception 
In Groman v. Watman, the court held that a sale that violated the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act satisfied the fraud exception to the 
general rule of no successor liability.503  There, the court concluded the 
plaintiff had proven (1) “a transfer by the debtor[/predecessor], (2) a 
debt owed to [the plaintiff by the debtor/predecessor] that preceded the 
transfer, (3) that [the debtor/predecessor] did not receive a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for what it transferred, and (4) that the 
[debtor/predecessor] was insolvent at the time of the transfer, or became 
insolvent as a result thereof.”504  In addition, the court found that many 
factors or “badges of fraud” were present that indicated an “actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”505 
In JSB Industries, Inc. v. Nexus Payroll Services, Inc., the federal 
district court stated that the lack of a showing of inadequate 
consideration was significant to the negation of allegations of fraud.506 
 Massachusetts: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Litton Indus., 
Inc.507 applied the continuity of enterprise exception using all four of the 
Turner v. Bituminous considerations, including “retention of key personnel, 
assets, general business operations, and. . . name”, as elemental criteria 
for the inquisition.508  The court decided that neither the mere 
continuation nor the continuity of enterprise exceptions were applicable 
to the given facts, and therefore declined to adopt the continuity of 
1458 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also Gregorio v. Excelergy Corp., No. 07-2754BLS2, 
2008 WL 2875430, at *5 (Mass. Super. 2008). 
 
503 Groman v. Watman, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 359, No. 0300646, 2010 WL 
4244833, at *3–5 (Mass. Super.  July 1, 2010); MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. Ch. 
109A (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), §§ 5 & 6.  
 
504 Groman, 2010 WL 4244833, at *2. 
 
505 Groman, 2010 WL 4244833, at *4. 
 
506 463 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110–11 (D. Mass. 2006).  
 
507 570 N.E.2d at 1013.  
 
508 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976). 
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enterprise doctrine at that time.509   The court did not state whether or 
not it would adopt the continuity of enterprise exception if given the 
proper set of facts but noted in a footnote that the exception was 
“distinctly a minority approach.”510 
Michigan 
Michigan recognizes five exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability including the traditional four plus “where some of the elements 
of a purchase in good faith [are] lacking, or where the transfer was 
without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not 
provided for.”511  Most importantly, Michigan expanded the continuation 
exception to what has become known as the “continuity of enterprise” 
exception.512  The continuity of enterprise exception applies in the 
context of products liability and not always in a purely commercial 
context.513 
Gorge v. Rapid Advance LLC514 bears mentioning.  The case offers 
no analysis regarding any of the exceptions to successor non-liability; 
however, it does describe (in atypical terms) the general rule of successor 
non-liability:  “The mere fact that a corporation acquires all the assets of 
another does not necessarily mean it will be liable for the obligations of 
509 McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1013. 
 
510 McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1013 n. 6. 
  
511 Oliver v. Perry, No. 296871, 2011 WL 2204128, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. June 7, 
2011), appeal denied, 490 Mich. 983, 806 N.W.2d 531 (2011) (quoting Turner, 244 
N.W.2d at 878 n.3); see also Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 
506, 509–510 (Mich. 1999) (the Turner v. Bituminous court recognized only the 
four traditional exceptions at the time it expanded the “mere continuation” 
exception); Starks v. Mich. Welding Specialists, Inc., 722 N.W.2d 888 (Mich. 
2006); Jeffrey v. Rapid Am. Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644 (Mich. 1995); accord First 
Presbyterian Church of Ypsilanti v. H.A. Howell Pipe Organs, Inc., 2010 WL 
419972, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2010); Perceptron, Inc. v. Silicon Video, Inc., 
423 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2006).   
 
512 See Turner, 244 N.W. 2d at 883. 
 
513 Starks, 722 N.W.2d at 889. 
 
514 Gorge v. Rapid Advance LLC, No. 10-11474, 2011 WL 679842, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Feb. 16, 2011). 
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its predecessor. If it is liable for the predecessor's obligations, however, it 
will be subject to longarm jurisdiction in a suit to enforce the obligation 
if the predecessor would have been subject to such jurisdiction.”515 
 Michigan:  The Express/Implied Assumption Exception 
Michigan recognizes express or implied assumption of liabilities 
as an exception to the general rule of successor nonliability.516  The 
Michigan appellate court has, at least on one occasion, concluded that, 
where the facts and circumstances surrounding a purchase agreement as 
well as a deposition of the successor’s vice-president, suggest the 
possibility of implied assumption, summary judgment for the successor 
is inappropriate.517  
 Michigan:  The Fraud Exception 
 “The general rule of nonliability holds except where the 
transaction is fraudulent as to creditors of the transferor.  The creditors 
may then follow the property to the transferee.  Indicia of fraud may be 
inadequate consideration paid to the transferor, and/or lack of good 
faith.”518   
Both the fraud and mere continuation exceptions share the 
element of inadequacy of consideration.  A Michigan appellate court 
addressed a trial court’s application of the fraud exception in Gougeon 
Bros., Inc. v. Phoenix Resins, Inc.519  In reviewing the trial court’s holding of 
successor liability, the court stated: 
The trial court held that plaintiff 
demonstrated that defendant was subject 
to successor liability because the sale of 
Matrix’ [the predecessor] assets was a 
515 Gorge, 2011 WL 679842, at *4 (quoting Inter-Americas Ins. Corp. v. Xycor 
Systems, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 1213, 1217 (Miss. 2006); Neagos v. v. Valmet-
Appleton, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 682, 688–89 (E. D. Mich. 1992)). 
 
516 See Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 509–10.  
 
517 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pontiac Plastics & Supply Co., No. 214079, 2000 WL 
33538535, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000).  
 
518 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 886–87 (Coleman, J., dissenting).  
  
519 No. 211738, 2000 WL 33534582, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000). 
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fraudulent transfer designed to defraud 
Matrix’ creditors and because defendant 
was a mere continuation of Matrix.  To 
support this holding, the court made the 
following findings of fact:  defendant 
bought Matrix’ assets for $3,000, while 
Matrix’ sales had exceeded $115,000; the 
same two persons were equal 
shareholders of both Matrix and 
defendant; defendant conducts business 
at same [sic] address as did Matrix; and 
defendant notified Matrix’ distributors 
that MAS epoxy was now one of 
defendant’s products, that defendant 
would pay any currently owed invoices, 
and that the distributors should continue 
to use Matrix literature until the new 
literature was available . . . .  These 
findings demonstrate, at least, that 
defendant is a mere continuation of 
Matrix.520 
Implicit in this holding is that the threshold for finding a mere 
continuation may be lower than the threshold for a finding of fraud. 
 Michigan:  The De Facto Merger Exception  
The court in Turner v. Bituminous, though most interested in 
fashioning the continuity of enterprise exception, cited Shannon v. Samuel 
Langston Co.521 for the requirements of a de facto merger: 
(1) There is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
520 Gougeon, 2000 WL 33534582, at *2. 
 
521 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). 
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corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation. 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates, 
and dissolves as soon as legally and 
practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation.522 
The Turner court noted that “the general results of a [de facto] merger are 
that [(1)] the acquired corporation ceases to exist, [(2)] the acquiring 
corporation takes over the entire operation of the acquired corporation 
and [(3)] shareholders of the acquired corporation become shareholders 
of the acquiring corporation,” and held that all three of these criteria 
must be present in order to fulfill the de facto merger doctrine and 
override the traditional rule of successor non-liability.523   
 Michigan:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
 As noted by the dissent in Turner, the mere continuation 
exception is “the most confused of the four exceptions.”524   “[T]he 
522 Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 891; (Coleman, J., dissenting) (quoting Shannon 379 F. 
Supp. at 801); see also Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 684 N.W. 2d 296, 314–15 
(Mich. 2004) (holding there was no de facto merger “simply because . . . the 
purchasing corporation paid cash, not stock”); Tassos Epicurean Cuisine, Inc. 
v. Triad Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-71510-DT, 2007 WL 956745, at *9 
(E.D. Mich.  2007); Bestfoods v. Aerojet-General Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 729, 
757–58 (W.D. Mich. 2001).  
    
523  Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 892 (Coleman, J. dissenting). 
 
524 Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
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exception seems to encompass the situation where one corporation sells 
its assets to another corporation with the same people owning both 
corporations.”525 A recent Michigan decision has elucidated the situation 
though, stating that “[a] new entity with different owners and a different 
business purpose does not constitute a mere continuation of the old 
entity.”526    
 The Sixth Circuit examined the disparity among Michigan cases 
dealing with the mere continuation exception, noting that “[t]he only 
indispensable prerequisites to application of the exception appear to be 
common ownership and a transfer of substantially all assets.”527  Further, 
“[b]eside these two factors, the most important consideration appears to 
be the nature of the business performed by the successor corporation—
that is, whether its ‘main corporate purpose was to conduct the same 
business’ as its predecessor.”528    
 Michigan:  The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
The Turner court expanded the mere continuation exception, 
essentially removing the commonality of shareholders requirement from 
the de facto merger test.  Thus, the court stated that the test for continuity 
of enterprise is: 
 (1) there is continuation of the seller 
corporation, so that there is a continuity 
of management, personnel, physical 
location, assets, and general business 
operations of the predecessor 
corporation; (2) the predecessor 
corporation ceases its ordinary business 
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
 
525 Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
 
526 Belfor USA Group, Inc. v. Alexis Manor Apts., No. 281444, 2009 WL 
609558, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Shue & Voeks v. Amentiy Design & 
Mfg., 511 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich. 1993)). 
 
527 Stramaglia v. United States, No. 08–2624, 2010 WL 1923764, at *3 (6th Cir. 
2010) (footnote omitted) (citatations omitted). 
 
528 Id. at *3 (citations omitted) (quoting Pearce v. Schneider, 242 Mich. 28, 31, 
217 N.W. 761, 762 (1928)). 
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soon as legally and practically possible; 
and (3) the purchasing corporation 
assumes those liabilities and obligations 
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the selling 
corporation. . . .  [A]n additional principle 
relevant to determining successor liability 
[is] whether the purchasing corporation 
holds itself out to the world as the 
effective continuation of the seller 
corporation.529   
The court in Foster v. Cone-Blanchard concluded that this test “applies only 
when the transferor is no longer viable and capable of being sued.”530   
The Michigan Supreme Court, in denying an application for leave to 
appeal, indicated that the Turner exception is inapplicable outside of the 
products liability context.531 
Minnesota  
“Minnesota follows the traditional approach to corporate 
successor liability.”532  The Minnessota Supreme Court described the 
approach as follows: 
529 Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Mich. 1999) 
(footnote omitted) (citing Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883–84). 
 
530 597 N.W.2d at 511 (citations omitted). 
 
531 Starks v. Michigan Welding Specialists, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Mich. 
2006) (“Because an exception designed to protect injured victims of defective 
products rests upon policy reasons not applicable to a judgment creditor, the 
Court declines to expand the exception to the traditional rule set forth in 
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), to cases in 
which the plaintiff is a judgment creditor.”); see also DeWitt v. Sealtex Co., Nos. 
273387, 273390, 274255, 275931, 2008 WL 2312668, at *2–4 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Jun 5, 2008). 
 
532 Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); see also 
Noack v. Colson Const., Inc., 2009 WL 305114, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 
2009); Dunn v. National Beverage Corp., 729 N.W.2d 637, 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007), aff’d, 745 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 2008). 
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[W]here one corporation sells or 
otherwise transfers all of its assets to 
another corporation, the latter is not 
liable for the debts and liabilities of the 
transferor, except: (1) where the 
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to 
assume such debts; (2) where the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or 
merger of the corporation; (3) where the 
purchasing corporation is merely a 
continuation of the selling corporation; 
and (4) where the transaction is entered 
into fraudulently in order to escape 
liability for such debts.533 
In addition to the four traditional exceptions, “[another] 
exception, sometimes incorporated as an element of one of the 
[traditional four] exceptions, is the absence of adequate consideration for 
the sale or transfer.”534  
 Minnesota:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
A Minnesota appellate court has listed factors that are to be 
considered when making the determination of whether or not a 
successor is the mere continuation of its predecessor.  The test 
articulated by the Huray court is as follows: 
The traditional indications of 
“continuation” are: common officers, 
directors, and shareholders; and only one 
corporation in existence after the 
completion of the sale of assets . . .  
Other factors such as continuation of the 
533 Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting J. F. Anderson 
Lumber Co. v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365, 368–69 (Minn. 2015); see also Noack, 
2009 WL 305114, at *9; Dunn, 729 N.W.2d at 645; Sweeter v. Power Indus., 
Inc., No. A05-2466, 2006 WL 2865329, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Knott v. 
AMFEC, Inc., No. 09–CV–1098, 2010 WL 1528393, at *6 (D. Minn. April 15, 
2010); A.P.I., Inc. v. Home Ins. 706 F. Supp. 2d 926,  (D. Minn. March 31, 
2010). 
 
534 J. F. Anderson Lumber Co., 206 N.W.2d at 369 (citing McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co, Division of Harris-Intertype Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 102 (N.J. 1970)). 
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seller's business practices and polices and 
the sufficiency of the consideration 
running to the seller corporation in light 
of the assets being sold may also be 
considered. To find that continuity exists 
merely because there was common 
management and ownership without 
considering other factors is to disregard 
the separate identities of the corporation 
without the necessary considerations that 
justify such an action.535  
 Minnesota: The Fraud Exception 
 Minnesota’s successor liability fraud exception is governed by the 
Minnesota Fraudulent Transfers Act, which can be found in section 
513.44 of the Minnesota Statutes.536   
Mississippi 
Mississippi courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the 
general rule of successor nonliability.537  In addition, Mississippi has 
adopted a variation of the “continuity of enterprise” exception and 
accepts the “product line theory as a viable basis for recovery.”538   
 
535 Huray v. Fournier NC Programming, Inc., No. C9-02-1852, 2003 WL 
21151772, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).  
 
536 Matson Logistics, LLC v. Smiens, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *25 (D. 
Minn. 2012); see also Sweeter, 2006 WL 2865329, at *4. 
 
537 See Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179–80 (Miss. 
2003); see also Stanley v. Mississippi State Pilots of Gulfport, Inc., 951 So. 2d 
535, 538 (Miss. 2006).  
 
538 Beck v. Koppers, Inc., Nos. 3:03CV60-P-D, 3:04CV160-P-D, 2006 WL 
2228911, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 7, 2006); Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180 
(continuity of enterprise); Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 
2001); Gregory ex rel. v. Central Sec. Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 233, 238 (Miss. 
2007) (acknowledging that Huff had accepted the product-line exception); 
Stanley, 951 So. 2d at 539–40 (quoting the Paradise factors for continuity of 
enterprise). 
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Mississippi:  The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
 In Paradise Corporation v. Amerihost Development, Inc., the court 
stated:   
[Continuity of enterprise] considers the 
traditional [mere continuation] factors as 
well as other factors such as: (1) retention 
of the same employees; (2) retention of 
the same supervisory personnel; (3) 
retention of the same production facilities 
in the same physical location; (4) 
production of the same product; (5) 
retention of the same name; (6) continuity 
of assets; (7) continuity of general 
business operations; and (8) whether the 
successor holds itself out as the 
continuation of the previous enterprise.539 
 This test is applicable where the “successor takes on the identity 
of the predecessor company in every way except taking responsibility for 
the predecessor’s debts.”540  The Paradise court borrowed its analysis 
from a Fifth Circuit case, Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp.,541 in which it was 
made clear that the continuity of enterprise test adds more factors but 
does not treat the common ownership factor as dispositive. 
 Mississippi:  The Product Line Theory 
 The Mississippi Supreme Court explained the product line 
exception as follows:  
[U]nder the product line theory, successor 
corporations which undertake the 
manufacture of the same products as the 
predecessor are liable for injuries caused 
by the defects in that product and inherit 
the liabilities associated with the product 
539 Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 
F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Stanley, 951 So. 2d at 540. 
 
540 Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180. 
 
541 Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985).  
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even if sold and manufactured by the 
predecessor corporation. . . .  [C]ertain 
elements must be present to subject a 
successor corporation to liability for the 
products of a predecessor.  The successor 
must produce the same product under a 
similar name, have acquired substantially 
all of the predecessor’s assets leaving no 
more than a corporate shell, hold itself 
out to the public as a mere continuation 
of the predecessor, and benefit from the 
good will of the predecessor.542 
 Mississippi: The Fraud Exception 
 The Mississippi Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Mississippi State 
Pilots of Gulfport, Inc.543 that the determination of whether or not a 
transaction is fraudulent for purposes of successor liability is governed 
by the Mississippi Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act; this piece of 
legislation was enacted in 2006 and can be found in sections 15-3-101 
through 15-3-121 of the Mississippi Code Annotated.544 
Missouri 
Missouri follows the general rule of successor liability and 
recognizes the four traditional exceptions.545  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals in Chemical Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc. addressed the 
542 Huff, 786 So. 2d at 387–88 (citing Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 
811, 825 (N.J. 1981)); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8–11 (Cal. 1977)); see also 
Gregory, 953 So. 2d at 238; Sharp v. Atwood Mobile Products, No. 2:12–CV–
82–KS–MTP, 2012 WL 3024726, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 2012). 
 
543 Stanley v. Mississippi State Pilots of Gulfport, Inc., 951 So. 2d 535, 540 
(Miss. 2006). 
  
544 Id. at 540. 
  
545 Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1993); see also Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d 801, 
803 (8th Cir. 2003); ARE Sikeston Ltd. P’ship v. Weslock Nat’l, et. al., 120 F.3d 
820, 828 (8th Cir.1997); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Se., Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 
(8th Cir. 1988); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 938 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
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possibility of extending successor liability through the adoption of the 
continuity of enterprise and product line exceptions, ultimately choosing 
not to adopt either.546  Public policy in Missouri favors successor liability 
in cases involving nursing homes to prevent successors from avoiding 
paying sanctions and penalties imposed against the predecessor.547 
 The general rule in Missouri is that when all of the assets of a 
corporation are sold or transferred the transferee is not liable for the 
transferor's debts and liabilities.  There are, however, four exceptions to 
the general rule of nonliability . . . (1) where the purchaser expressly or 
impliedly agrees to assume the debts or liabilities of the transferor; (2) 
where the transaction amounts to a merger or consolidation; (3) where 
the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation; or (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently for 
the purpose of escaping liability for the debts and liabilities of the 
transferor.548  
 Missouri:  The Fraud Exception 
 In general, Missouri seems to treat fraud claims as those where 
actual fraud is demonstrated and considers “continuation” and de facto 
merger exceptions as a species of constructive fraud.549 
 
546 Chem. Design, 847 S.W.2d at 492 (“[C]ourts in Missouri have not seen fit to 
depart from the traditional distinction between corporate mergers or the sale 
and purchase of outstanding stock of a corporation, whereby preexisting 
corporate liabilities also pass to the surviving corporation or to the purchaser, 
and the sale and purchase of corporate assets which eliminates successor 
liability.”).  But see Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708, 
711–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing the case from Chem. Design by 
qualifying that opinion as one including the “extent of the involvement of prior 
officers . . . as consultants.”). 
  
547 Cedar Hill Manor, LLC v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 145 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
 
548 ARE Sikeston Ltd. P’ship, 120 F.3d at 828 (citing Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am. 
Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Ernst v. Ford Motor 
Co., 813 S.W.2d 910, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).  
 
549 See Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 5 S.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Mo. 1928); see 
also Sweeney v. Heap O’Brien Mining Co., 186 S.W. 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).  
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 Missouri:  The Express/Implied Assumption Exception 
Missouri courts have not analyzed the express/implied 
assumption exception to the general rule of successor nonliability. 
 Missouri:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Chemical Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., the Missouri 
Court of Appeals noted that Missouri continues to adhere to the concept 
that the phrase “continuation of the corporation” should be applied 
literally, necessitating the continuation of the corporate organization, 
management, and operations, rather than merely the continuation of the 
enterprise or the product line. 550  In Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 
the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that “Missouri case law strongly 
leans toward the view that a lack of identity of officers, directors, and 
shareholders does not preclude a finding of corporate continuation, but that 
such identity is merely one factor in making this determination.”551  The 
court went on to state that, “[i]n Missouri, identity of the officers, 
directors, and shareholders for both corporations (although a substantial 
factor) is not a precursor to invocation of the ‘corporate continuation’ 
doctrine . . . . [A]lthough the ‘identity’ factor is a ‘key’ element to be 
considered, the lack thereof (standing alone) does not mandate reversal 
of [a] trial court’s judgment.”552  The court noted that other jurisdictions 
take a contrary view and require “identity of officers, directors, and 
shareholders in both corporations before a corporate continuation can 
550 Chem. Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc.,  847 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1993); see also Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
 
551 Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001) (emphasis in original); see also Osborn v. Prime Tanning Corp., No. 09–
6082–CV–SJ–GAF, 2010 WL 1935980, at *9 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2010); 
Sundance Rehab. Corp. v. New Vision Care Assocs. II, Inc., No. 04-3571-CV-
S-FJG, 2006 WL 2850556, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006); Boycom Cable 
Vision, Inc. v. Howe, No. 1:04CV 38 LMB, 2006 WL 2727984, at *5 (E.D. Mo. 
Sept. 22, 2006). 
 
552 Roper Elec. Co., 60 S.W.3d at 712 (citing Flotte v. United Claims, Inc., 657 
S.W.2d 387, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Brockmann v. O'Neill, 565 S.W.2d 796, 
798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).  
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be found to exist[,]” but that “Missouri does not ascribe to this . . . 
view.”553 
 Missouri:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The court in Harashe v. Flinkote, Co. used the term “elements” in 
setting out the test for a de facto merger but then stated that not all were 
necessary in order to satisfy this exception; this view would appear to 
indicate that they are factors to be considered (indicators) rather than 
elements (requirements): 
The elements of a de facto merger are: (1) a 
continuation of management and 
personnel and general business 
operations; (2) a continuity of 
shareholders resulting from the 
purchasing corporation paying for the 
assets with shares of its own stock so the 
selling corporation stockholders become 
a constituent part of the purchasing 
corporation; (3) the seller corporation 
ceasing ordinary business operation and 
dissolving as soon as possible; and (4) the 
purchasing corporation assuming those 
obligations necessary to continue normal, 
ordinary business operations . . . .  It is 
not necessary to find all the elements to 
find a de facto merger.554 
The court in Harashe found that the facts satisfied all of the 
considerations (be they elements or factors) listed.  There, the 
predecessor, Zonolite, was purchased by the successor, Grace, under an 
agreement where Zonolite would be dissolved as soon as possible, and 
Grace would assume all obligations of Zonolite necessary to continue 
the ordinary business of the predecessor.555  Even though the agreement 
553 Roper Elec. Co., 60 S.W.3d at 712 (emphasis omitted). 
 
554 Harashe v. Flinkote Co., 848 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing15 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7124.40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)); see also Osborn, 2010 
WL 1935980, at *7. 
 
555 Harashe, 848 S.W.2d at 509. 
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was “delineated as a reorganization through a purchase of assets, it 
satisfied the test for a de facto merger.”556 
Montana 
In Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Montana described the state of of successor liability law in that state: 
A successor corporation can be liable for 
the debts of its predecessor, if it is merely 
a continuation or reincarnation of the 
first corporation.  Generally, however, 
before a corporation can be deemed a 
successor, certain showings must be 
made.  For example, it is generally 
required that the plaintiff establish that 
insufficient consideration ran from the 
new company to the old and that only 
one corporation existed at the completion 
of the transfer.557 
The Buck court ultimately concluded that successor liability 
should not be imposed in the case, stating: 
The facts here do not support the 
conclusion that Frontier Montana is a 
successor corporation to Billings 
Montana Chevrolet. According to the 
record Billings Montana Chevrolet sold 
some assets to Frontier-Montana. 
However, Billings Montana Chevrolet has 
actively remained in business and holds 
equipment and real property received 
from the sale of Frontier-Delaware. There 
is no evidence that there was fraud in the 
sale of the corporate assets from Billings 
Montana Chevrolet to Frontier-Montana 
or lack of consideration that would justify 
556 Id. 
 
557 Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 543 (Mont. 1991) 
(citations omitted) (citing 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 271 (1964)). 
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a finding that it was a successor 
corporation.558 
Since the decision in Buck, there does not appear to have been a 
published opinion in Montana addressing successor liability.  In Hanson v. 
Dix, an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court of Montana held that 
the successor owner of hotel was not liable for its predecessor's wrongful 
discharge of an employee where the predecessor did not transfer the 
hotel in order to escape liability (rather, he died) and where the successor 
had no notice of a legal obligation owed to the former employee.559  A 
2008 published opinion mentions claims of successor liability in the 
plaintiff’s amended complaint, but the case was decided on other 
grounds.560 
Nebraska 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has addressed successor liability 
at least three times:  twice in the context of products liability and once in 
the context of successor liability for contracts.561  The Nebraska Supreme 
Court first adopted the traditional rule of successor nonliability in asset 
sales, excluding for the four traditional exceptions, in Jones v. Johnson 
Mach. & Press Co. of Elkhart, Indiana.562  The court listed the four 
exceptions as follows:  
(1) When the purchasing corporation 
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume 
the selling corporation's liability; (2) 
558 Buck, 811 P.2d at 543. 
 
559 Hanson v. Dix, 100 P.3d 167 (Table), No. 03-605, 2004 WL 2095539, at *3 
(Mont. Sep. 21, 2004). 
 
560 See Tin Cup Cnty. Water v. Garden City Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 200 P.3d 
60, 70 (Mont. 2008). 
 
561 See Earl v. Priority Key Servs., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 610 (Neb. 1989) (successor 
liability action based on contractual relationship with predecessor); Timmerman 
v. Am. Trencher, Inc., 368 N.W.2d 502 (Neb. 1985) (successor products 
liability action based on an allegedly defective drop hammer); 
Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982) (successor 
products liability action based on an allegedly defective punch press).   
 
562 Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 484. 
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When the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the purchaser 
and seller corporations; (3) When the 
purchaser corporation is merely a 
continuation of the seller corporation; or 
(4) When the transaction is entered into 
fraudulently to escape liability for such 
obligations.563   
The court next noted that some courts “have developed and 
applied a theory in products liability cases which imposes liability on 
successor corporations without regard to the ‘niceties’ of corporate 
transfers where the successor acquires and continues the predecessor’s 
business in an essentially unchanged manner.”564  The court identified 
three different theories used to “expand the focus of legal liability:” the 
de facto merger (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.),565 continuity of 
enterprise (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.),566 and the product-line 
exception (citing Ray v. Alad Corp.567).568  However, the court decided not 
to depart from the traditional exceptions under the facts of the case 
before them, finding “no basic justification” for departing from the 
traditional rule.569   
Although many states treat de facto merger as a traditional 
exception, the court in Jones viewed it as a more expansive theory, stating:  
“Various theories have been adopted to expand the focus of legal 
liability.  Some courts have looked to the nature and consequences of the 
transaction and found a de facto merger for product liability purposes 
563 Id. at 483.   
 
564 Id. at 484.  
 
565 Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). 
 
566 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). 
 
567 Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).  
 
568 Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 483. 
 
569 Id. at 484.  
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even though the formal characteristics of a corporate merger were not 
present.”570   
In Farris Engineering, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., a 
Nebraska appellate court applied a de facto merger test while addressing 
the mere continuation exception (see below).571  
 Nebraska:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme 
Court analyzed the factors necessary for the mere continuation 
exception, a task which had not been undertaken in Jones.572  Continuing 
the business operations of a predecessor by itself is not enough to 
constitute mere continuation.573  “[A] commonality of officers, directors, 
or stockholders is an important consideration in determining whether a 
purchasing corporation is but a continuation of the corporate entity of a 
selling corporation.”574  The Timmerman court also looked back to a 1903 
Nebraska case, Douglas Printing Co. v. Over,575 reiterating two factors 
considered in the continuation analysis: “[(1) T]here was commonality of 
both ownership and leadership between the selling and purchasing 
corporations, and . . . [(2) the] creation of the purchasing corporation 
simply became a means of refinancing a major secured debt of the selling 
corporation.”576   
570 Id.; see Shannon 379 F. Supp. 797.  
 
571 Farris Eng’g, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., Nos. A-99-
1384, A-99-1385, 2001 WL 47017, at *5–6 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001). 
 
572 Timmerman v. Am. Trencher, Inc., 368 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Neb. 1985). 
 
573 Id. at 505 (“The mere fact that the purchaser continues the operations of the 
seller does not of itself render the purchaser liable for the obligations of the 
seller;  to impose liability on the purchaser, it must be shown that the purchaser 
represents “merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller” (quoting Armour-Dial, Inc. v. 
Alkar Eng’g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Wis. 1979)).  
 
574 Timmerman, 368 N.W.2d at 506 (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 
437 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); 
Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Engineering Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. 
Wis. 1979); Weaver v. Nash Intern., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983).  
 
575 Douglas Printing Co. v. Over, 95 N.W. 656 (Neb. 1903).  
 
576 Timmerman, 368 N.W.2d at 506.   
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In Farris Engineering, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., a 
Nebraska appellate court reversed a summary judgment order holding 
the defendant liable as successor under the mere continuation 
exception.577  In its analysis, the court relied on Timmerman as well as 
various de facto merger factors, stating:  
The trial court based its decision on the 
third exception set out in Timmerman v. 
American Trencher, Inc., stating that as a 
matter of law, FAL was a mere 
continuation of FAFD [(Folgers 
Architects & Facility Design)]. 
The factors for establishing a de facto 
merger are that (1) there is a continuation 
of the enterprise of the seller corporation, 
so that there is a continuity of 
management, personnel, physical location, 
assets, and general business operations; 
(2) there is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation; (3) the seller 
corporation ceases its ordinary business 
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
soon as legally and practically possible; 
and (4) the purchasing corporation 
assumes those liabilities and obligations 
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations of the seller 
corporation.578 
 
577 Farris Eng’g, Inc.. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., Nos. A-99-
1384, A-99-1385, 2001 WL 47017, at *5–6 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001). 
 
578 Farris, 2001 WL 47017, at *5 (citing Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 
N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).  
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The court concluded: 
In contrast [to Timmerman], in the instant 
case, the facts support an inference that 
FAL is not merely a continuation of 
FAFD. The record shows that although 
FAFD and FAL share common officers, 
there is no commonality regarding FAFD 
and FAL's shareholders and directors. 
While both Folgers and Pappalardo were 
shareholders and directors at FAFD, 
Pappalardo is FAL's sole shareholder and 
director. Given these facts, we conclude 
that reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the inference that FAL is merely 
a continuation of FAFD can be drawn. 
Thus, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
FAL was merely a continuation of FAFD, 
and we reverse that portion of the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Farris on its contract action.579 
In the context of contractual successor liability, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court found a successor to be liable for contractual obligations 
of its predecessor where the parties described their relationship to 
customers and employees as a merger (even though it was an asset 
purchase), the business continued to provide the same service at the 
same address to the same customers with the same employees, and the 
predecessor virtually went out of business.580 To date, no Nebraska case 
has addressed the fraud or express/implied assumption exceptions to the 
traditional rule. 
Nevada 
In 2005, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to 
the traditional four exceptions to the general rule of successor non-
liability in asset purchases and declined to adopt the continuity of 
579 Farris, 2001 WL 47017, at *6. 
 
580 Earl v. Priority Key Servs., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 610, 613-14 (Neb. 1989).  
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enterprise exception in the negligence context.581  Additionally, the court 
stated: “We will leave the consideration of this exception in CERCLA 
and products liability claims for another day.”582  It is difficult to predict 
whether the Nevada Supreme Court would adopt the continuity of 
enterprise exception.  This court noted that “[c]ourts have adopted the 
expanded doctrine in the limited circumstance of products liability 
because they recognized that sound public policy favors the protection 
of the public against dangerous products.”583  However, the court also 
stated that it was persuaded by the fact that “the trend in other 
jurisdictions appears to be away from the expansion of successor 
liability” and “in favor of retaining the traditional rule on 
non-liability.”584   
The court set forth the following test for de facto merger’s: “(1) 
whether there is a continuation of the enterprise, (2) whether there is a 
continuity of shareholders, (3) whether the seller corporation ceased its 
ordinary business operations, and (4) whether the purchasing 
corporation assumed the seller's obligations.”585  It noted that “some 
courts give great weight to the question of whether the consideration 
given by the seller consists of shares of the seller's own stock” but 
concluded that the factors should be weighed equally, and therefore no 
single factor is “'either necessary or sufficient to establish a de facto 
merger.”586  The court opined that “[t]his approach is more reasonable 
because it properly balances the successor corporation's rights to be free 
from liabilities incurred by its predecessor, with the important interest 
involved in ensuring that ongoing businesses are not able to avoid 
581 Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082, 1087, 1091 (Nev. 
2005).   
 
582 Id. at 1091. 
 
583 Id. at 1091 (citing Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (D. Nev. 
2001); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)).  
 
584 Village Builders, 112 P.3d at 1091 (quoting MBII v. PSI, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 
781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).  
 
585 Id. at 1087. 
586 Id. (quoting Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. at 230–31 (quoting In re Acushnet 
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass.1989))).  
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liability by transferring their assets to another corporation that continues 
to operate profitably as virtually the same entity.”587  
In applying the mere continuation exception, the court noted 
that “[o]ne federal district court has opined that ‘the gravamen of the 
“mere continuation” exception is the continuation of corporate control 
and ownership, rather than continuation of business operations.’ Many 
courts have likewise concluded that the key inquiry in resolving this issue 
is whether there exists a continuation of the corporate entity.  We 
agree.”588 
New Hampshire 
New Hampshire courts follow the general rule of successor 
nonliability for asset purchases and recognize the four traditional 
exceptions:  express or implied assumption, de facto merger, mere 
continuation, and fraud.589  In Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court expressly rejected the product-line 
exception and other “risk spreading” doctrines (including the continuity 
of enterprise exception).590  The court has also stated unequivocally that 
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc.591 does not represent a valid interpretation of 
587 Id. at 1088. 
 
588 Id. at 1091–92 (quoting East Prairie R-2 School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
813 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Mo. 1993)).  
 
589 See J.G.M.C.J. Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S., Inc, 924 A.2d 400, 405-06 (N.H. 2007); 
Thompson v. C&C Research & Dev. LLC, 898 A.2d 495, 501 (N.H. 2006); 
Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); 
see also Members of Beede Site Group v. Fed Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 
09-370 S, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30185 (D.N.H. 2011) (discussing standard of 
CERCLA, de facto merger, and mere continuation successor liability).  
 
590 See Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 569;  Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407 
(N.H. 1988); see also Appeal of SAU #16 Coop. Sch. Bd., 103, 719 A.2d 613, 
617 (N.H. 1998) (using federal successor liability standard); Russell v. Philip D. 
Moran, Inc., 449 A.2d 1208, 1209–10 (N.H. 1982) (contractual indemnification 
and warranty claims could be viable under a theory of successor liability); 
Zimmerman v. Suissevale, Inc., 438 A.2d 290, 292 (N.H. 1981) (successor 
liability under stock purchase agreement). 
 
591 Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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New Hampshire law.592  To date, no New Hampshire case has dealt with 
the fraud or express/implied assumption exceptions to the traditional 
rule of successor non-liability. 
 New Hampshire: The De Facto Merger Exception 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the de factor 
merger exception in detail in Bielagus, stating:   “Under the de facto merger 
exception, successor liability will be imposed ‘if the parties have achieved 
virtually all of the results of a merger’ without following the statutory 
requirements for merger of the corporations.”593   Further, “a de facto 
merger occurs when a company is completely absorbed into another 
through a sale of assets; continues its operations by maintaining the same 
management, personnel, assets, location and stockholders; but leaves its 
creditors without a remedy for its outstanding debt.”594  The court goes 
on to say,  “The fact-finder may look to other factors indicative of 
commonality or distinctiveness with the corporations. ‘The bottom-line 
question is whether each entity has run its own race, or whether there 
has been a relay-style passing of the baton from one to the other.’”595   
 The court also adopted the four, non-exclusive factor test 
articulated in Kleen Laundry I: 
(1) There is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
592 Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 569; see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S. Inc., 924 
A.2d 400, 405–07 (N.H. 2007).  
 
593 Id. at 565 (quoting Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Total Waste Mgt., 817 
F. Supp. 225, 230 (D.N.H. 1993) (referred to as “Kleen Laundry I”). 
 
594 Id. at 565.   
 
595 Id. (quoting and citing 300 Pine Island Assocs., Inc. v. Stephen L. Cohen & 
Assocs., P.A., 547 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also J.G.M.C.J. 
Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S., Inc., 924 A.2d 400, 405 (N.H. 2007); Thompson v. C&C 
Research & Dev. LLC, 898 A.2d 495, 501 (N.H. 2006). 
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with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation. 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates, 
and dissolves as soon as legally and 
practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those obligations of the seller ordinarily 
necessary for the uninterrupted 
continuation of normal business 
operations of the seller corporation.596 
The court noted that “[t]he factor that usually ‘tips the scales in favor of 
finding a merger is continuity of ownership, usually taking the form of an 
exchange of stock for assets.’”597 
 New Hampshire: The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Supreme Court noted in Bielagus that the mere continuation 
exception is similar to that of the de facto merger.598  The court explained:   
“[U]nder the traditional application of the 
‘mere continuation’ exception, the court 
should not find a corporation to be the 
continuation of a predecessor unless only 
one corporation remains after the transfer 
of assets and unless there is an identity of 
stock, stockholders and directors between 
the two corporations.”  
596 Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 565-66 (citing Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. at 230-31); 
see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp., 924 A.2d at 405; Thompson, 898 A.2d at 501.  
  
597 Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 566 (quoting Devine & Devine Food v. Wampler 
Foods, 313 F.3d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Welco Indus., Inc., v. Applied 
Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993))); see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp., 924 A.2d at 
405. 
 
598 Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 559. 
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This traditional theory envisions a 
corporate reorganization where one 
company sells its assets to another 
company under the same ownership.  
Successor liability is imposed upon the 
purchasing corporation because the 
purchaser is merely the seller reincarnated 
as a different entity.  While continuity of 
ownership is the key factor for imposing 
successor liability under this exception, 
some courts also look to the adequacy of 
the consideration given in the asset sale 
and to whether there is evidence of a 
purchase made in good faith.599 
New Jersey 
New Jersey courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to 
the general rule of corporate successor nonliability, as well as a “‘fifth 
exception, sometimes incorporated as an element of one of the above 
exceptions[:] . . . the absence of adequate consideration for the sale or 
transfer.’”600  In 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court also adopted the 
599 Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted) (quoting Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. At 
231 (citing Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 
1993))); see also G.P. Publ’ns. v. Quebecor Printing, 481 S.E.2d 674, 680 (N.C. 
1997). 
 
600 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1981) (quoting 
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), 
aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), abrogated by Ramirez v. 
Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981)); see Marshak v. Treadwell, 595 
F.3d 478, 490 (3d Cir. 2009); G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Bennet, 380 F. Supp. 2d 469 
(D.N.J. 2005); see also Mark IV Transp. & Logistics, Inc. v. Lightning Logistics, 
LLC, NO. 09-6480, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141721, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 
2012) (accord); Fink v. EdgeLink, Inc., No. 09-5078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42656, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012) (accord); Menkevich v. Delta Tools, No. A-
1950-10T2, 2012 WL 986995, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 26, 2012); 
Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, No. 08-5489, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93219, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2011) (accord); Ascencea LLC v. Zisook, 
No. 08-5339, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36786, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2011) 
(accord); Tatum v. Chrysler Group LLC, No.10-cv-4269, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32362, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011) (reciting general rule of successor 
non-liability and the four traditional exceptions). 
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product-line exception.601  In doing so, the court stated it “has long 
recognized the significance of the social policy of risk-spreading in 
establishing the manufacturer’s duty to the product user under the 
rapidly expanding principles of strict liability in tort.”602   In New Jersey, 
where successor liability has been found, the jury will assess the 
defendant’s financial condition at the time of the wrongful conduct in 
order to determine punitive damages.603 
 New Jersey:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
New Jersey courts have not extensively analyzed the express or 
implied assumption exceptions to the general rule of corporate successor 
nonliability.  In McKee v. Harris-Seybold, Co., the court approached 
assumption using a traditional contracts analysis, beginning with the 
propositions: 
A contract must be construed as a whole 
and the language employed must be given 
its ordinary meaning, in the absence of 
anything to show that the language was 
used in a different sense.  Provisions of a 
contract must be interpreted, if possible, 
 
601 Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825. (“[W]e hold that where one corporation acquires 
all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if 
exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing 
operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable 
for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if 
previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its 
predecessor.”); see also Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467 
(D.N.J. 1992) (holding the product line exception adopted by Ramirez did not 
apply to the case before it brought under CERCLA). 
 
602 Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 820. But see Jenkins v. Anderson Mach. Sys., Inc., No. 
A-3707-00T5, 2002 WL 31398172, at *6–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 
2002) (unpublished opinion holding no successor liability based on operation of 
similar business at predecessor’s location under similar name when successor 
had not acquired assets of predecessor). 
 
603 Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866, 871 (N.J. 2008). 
 
                                                          
928       TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW            [Vol. 18 
so as to give effect to the general purpose 
and intention of the parties.604 
Applying these general rules of construction, the court concluded that 
the purchase agreement in question did not include any express 
assumption by the purchasing corporation.605   
 New Jersey:  The Fraud Exception 
Similar to the express or implied assumption exception, New 
Jersey courts have not offered very much analysis regarding the fraud 
exception.606  In McKee, the court quickly disposed of both the fraud and 
inadequate consideration exceptions.607  While some jurisdictions have 
concluded that inadequacy of consideration is the primary element of 
fraud, the McKee court, though discussing both together, kept them 
604 McKee, 264 A.2d at 102 (citations omitted) (citing Hudson County 
Newspaper Guild v. Jersey Pub. Co., 88 A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div.1952); S.G. Young, Inc. v. B. & C. Distributors Co., 92 A.2d 519 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)).  
 
605 McKee, 264 A.2d at 102. 
 
606 In a fraudulent transfer case that is roughly similar to a successor liability 
action, in an unpublished opinion, Spikes v. Hamilton Farm Golf Club, LLC, No. 
13-3669, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9088, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2014), the Federal 
District Court for New Jersey confronted a plaintiff alleging that a golf club 
transferred property to a business trust  to “hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor or debtor.” The court examined a number of factors for determining 
fraudulent conveyance, including whether the transfer was to an insider; the 
debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the 
transfer; the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; the transfer was 
of substantially all the debtor’s assets; the value of consideration received by the 
debtor was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred; and 
the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was 
made. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, as the golf 
club remained open for a substantial time after the transfer, and the plaintiffs 
failed to show that the golf club was unable to pay its debts. 
 
607 McKee, 264 A.2d at 106–07. (Although McKee has been overruled or severely 
qualified by Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1976) with regard to de facto merger and mere continuation, it appears to 
remain good law in the areas of express or implied assumption of liabilities and 
the fraud exception).   
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analytically separate.  The court quoted West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue,608 stating: 
It is equally well settled when the sale is a 
bona fide transaction, and the selling 
corporation receives money to pay its 
debts, or property that may be subjected 
to the payment of its debts and liabilities, 
equal to the fair value of the property 
conveyed by it, the purchasing 
corporation will not, in the absence of a 
contract obligation or actual fraud of 
some substantial character, be held 
responsible for the debts or liabilities of 
the selling corporation.609 
Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman610 provides a list of the 
badges of fraud, derived from Gilchinsky v. Nat’l Westminister Bank N.J.611 
and New Jersey Statute § 25:2-26. 
 New Jersey:  The Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions 
In Woodrick v. Jack. J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., a 1997 case, the court 
noted that “[b]ecause [the mere continuation and de facto merger] 
exceptions to the general rule of non-liability tend to overlap, with much 
of the same evidence being relevant to each determination, these 
exceptions are often treated in unison.”612  “The standards for 
608 West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 68 F.2d 77 
(10th Cir. 1933). 
 
609 McKee, 264 A.2d at 107 (quoting W. Tex. Refining & Dev. Co. v. Comm'r, 68 
F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir. 1933). 
 
610 Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman, No. No. 064802DMC 
MCA, 2010 WL 2179181, at *24 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd, 441 F. App'x 938 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 
611 Gilchinsky v. Nat’l Westminister Bank N.J., 732 A.2d 482, 489 (N.J. 1999). 
 
612 Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (citing Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 265, 
276 (D.N.J.1994)); see also Forman Indus., Inc. v. Blake-Ward, No. L-5332-06, 
2008 WL 4191155, at *5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 15, 2008); Einhorn v. 
M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475–476 (D.N.J. 2009). 
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application of the continuation theory of corporate successor liability are 
not entirely clear.”613  New Jersey decisions from the early 1970’s list 
factors for a de facto merger, such as “transfer or sale of all assets, 
exchange of stocks, change of ownership whereby stockholders, officers 
and creditors go to the surviving corporation, and assumption of a 
variety of liabilities pursuant to previously negotiated agreements.”614  
Elements needed to find a mere continuation include “use of the same 
name, at the same location, with the same employees and common 
identity of stockholders and directors.”615  In McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., a 
New Jersey superior court stated that continuity of interest was a 
necessary, threshold requirement for mere continuation.616  By 1991, one 
superior court listed the factors to be considered for mere continuation as 
“less than adequate consideration, common directorships or 
management, and whether the transaction rendered the predecessor 
entity incapable of satisfying its liabilities . . .”617   
The court Woodrick v. Jack. J. Burke Real Estate, Inc. listed the 
following factors to be considered for both the mere continuation and de 
facto merger exceptions: 
In determining whether a particular 
transaction amounts to a de facto 
 
613 Tatum v. Chrysler Group LLC, No.10-cv-4269, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32362, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011). 
 
614 Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).  
 
615 Id. at 464; see also Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman, 441 
Fed. App’x 938, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (offering a brief and vague description of 
the mere continuatioin and de facto merger doctrines, concluding that one of the 
defendants was liable thereunder due to proof of continuity of ownership, 
continuity of management, continuity of a physical location, assets, and general 
business operations, and cessation of the prior business of the predecessor 
shortly after the successor entity was formed). 
 
616 McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1970) (citing Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Ag. v. Flash Cab Co., 24 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1969) (“For liability to attach, the purchasing corporation must 
represent merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller.”).  
 
617 Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus., Inc., 595 A.2d 534, 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1991).  
 
                                                                                                                                        
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   931 
consolidation or mere continuation, most 
courts consider four factors: (i) continuity 
of management, personnel, physical 
location, assets, and general business 
operations; (ii) a cessation of ordinary 
business and dissolution of the 
predecessor as soon as practically and 
legally possible; (iii) assumption by the 
successor of the liabilities ordinarily 
necessary for the uninterrupted 
continuation of the business of the 
predecessor; and (iv) continuity of 
ownership/shareholders.618 
 “Not all of these factors need be present for a de facto merger or 
continuation to have occurred.  Rather, [t]he crucial inquiry is whether 
there was an ‘intent on the part of the contracting parties to effectuate a 
merger or consolidation rather than a sale of assets.’”619 
 When the plaintiff in the case contended that both the mere 
continuation and de facto merger exceptions were inapplicable because 
there was no continuity of ownership, the court stated, “[the plaintiff’s] 
reliance on McKee for the proposition that a de facto merger is precluded 
where the predecessor corporation receives no ownership interest in the 
successor corporation, omits consideration of the more modern view of 
New Jersey law as no longer requiring continuity of shareholder 
interest.”620  Applying the factors listed above, the court concluded:  
“[b]ased on the foregoing facts, it appears that the intent of the asset 
purchase transaction was to effectuate a merger of the two firms.  This 
618 Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quoting Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 
265, 276 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying New Jersey law on the issue of corporate 
successor liability)).  
 
619 Woodrick, 703 A.2d at 312 (citations omitted) (citing and quoting Luxliner 
P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 73 (3rd Cir.1993) (applying 
New Jersey law); see Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462–63 
(3d Cir. 2006); Marsdale v. Port Liberte Partners, No. L-5117-97, 2007 WL 
92666, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. Jan. 9, 2007). 
 
620 Woodrick, 703 A.2d at 313. 
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transaction resulted in nothing more than a change of hat for Burke, thus 
constituting a mere continuation of the predecessor’s business.”621    
Thus, two courts have indicated that McKee v. Harris-Seybold does 
not reflect the modern trend in New Jersey law.622  Indeed, the court in 
Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., stated that McKee’s application of both doctrines 
was too narrow, limited, and harsh.623 
The right approach, according to Wilson, is to evaluate the 
"continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and 
general business operations; [the] continuity of shareholders since the 
purchasing corporation pays with its stock; [whether or not the] seller 
ceases operations and dissolves; [and the] assumption of obligations 
necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business 
operations," in order to determine whether a successor corporation is the 
product of a de facto merger or a mere continuation.624 
Wilson rejected the "extremely limited" view set forth in McKee 
and embraced the “more modern, fair-minded broad approach” in 
which: 
the most relevant factor is the degree to 
which the predecessor's business entity 
remains intact. The more a corporation 
physically resembles its predecessor, the 
more reasonable it is to hold the 
successor fully responsible. In this way, 
the innocent, injured consumer is 
protected without the possibility of being 
left without a remedy due to the 
subsequent corporate history of the 
manufacturer.625 
621 Id. at 314.  
 
622 McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1970); see also Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Ch. Div. 
1976). 
 
623 Wilson, 356 A.2d at 468. 
 
624 Id. at 466.  
 
625 Id.   
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 In Wilson, there were two predecessor companies.   The court 
found a de facto merger with regards to one predecessor and a 
continuation as to the other.  Thus, Wilson appears to reflect an 
expansion of the doctrines of mere continuation and de facto merger in 
New Jersey.   
 New Jersey:  The Product Line Exception 
In Ramirez v. Armsted Industries, Inc.,626 the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey substantially adopted the product line analysis as articulated by the 
California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad.  The Ramirez court applied the 
same “three-fold justification” applied by the Ray court.  The three 
policy justifications from Ray are  
(1) The virtual destruction of the 
plaintiff’s remedies against the original 
manufacturer caused by the successor’s 
acquisition of the business, (2) the 
successor’s ability to assume the original 
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and 
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor 
to assume a responsibility for defective 
products that was a burden necessarily 
attached to the original manufacturer’s 
good will being enjoyed by the successor 
in the continued operation of the 
business.627   
New Jersey’s application of the product line exception differs 
most sharply from California’s application of the exception in that New 
Jersey does not impose the same strict causation required by the first 
prong of Ray.628  In addressing the question of whether the product line 
626 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 819–20 (N.J. 1981). 
 
627 Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977). 
 
628 LeFever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 298–99 (N.J. 1999) 
(“We believe, however, that the California court has focused on the first 
justification for the product-line exception, specifically, that strict liability is 
appropriate when the successor’s acquisition of the business has virtually 
destroyed the plaintiff’s remedies, to the exclusion of the more dominant 
themes.”). 
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exception might apply to assets purchased at a bankruptcy sale, the court 
opined,  
We share the instinctive reaction of those 
who hesitate to apply the product-line 
exception to a successor at a bankruptcy 
sale.  At first glance, to apply the doctrine 
to one who could be contemplating the 
purchase of assets free and clear of any 
predecessor liability seems unfair.  That 
concern turns out to be unfounded.629   
In justifying its departure from California’s more strict 
application of the product line exception, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
noted, “Ultimately, the question is whether the imposition of a duty on 
the successor to respond to the complaints of its predecessor’s 
customers is fair, when the successor trades on the loyalty of those 
customers.”630   
 On the same day that the New Jersey Supreme Court decided 
Ramirez,631 it also decided Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp632 in which it held 
that the product line exception should be extended to include 
intermediate successor corporations.  The court noted that the 
intermediate corporation had contributed to the destruction of plaintiffs’ 
remedy against the original manufacturer and that the company “became 
‘an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that 
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.’”633  
This theory was employed again in 1998 in Class v. American Roller Die 
Corp.634  In both the Nieves and the Class cases, one of the key factors 
629 Id. at 300; see also In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 697 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying New Jersey law and holding that the plaintiff’s 
product line claims could not be foreclosed by a Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) sale 
order that was entered before plaintiff’s injuries had occurred).  
 
630 LeFever, 734 A.2d at 301.  
 
631 Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 811. 
 
632 Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826, 831 (N.J. 1981). 
 
633 Id. (quoting Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)). 
  
634 Class v. Am. Roller Die Corp., 705 A.2d 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998).  
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influencing the court’s decision was that the intermediate companies 
expressly retained liability for products sold prior to the asset sale when 
they were liquidating the product line.  This leaves the question open as 
to whether or not intermediate successor corporations would be liable 
under the product line theory if the companies they sold to were to 
assume all liabilities as part of the sale.635 
 The appellate court in Class went on to determine how fault 
should be apportioned between multiple successor corporations.636  The 
court concluded that the Market Share method of apportionment was 
most “fair,” imposing fault based on the number of units produced by 
each successor corporation.637  The court stated that this method most 
comports with the policy reasons used to justify the imposition of 
product line successor liability in the first place, namely each successor 
corporation is liable for the portion of good will and benefit obtained 
from their respective use of the original producers product line.638  The 
court then pointed out that data was not available on the number of 
products sold by each corporation in this case.639  It decided that in the 
absence of data on number of units produced the court would apportion 
fault based on the number of years that each company had actually 
produced the product:640   
[I]t is fair and reasonable to apportion 
plaintiff's damages among multiple 
 
635 Nieves, 431 A.2d at 831–832; see also Class, v. Am. Roller Die Corp., 683 A.2d 
595, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (published trial court decision affirmed without 
further comment by Class, 705 A.2d 390, on the issue of whether successor 
liability applied). 
 
636 Class, 705 A.2d at 394–96.    
  
637 Id. at 394. 
 
638 Id. at 395 (“[T]he market share analysis ‘provides a ready means to apportion 
damages among the defendants,’ by holding that ‘[e]ach defendant will be held 
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that 
market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which 
caused plaintiff's injuries.’”) (quoting Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 
924, 937 (Cal. 1980)). 
 
639 Id. at 394–96.   
 
640 Id. at 394–95. 
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successors based on the benefits received 
from the product line as reflected by the 
number of units produced, and in the 
absence of that information, the number 
of years that each corporation 
manufactured the product. Similar to 
damages apportioned based upon a 
defendant's share of the market, these are 
both appropriate measures to allocate 
plaintiff's damages. . . .641 
 The Class trial court also analyzed the potential affect of the 
product line exception on a hypothetical company that had purchased a 
product line through an asset sale but had ultimately never produced 
anything from the line. 642  The court decided that such a company would 
not be liable through the product line exception because such a company 
did not actually receive a benefit from the assets or goodwill of the 
predecessor—the hallmark of the Ramirez rationale for imposing 
liability.643  The Class appellate court did not review this determination, as 
it was not contested by the parties.644 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. 
Co.645 decided the question of whether a defendant distributor or retailer 
could use the product line exception to seek indemnification from a 
corporate successor (normally, absent an asset sale, in New Jersey a 
distributor can seek such indemnification against a manufacturer).646  
However, the court in Mettinger decided to expand the product line 
exception to include defendant distributors and retailers.647  It concluded 
that, even though the principle purpose of the product line exception 
was to provide a remedy to victims, applying the product line exception 
 
641 Id. at 396.  
  
642 Class, 683 A.2d 595, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).  
  
643 Id. at 606–07. 
 
644 Class, 705 A.2d at 393 n.1. 
  
645 Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co., 709 A.2d 779 (N.J. 1998) 
 
646 Id. at 783. 
 
647 Id. at 783. 
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to the defendant distributor seeking indemnification from the successor 
manufacturer furthered the purpose ‘“of spreading the risk to society at 
large for the costs of injuries from defective products.”’648   The court 
stated:  
 “Public policy requires that having 
received the substantial benefits of the 
continuing manufacturing enterprise, the 
successor corporation should also be 
made to bear the burden of the operating 
costs that other established business 
operations must ordinarily bear . . . .” 
Ordinarily, the manufacturer must bear 
the cost of indemnifying entities lower in 
the chain of distribution for injuries 
caused by defects in its products . . . . 
Therefore, the successor manufacturer 
also must bear that cost.649 
New Mexico 
The New Mexico Supreme Court first addressed the issue of 
successor liability in Pankey v. Hot Springs National Bank, a 1941 case in 
which the court adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general 
rule of successor non-liability.650  The Supreme Court of New Mexico 
 
648 Id. at 785 (citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 431 
A.2d 811, 813 (N.J. 1981)).  
 
649 Id. at 785 (citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 822–23).  
 
650 Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941) (quoting 
W. Tex. Refining & Dev. v. Comm’r of Int. Rev., 68 F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir. 
1933)) (“‘The general rule is that where one corporation sells or otherwise 
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for the 
debts and liabilities of the transferor . . . .  To this general rule there are four 
well recognized exceptions, under which the purchasing corporation becomes 
liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation.  (1) Where the 
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations; (3) 
where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation; and (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently  to 
escape liability for such debts . . . .’”).  
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did not address successor liability in the context of products liability until 
1997, when it recognized the four traditional exceptions as well as 
adopted the product line exception.651  In Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., the only 
traditional exception potentially applicable to the facts of the case was 
the mere continuation exception.652  However, the court noted that 
“[t]he ‘key element of a “continuation” is a common identity of officers, 
directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing 
corporations.”’653  “Thus, the mere continuation exception ‘has no 
application without proof of continuity of management and ownership 
between the predecessor and successor corporations.’”654   The Garcia 
court, finding the mere continuation exception inapplicable, adopted the 
product-line exception as articulated in Ray v. Alad.655  The Garcia court 
held that “[w]hen a successor corporation continues to market many of 
the same products and represents to the public and its predecessor’s 
customers that it is continuing the predecessor’s enterprise, it essentially 
picks up where the predecessor left off.”656  
New York 
The law of successor liability in New York appears unsettled in 
several key areas.657  In general, New York courts recognize the four 
traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for asset 
purchasers.658  In 2006, the Court of Appeals, New York’s court of last 
651 See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247–50 (N.M. 1997).  
 
652 Id. at 246. 
 
653 Id. at 247 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 
1977)). 
 
654 Id. (quoting Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)).  
 
655 Id. at 248.  
 
656 Id.   
 
657 See In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 582–83 (N.Y. 
2005). 
 
658 Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); see 
Battino v. Cornelia Fifth Ave., LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006); BT Ams. 
Inc. v. ProntoCom Mktg., Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008);  
Morales v. N.Y., 849 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408–09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Hoover v. 
                                                          
 
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   939 
resort, expressly rejected the product line exception in Semenetz v. Sherling 
& Walden, Inc., an issue which had previously split the Appellate 
division.659  The Semenetz court made no decision on the continuity of 
enterprise exception, noting that the plaintiff was no longer relying on 
that theory.660  Although the continuity of enterprise exception was 
adopted by a lower court in 1985, no New York court has adopted or 
applied the exception since Semenetz was decided.661 
New York:  The Express/Implied Assumption Exception 
New York courts recognize the express or implied assumption 
exception to the general rule of nonliability.  In cases that have addressed 
this exception, courts have looked at the language of the purchase 
agreement and other sale documents in order to determine whether the 
successor has expressly or impliedly assumed any of the liabilities of the 
predecessor.662  
New Holland N. Am., Inc., 898 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); I & 
G Lexington L.L.C. v. Ayers Serota Assocs., Inc., 836 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007).  
 
659 Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1173–75; see also New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 
Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2006); Colon v. Multi-Pak Corp., 477 F. Supp. 
2d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Broydo v. Baxter D. Whitney & Sons, Inc., No. 
36387/04, 2009 WL 1815092, at *2–3 (N.Y. Super. Ct. June 23, 2009). 
 
660 Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1173 n. 2. 
 
661 See, e.g., Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 
247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting the continuity of enterprise exception as 
articulated in Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 
1976)). 
 
662 See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(finding successor corporation liable when they had assumed “all debts” of the 
predecessor over objections of the successor that they did not assume the 
“acts” of the predecessor. “[T]he issue is not the assumption of acts. It is the 
assumption of liability for those acts.”); see also, e.g., Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co., Inc. v. Canron, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 364, 364–65 (N.Y. 1977) (finding 
no express or implied assumption by a successor in a purchase agreement); 
Valenta Enters., Inc. v. Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding neither express assumption of liability nor 
anything “presented to the court which would warrant a finding of implied 
commitment to assume such responsibilities.”); Wensing v. Paris Indus., 558 
N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“The applicable documents in this 
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New York:  The Fraud Exception 
 New York courts recognize the exception to the general rule of 
nonliability for asset purchasers where “the transaction is entered into 
fraudulently to escape [tort] obligations.”663   A federal court has held 
that this exception would apply where the evidence demonstrates a 
fraudulent conveyance under New York Debtor and Creditor Law § 
276.664   Under § 276 a fraudulent conveyance is one made “with actual 
intent . . . to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors. . 
. .”665  The court in Silverman Partners LP v. Verox Group articulated the 
test for a finding of fraud, holding that: 
Circumstantial evidence may be used to 
infer actual intent to defraud and there 
are certain “badges of fraud” to be used 
when determining if actual intent exists, 
which include: (1) the inadequacy of 
consideration received, (2) the close 
relationship between the parties to the 
transfer, (3) information that the 
transferor was insolvent by the 
conveyance, (4) suspicious timing of 
case reveal [the successor] purchased the assets without assuming ‘any warranty 
obligations or product liability claims . . . with respect to any inventory sold, 
shipped or delivered prior to [August 28, 1987].’ They further provide that 
[successor] took the assets ‘free and clear . . . of . . . all claims for products 
liability (to the extent that such claims are in existence or arise out of products 
manufactured and sold prior to the closing date).’ These provisions evince a 
clear intent that [the successor] was not assuming any liability for products sold 
prior to its acquisition of assets.”); Emrich v. Kroner, 434 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (finding that, “from the terms of the purchase 
agreement . . . [the successor] agreed to assume the tort liability of [the 
predecessor] arising out of incidents occurring after the closing date.”); see also 
Hoover, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 402.  
 
663 Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198. 
 
664 Silverman Partners LP v. Verox Grp., No. 08 CIV 3103(HB), 2010 WL 
2899438, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2010). 
 
665 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (LexisNexis 2013). 
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transactions or existence of pattern after 
the debt had been incurred or a legal 
action against the debtor had been 
threatened, or (5) the use of fictitious 
parties.666  
New York:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
One of the traditional exceptions to the general rule of 
nonliability exists where there has been a “consolidation or merger of 
seller and purchaser.”667  “A transaction structured as a purchase-of-
assets may be deemed to fall within this exception as a ‘de facto merger,’ 
even if the parties chose not to effect a formal merger . . . .”668   The 
following factors are considered “the hallmarks” of a de facto merger in 
New York: 
continuity of ownership; cessation of 
ordinary business and dissolution of the 
acquired corporation as soon as possible; 
assumption by the successor of the 
liabilities ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of the 
business of the acquired corporation; and, 
continuity of management, personnel, 
physical location, assets and general 
business operation . . . .669 
666 Silverman Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *6 (citing A.J. Heel Stone, L.L.C. v. 
Evisu Int'l, S.R.L., No. 03 CIV. 1097 (DAB), 2006 WL 1458292, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2006)). 
 
667 Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198.  
 
668 In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d 254, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005).  
 
669 Fitzgerald v. Fahnestock & Co.,  286 A.D.2d 573, 574, , 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (citation omitted); see also New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201 
(2d Cir. 2006); Battino v. Cornelia Fifth Ave., LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 392 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Crowley v. VisionMaker, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 144 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); Colon v. Multi-Pak Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Riverside Mktg., LLC v. SignatureCard, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 523, 535 
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 Courts have stated that not all of these factors necessarily need 
be present for a finding of de facto merger.670 There is a split of authority, 
however, regarding whether continuity of ownership is a threshold 
element as opposed to a mere factor.671  In New York City Asbestos 
Litigation the court noted:  “It has been held that, because continuity of 
ownership is ‘the essence of a merger,’ it is a necessary element of any de 
facto merger finding, although not sufficient to warrant such a finding by 
itself . . . .”672   
 Since then, several federal courts in the Second Circuit have held 
that continuity of ownership is a required element of the de facto merger 
exception.673  At least one New York state court has agreed,674 though 
another has held that the four factors should be analyzed in a flexible 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rodriguez v. Printco Indus., No. 9420/07, 2010 WL 2679898, 
at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2010); Buja v. KCI Konecranes Int’l. PLC., 815 
N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 
N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d 
at 256; Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. SIB Mortg. Corp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005); Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992). 
 
670 Fitzgerald, 286 A.D.2d at 573–74; see also Sweatland, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 56; 
Morales v. N.Y., 849 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411–13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).  
 
671 Silverman Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *4; In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 
15 A.D.3d at 256 (citing Fitzgerald, 286 A.D.2d at 573–74); Kretzmer v. Firesafe 
Prods. Corp., 805 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Wash. Mut. Bank, 
801 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 
788 N.Y.S.2d at 583; Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 411; Buja, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 415); 
see also Rodriguez, 2010 WL 2679898 at *4. 
 
672 In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d at 256 (quoting Cargo Partner 
AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 46–47 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
  
673 See e.g., New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 213-14 (2d Cir. 
2006) (declining to certify the question to the Court of Appeals); Silverman 
Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *4; Colon, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 626; Care Envtl. 
Corp. v. M2 Techs., Inc., No. CV-05-1600, 2006 WL 148913, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 18, 2006); Riverside Marketing, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 536.  
 
674 Buja, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 
A.D.3d at 256) (“Courts have determined that continuity of ownership ‘is a 
necessary element of any de facto merger finding . . . .’”). 
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manner, with no single one, including continuity of ownership, being 
determinative.675  One federal district court has held that the continuity 
of enterprise and de facto merger exceptions are “so similar that they may 
be considered a single exception.”676   
 Shortly before New York City Asbestos Litigation was decided, a 
New York supreme court held that the buyer of an auto parts store 
could not be held liable for an injury allegedly caused by its predecessor's 
sale of asbestos-containing products, neither under the de facto merger 
theory nor the continuity of enterprise theory because the predecessor 
was not immediately dissolved, the buyer did not assume seller's 
liabilities, and the store's operations changed from primarily retail to 
primarily wholesale.677  That court noted:  
Assuming . . . there is no one factor, 
including continuity of ownership, which 
is determinative of [a de facto merger], 
there is very little, if any, distinction 
between the exceptions of “continuity of 
enterprise” and consolidation and merger. 
In either instance, a court must weigh the 
various factors on a case by case basis to 
determine if tort liability should be 
imposed upon a successor corporation.678 
675 Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 411–13; see also Rodriguez, 2010 WL 2679898, at *11 
(appearing to balance the factors in a flexible manner, ultimately denying 
summary judgment in favor of the successor where there was evidence that 
“some” (not most) of the owners of the predecessor and successor were the 
same). 
 
676 Battino, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (quoting Cargo Partner AG, 352 F.3d at 45 
n.3). 
 
677 In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 583–84. 
 
678 Id. at 583; see also Doktor v. Werner Co., 762 F. Supp. 2d 494 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012); Jalili v. Xanboo Inc., No. 11 CIV. 1200 DLC, 2011 WL 4336690, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011); see also Optigen, LLC v. Int'l Genetics, Inc., 777 F. 
Supp. 2d 390, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Ortiz v. Green Bull, Inc., No. 10-CV-3747, 
(ADS)(ETB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131601, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011); 
Wexler v A.O. Smith Water Prod. Co., No. 190223/11, 2012 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 3233, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 2, 2012). 
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 New York:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
 In order for the mere continuation exception to apply, the 
predecessor must be completely extinguished; where the predecessor 
survives the sale transaction as “a distinct, albeit meager, entity[,]” the 
successor “cannot be considered a mere continuation . . . .”679  Note that 
the court in Morales held that “the dissolution of the predecessor/seller 
corporation is not necessary for there to be a ‘de facto merger.’”680 
New York:  The Continuity of Enterprise Exception 
A New York supreme court, in 1985, adopted the continuity of 
enterprise exception as articulated in Turner.681  The court adopted 
Turner’s three criteria test:  “[(1)] whether there was a continuation of the 
enterprise of the original entity; [(2)] whether the original entity ceased its 
ordinary business operations and dissolved promptly after the 
transaction; [(3)] and whether the purchasing entity assumed those 
liabilities and obligations of the seller normally required for an 
uninterrupted continuation of the seller’s operation.”682  Interestingly, the 
court’s application of Turner did not appear to require the destruction of 
a plaintiff’s remedies in order to satisfy the second prong of the 
 
679 Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198; see also Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 
N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (mere continuation exception 
inapplicable where the predecessor “survived the transaction, albeit in 
bankruptcy, for several years”); Wensing v. Paris Indus., 558 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 
(N.Y. App. 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“The record reveals that [the 
predecessor] survived the asset transfer as a distinct corporation, albeit in 
bankruptcy. Under such circumstances, [the successor] cannot be cast as its 
mere continuation”); Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 410; In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos 
Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 581–82 (“In summary, if a ‘predecessor corporation 
continues to exist after the transaction, in however a gossamer of form, the 
mere continuation exception is not applicable.’”) (quoting Diaz v. S. Bend 
Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 
680 Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 410–11. 
 
681 Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).  
 
682 Salvati, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 
N.W.2d 873, 879, 883 (Mich. 1976)).   
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continuity of enterprise test.683  In applying Turner’s second prong, the 
court stated, “[i]n the first sale, of course, [the predecessor] did not 
dissolve promptly, but continued on, in some form, for several years.  
What seems to be of greatest importance, however, is that it was 
completely out of the coffee granulizer business.”684  This particular 
application of Turner (without the destruction of remedy requirement) 
begins to look more like a Turner-Ray hybrid.   
In the 2006 Semenetz case, however, the Court of Appeals of New 
York expressly rejected the product line exception but made no decision 
on the continuity of enterprise exception, since the plaintiff had not 
relied on that theory on review.685  The Court of Appeals has yet to 
directly address the continuity of enterprise exception since expressly 
deciding not to adopt it in the 1983 Schumacher case.686  Additionally, in 
1984, the Monroe County Supreme Court reiterated that Schumacher 
refused to adopt the continuity of enterprise exception,687 and as of 
February 2017, no New York court has adopted or applied the 
continuity of enterprise exception since Semenetz was decided. 
 Note that in In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litigation, a 2005 
case, the Ontario County Supreme Court (a New York trial court) stated 
that if no one factor in the de facto merger exception is determinative, 
then “there is very little, if any, distinction between the exceptions of 
“continuity of enterprise” and consolidation and merger.  In either 
instance, a court must weigh the various factors on a case by case basis 
to determine if tort liability should be imposed upon a successor 
corporation.”688 
683 Salvati, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 242–48.  
 
684 Id. at 247. 
 
685 Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 n.2, 1173–
1175 (N.Y. 2006). 
 
686 Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198; see also Radziul v. Hooper, Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 
324, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (stating that the New York Court of Appeals has 
“refused to adopt” the product line or continuity of enterprise exceptions). 
 
687 Radziul, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 326.  
 
688 In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 583; see also Battino, 861 
F. Supp. 2d at 392 (accord). 
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New York: Jurisdiction over Successor Corporations 
 One interesting question that has arisen in New York is whether 
or not a successor corporation can be subject to personal jurisdiction 
under New York’s long arm statute.  At least one federal court has 
answered this question in the affirmative.689 
North Carolina 
North Carolina courts follow the traditional approach, 
recognizing the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of 
successor nonliability:  “(1) where there is an express or implied 
agreement by the purchasing corporation to assume the debt or liability; 
(2) where the transfer amounts to a de facto merger of the two 
corporations; (3) where the transfer of assets was done for the purpose 
of defrauding the corporation's creditors; or (4) where the purchasing 
corporation is a ‘mere continuation’ of the selling corporation in that the 
purchasing corporation has some of the same shareholders, directors, 
and officers.”690   
The court in G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc., 
further noted that: 
[a] review of the case law reveals that 
North Carolina follows the traditional 
approach to the “mere continuation” 
theory . . . .  This jurisdiction also 
considers two factors in addition to the 
issue of continuity of ownership: (1) 
689 Hughes v. BCI Int’l. Holdings, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 290, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (citing Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 213 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Abbacor, Inc. v. Miller, No. 01 Civ. 803, 2001 WL 
1006051, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (“acts of 
a predecessor corporation can be attributed to a successor corporation for the 
purpose of establishing long arm jurisdiction where the predecessor and the 
successor are one and the same”). 
 
690 G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted) (citing Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire 
Co, 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988));  see Atwell v. DJO, Inc., 803 F. 
Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Lattimore & Assocs., LLC v. Steaksauce, Inc., 
No. 10 CVS 14744, 2012 WL 1925729, at *3 (N.C. May 25, 2012).  
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inadequate consideration for the 
purchase; and (2) lack of some of the 
elements of a good faith purchaser for 
value . . . .  In fact, a purchaser conceivably 
could be found to be the corporate successor of the 
selling corporation even though there is no 
continuity of ownership . . . . 691 
The last sentence is particularly perplexing because the court 
noted that North Carolina follows the traditional approach to mere 
continuation in which at least some continuity of ownership is required 
but then goes on to reject the “substantial continuity” or “continuity of 
enterprise” exception.692  The court stated:  
In the instant case, we find that the trial 
court erred by applying the “substantial 
continuity” test rather than the more 
restrictive traditional test to determine 
whether a successor corporation is a mere 
continuation of its predecessor. In the 
context of a commercially reasonable sale 
under UCC § 9-504, allowing successor 
liability based on factors other than 
inadequate consideration and identity of 
ownership might have a chilling effect on 
potential purchasers who would have to 
be concerned that by acquiring a 
foreclosed business, they would also 
acquire liabilities they never intended to 
assume.693 
 It is worth noting that G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. indicated that the 
purchaser could be the “corporate successor” versus the “mere 
continuation” of the selling corporation even if there was not continuity 
691 G.P. Publ’ns., 481 S.E.2d at 680 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 
692 Id. at 680–81; see also Atwell, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 372. 
 
693 G.P. Publ’ns., 481 S.E.2d at 682. 
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of ownership.  Following the traditional approach, this theory of 
successor liability (based on lack of adequacy of consideration and a lack 
of some of the elements of a good faith purchaser for value) would fit 
under the fraud exception.  Indeed, L.J. Best Furniture v. Capital Delivery 
Serv., which the court cited, dealt exclusively with the fraud and mere 
continuation exceptions.694 
North Dakota 
North Dakota follows the traditional rule of corporate successor 
nonliability, subject to the four traditional exceptions.695  In Downtowner v. 
Acrometal Prods. Inc., the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the 
expanded approaches to successor liability found in Turner and Ray v. 
Alad.  After extensive analysis, the court concluded that the decision to 
adopt an expanded exception should be made by the legislature, stating: 
[W]hen the issue is whether successor 
corporations should assume the liability 
of their predecessors, and the primary 
justification for the assumption is the 
successors’ ability to bear the costs, then 
before the successors should be required 
to bear the costs we must be sure they 
can do so.  Legislatures and not courts are 
in a much better position to determine 
the issue. . . . We therefore conclude that 
the established principles pertaining to 
the liability of a cash purchaser of assets 
are applicable to products liability cases.696 
694 L.J. Best Furniture Distribs., Inc. v. Capital Delivery Serv., 432 S.E.2d 437, 
440 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (vacating summary judgment because there was a 
dispute of fact as to whether or not the successor was a mere continuation of 
the predecessor or whether the transfer of assets was made to defraud 
creditors); see also Atwell, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 372. 
695 Benson v. SRT Commc’ns, Inc., 813 N.W. 2d 552 (N.D. 2012); see also 
Drayton Grain Processors v. NE Foods, Inc., No. CIV. 3:05-CV-73, 2007 WL 
983825, at *5 (D.N.D. Mar. 30, 2007); Kristy's Inc. v. Allied Prods. Corp., No. 
A2–89–100, 1991 WL 541160, at *2 (D.N.D. Jun 21, 1991); Downtowner, Inc. 
v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984). 
696 Downtowner, 347 N.W.2d at 124–25. 
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 In Axtmann v. Chillemi, in which the majority opinion addressed 
piercing the corporate veil, not successor liability, Justice Kapsner’s 
concurrence in part and dissent in part discussed five “factors” to be 
considered when attempting to impose successor liability under the mere 
continuation exception:  
(1) [The] transfer of corporate assets (2) 
for less than adequate consideration (3) to 
another corporation which continued the 
business operation of the transferor (4) 
when both corporations had at least one 
common officer or director who was in 
fact instrumental in the transfer . . . and 
(5) the transfer rendered the transferor 
incapable of paying its creditors’ claims 
because it was dissolved in either fact or 
law.697 
 In this case, Main Realty had been somewhat dissolved, but real 
estate agents continued to work under its name and used the 
commissions to pay off the prior debts of Main Realty, a fact which was 
not made clear to the purchasers of real estate through those agents.698  
“The trial court found each of the five factors . . . applied to the facts of 
th[e] case,” and thus, Justice Kapsner maintained that liability should 
have been imposed against the defendant corporation under the mere 
continuation doctrine. 699   
Ohio 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed separately the issue 
of successor liability in the context of product liability and contract 
claims.  In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., the court recognized 
only the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor non-
 
697 Axtmann v Chillemi, 740 N.W. 2d 838, 855 (N.D. 2007) (Kapsner, J., 
concurring/dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 241 
A.2d 471, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968)). 
 
698 Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 845–47. 
 
699 Id. at 855. 
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liability in the context of products liability claims.700  In Welco Industries, 
Inc. v. Applied Cos., the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to expand the 
traditional exceptions or adopt the continuity of enterprise exception in 
the context of contract liabilities.701  The Flaugher court also declined to 
adopt the product line exception, concluding that the legislature should 
make major policy decisions.702   
 Note that a federal court has held that it is not necessary to use 
the phrase  “successor liability” in the complaint in order to pursue the 
theory at later stages of litigation.703 
Ohio:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
The courts look to the language of the purchase agreement in 
determining the extent to which a purchaser assumed the liabilities of the 
seller.704  If the court cannot determine, based on the “four corners of 
the contract,” whether the successor assumed the liabilities of the 
700 Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ohio 1987); 
see also Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Universal Pallets, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-113, 2011 
WL 3297239, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2011); Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 130 (Ohio 2006); Rondy & 
Co.,Rondy & Co., Inc. v. Plastic Lumber Co., No. 25548, 2011 WL 5377741, at 
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011). 
 
701 Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993); see 
also Pilkington N. Am., 861 N.E.2d at 130; Kuempel Serv., Inc. v. Zofko, 672 
N.E.2d 1026, 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).  
 
702 Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 337.  
 
703 Kennedy v. Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 481 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[A] 
plaintiff must put the defendant on notice that the plaintiff is pursuing a theory 
of successor liability  to further pursue it at trial.  Notice, not specific pleading, 
is the standard.”).   
 
704 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (“It is clear that [the purchaser] did not expressly 
or impliedly assume any contractual liability to [the seller]. The purchase 
agreement expressly disclaimed both Welco's rights in its claim against Applied 
and its liability in the counterclaim.”); see also Pilkington N. Am., 861 N.E.2d at 
130–31; Dobbelaere v. Cosco, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997). 
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predecessor, the fact-finder must resolve any ambiguities in the 
contract.705   
Ohio:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
 The Welco court described a de facto merger as “a transaction that 
results in the dissolution of the predecessor corporation and is in the 
nature of a total absorption of the previous business into the successor. . 
. .  A de facto merger is a merger in fact without an official declaration of 
such.”706 Subsequently the court listed the “hallmarks” of a de facto 
merger:  
(1) the continuation of the previous 
business activity and corporate personnel, 
(2) a continuity of shareholders resulting 
from a sale of assets in exchange for 
stock, (3) the immediate or rapid 
dissolution of the predecessor 
corporation, and (4) the assumption by 
the purchasing corporation of all liabilities 
and obligations ordinarily necessary to 
continue the predecessor’s business 
operations.707 
 The court also indicated that a “transfer of assets for stock is the 
sine qua non of [a de facto] merger.”708  Even though the court initially 
referred to them as “hallmarks,” the court later referred to the four listed 
705 Davis v. Loopco Indus., Inc., 609 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ohio 1993).  
 
706 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing 
Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 340). 
 
707 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 
873, 879 (Mich. 1976)); see also Rondy & Co., 2011 WL 5377741, at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 9, 2011); Kennedy, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 476–80 (noting that “the fourth 
factor does not examine if the specific liability in question was transferred; 
rather, the fourth factor asks whether the predecessor company transferred to 
the successor company the ‘liabilities ordinarily necessary to continue’ regular 
business operations.”) This analysis appears to keep the de facto merger doctrine 
conceptually distinct from the assumption of liabilities doctrine.  
 
708 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134. 
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characteristics as “elements.”709  Subsequent decisions by the Ohio Court 
of Appeals indicate that all four elements must be present before a 
successor can be held liable under the de facto merger exception.710  
Federal district courts, however, have held that under Welco not all four 
hallmarks are required in order to find a de facto merger.711  Also, Ohio 
courts will liberally construe the “rapid dissolution” hallmark to include 
situations where a predecessor survives but retains too few assets to 
satisfy creditors.712 
709 Id. at 1134 (stating that “this transaction fails to satisfy the elements of a de 
facto merger”). 
 
710 Mohammadpour v. Thomas, No. 85474, 2005 WL 1793515, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 28, 2005) (referring to the hallmarks individually as “elements”); 
Howell v. Atlantic-MEECO, Inc., No. 01CA0084, 2002 WL 857685, at * 3 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2002) (“Although AMI arguably meets the first of 
those hallmarks of a de facto merger, because it is engaged in the same business 
as its predecessors, the manufacture and sale of marine dock systems, that alone 
cannot subject AMI to liability as a successor to the manufacturer of the Buck 
Creek catwalk. The others must be shown, as well, and they are not.”).   
 
711 Cytec Indus. Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 644, 657 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (“The Supreme Court of Ohio has never stated that it is an absolute 
requirement that all of the “hallmarks” of a de facto merger be present before 
concluding that a particular transaction is in fact a de facto merger. Further, 
despite that court's acknowledgment that one court had found that an assets-
for-stock transfer is the sine qua non of a de facto merger, the court has never 
stated that this is the only transaction in which there exists continuity of 
shareholders. A rule mandating the presence of all of the ‘hallmarks’ of a de 
facto merger or always requiring an assets-for-stock transaction would be too 
rigid, as it would likely except some ‘transaction[s] that result[ ] in the 
dissolution of the predecessor corporation and [that] [are] in the nature of a 
total absorption of the previous business into the successor.’ Such a rule would 
dilute the de facto merger doctrine, which recognizes transactions that are 
mergers in fact without an official declaration of such”) (citing Welco, 617 
N.E.2d at 1134); Kennedy, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (“It is not a requirement that 
all four factors be present for a court to find that a de facto merger occurred.”) 
(citing Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134). 
 
712 Pottschmidt v. Klosterman, 865 N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 
(“[A]s to the fact that the original corporation technically still exists, we have 
previously held that the continued existence of the transferor corporation does 
not defeat a claim for de facto merger except if ‘the transferor retains sufficient 
assets to satisfy the claims of its creditors.’ As has been discussed above, the 
original corporation retained no assets. Moreover, the original corporation 
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Ohio:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Flaugher court discussed the narrow and broad constructions 
of the mere continuation exception but ultimately did not adopt either 
approach.713  The major distinction between the two approaches, 
according to the court in Flaugher, is that one focuses on the continuation 
of the entity and the other focuses on the continuation of the business 
operation.  The court declined to adopt one approach over the other, 
stating:  “It is obvious that even the expanded view of continuity has no 
application under these facts.”714   
The Welco court explicitly refused to expand the mere 
continuation exception and required continuity of ownership as a 
threshold finding but limited its holding to contract-related actions.715  In 
the same year that the Supreme Court of Ohio issued the Welco decision, 
it was presented with a “certified question presented by the appellate 
court” asking “whether [Flaugher] adopted the traditional test or the 
expanded test to determine whether a successor corporation is a mere 
continuation of a predecessor corporation.”716  Unfortunately, the court 
declined to answer the certified question, concluding there was an issue 
of fact as to whether liabilities were assumed under the asset purchase 
agreement.717   
closed its corporate bank account, changed the name on the profit-sharing 
accounts, and filed a final tax return with the IRS, which effectively constituted 
an end of the original corporation”) (citations omitted) (citing Crisplip v. 
Twentieth Century Heating & Ventilating Co., No. 13721, 1989 WL 11795, at 
*4 (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 15, 1989)). 
 
713 Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 336.  
 
714 Id.  
 
715 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133; Mandalaywala v. Omnitech Elecs., Inc., No. 
05AP-1216, 2006 WL 1556773, at *7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 8, 2006). 
 
716 Davis, 609 N.E.2d at 145. 
 
717 Id. 
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Subsequently, it appears that Ohio appellate courts and federal 
courts in the sixth circuit have concluded that the expanded mere 
continuation test is also inapplicable in tort actions.718    
Ohio:  The Fraud Exception 
Under Ohio law, indicia of fraud include inadequate 
consideration and lack of good faith.719  It appears that inadequacy of 
consideration is also one of the indicia of mere continuation.720  
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma follows the traditional approach to successor liability, 
recognizing the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of 
successor nonliability; they include: 
(1) Where there is an agreement to 
assume such debts or liabilities (2) Where 
the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction warrant a finding that there 
was a consolidation or merger of the 
corporations, or (3) that the transaction 
was fraudulent in fact or (4) that the 
718 Miami Cty. Incinerator Qualified Trust v. Acme Waste Mgmt. Co., 61 F. 
Supp. 2d 724, 729–30 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (collecting cases); see also Aluminum 
Line Prods. Co. v. Brad Smith Roofing Co., 671 N.E.2d 1343, 1355 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1996); Howell, 2002 WL 857685, at *4; Pottschmidt, 865 N.E.2d at 120.  
 
719 Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134; Howell, 2002 WL 857685, at *3; see also Pottschmidt, 
865 N.E.2d at 120 (holding that the evidence supported the imposition of 
successor liability based on the fraudulent transaction exception where the new 
corporation was formed one month after a third party sued predecessor 
corporation; predecessor's and successor’s sole shareholder acknowledged that 
new corporation was formed to escape liability, albeit distinct from third party's 
lawsuit; and sole shareholder's accountant-attorney testified that accountant-
attorney had discussed lawsuit and damages with sole shareholder before the 
new corporation was formed); Per-Co, Ltd. v. Great Lakes Factors, Inc., 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 642, 653–54 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 
720 Rondy & Co., 2011 WL 5377741, at *4; Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Universal 
Pallets, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 3297239 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2011). 
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purchasing corporation was a mere 
continuation of the selling company.721   
 Also, in order to establish the liability of a once-removed 
successor corporation, “each company along the line of succession [must 
meet] one of the four exceptions to non-liability.”722 
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained in Crutchfiled:  “The 
mere continuation exception covers a re-organization of a corporation.  
For this exception, the test is not whether there is a continuation of 
business operations, but whether there is a continuation of the corporate 
entity.”723  In making this determination, courts “look[] to whether there 
is a common identity of directors, officers, and stockholders before and 
after the sale, whether there was good consideration for the sale, and 
whether the seller corporation continues to exist in fact.”724  Further, 
“[t]he bare de jure existence of the seller corporation after the sale is 
insufficient alone to establish that the successor corporation is not a 
mere continuation of the seller company.725 The Crutchfield court further 
noted that “[i]n many states that employ the mere continuation 
exception, the common identity of directors, officers, and shareholders is 
the most important factor.”726 
In 1985, the Oklahoma appellate court addressed the product-
line exception, concluding that the rationale articulated by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court in Pulis, that is,“[t]he test is not the continuation of the 
721 Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); see also Murrah v. 
EOG Res., Inc., No. CIV-10-994-M, 2011 WL 227652, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 
21, 2011); CTI Servs. LLC v. Haremza, No. 09-CV-144-GKF-TLW, 2011 WL 
2472566, at *6 (N.D. Okla. June 21, 2011); Crutchfield v. Marine Power Engine 
Co., 209 P.3d 295, 300 (Okla. 2009); Coline Oil Corp. v. State, 88 P.2d 897, 898 
(Okla. 1939).  
 
722 Crutchfield, 209 P.3d at 300. 
 
723 Id. at 301. 
 
724 Id. at 300 (collecting cases and listing pertinent facts supporting imposition 
and non-imposition of liability). 
 
725 Id. at 301–02. 
 
726 Id. at 302. 
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business operation, but the continuation of the corporate entity,” 
foreclosed any possibility of adopting the product-line exception.727  
Oregon 
The Supreme Court of Oregon articulated the general rule of 
successor nonliability and its four traditional exceptions in Erickson v. 
Grande Ronde Lumber Co.728  In this case, the court addressed whether a 
successor corporation had assumed liability for services rendered to its 
predecessor.729  The other three exceptions to the general rule were not 
analyzed.  In 2000, an Oregon appellate court addressed successor 
liability where a purchasing corporation had been ordered to reinstate a 
worker injured while working for the selling corporation.730  The court 
noted the general rule and reiterated the four traditional exceptions, 
ultimately holding that the consolidation or merger exception did not 
apply because—among other things—the predecessor company 
continued to exist, and the predecessor and successor companies had 
“completely different ownership and management.”731  The Ninth 
Circuit, applying Oregon law, declined to adopt a broad interpretation of 
the mere continuation exception that would include the substantial 
continuation doctrine.732    
727 Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953, 954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984). 
 
728 Erickson v. Grand Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. 1939); Dahlke 
v. Cascade Acoustics, Inc., 171 P.3d 992, 997 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); see Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 
1997); Century Indem. Co. v. Marine Group, LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. 
Or. 2012). 
 
729 Erickson, 92 P.2d at 174 (Or. 1939).  
 
730 Tyree Oil, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 7 P.3d 571, 571–72 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2000).  
 
731 Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 574. 
 
732 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 
358 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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Oregon has explicitly declined to extend successor liability to 
include the product line exception.  In Dahlke v. Cascade Acoustics, Inc.,733 a 
case involving the alleged successor to an asbestos manufacturer, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals stated: 
“[In a previous case] we explained that, 
apart from the four exceptions [to 
successor liability], ‘[i]t has long been the 
general rule in Oregon that, when one 
corporation purchases all of the assets of 
another corporation, the purchasing 
corporation does not become liable for the 
debts and liabilities of the selling 
corporation.’ . . . Plaintiff's proposed 
modification of successor liability would 
require us to depart from that established 
rule.”734 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania courts generally recognize five species of successor 
liability for corporate asset purchasers, including where 
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly 
agreed to assume liability, (2) the 
transaction amounted to a consolidation 
or merger, (3) the purchasing corporation 
was merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation, (4) the transaction was 
fraudulently entered into to escape 
liability, or (5) the transfer was without 
adequate consideration and no provision 
733 171 P.3d 992 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). See generally Cox v. DJO, Inc., No. 07–
1310–AA, 2009 WL 3855084, at *3–4 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting Dahkle, 
171 P.3d at 992 (quoting Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 573)). 
 
734 Dahlke, 171 P.3d at 998 (quoting Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 573 (citing Erickson 
v. Grande Ronde Lbr. Co., 92 P.2d 170 (Or. 1939)) (first and second alterations 
added) (emphasis in original). 
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were made for creditors of the selling 
corporation.735 
In addition, in the context of products liability, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania adopted a  flexible product line exception based on a 
combination of Ramirez v. Amsted Indus. Inc.736 and  Ray v. Alad Corp.,737 
735 McClure v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 28 A.3d 951 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2011); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 873 A.2d 1286, 1291 (Pa. 2005) 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Simmers v. American Cyanamid 
576 A.2d 386 (Pa. Super. Ct.1990) (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, 
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308–09 (3rd Cir. 1985), and Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 
434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)); see, e.g., Adani Exports Ltd. v. AMCI 
Corp., No. 2:05-cv-00304, 2006 WL 1785707, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jun. 26, 2006) 
(citing Granthum v. Textile Mach. Works, 326 A.2d 449 (1974), and Lopata v. 
Bemis Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974)); In re Total Containment, 
Inc., 335 B.R. 589, 617 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d 
at 1291 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 308–09); Fizzano Bros. 
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 973 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) 
(citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291, and Hill, 603 A.2d at 605), appeal granted 
on other grounds, 994 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Hayduk v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeal Bd., 906 A.2d 622, 632 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006); In Re Thorotrast Cases, 
No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120, at *488–95 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 13, 1994); see also 
Tender Touch Rehab Servs. LLC v. Brighten at Bryn Mawr, No. 11-7016, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40656, at *10–11 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 23, 2012) (citing 
Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 565 (3d Cir 1997) 
(citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 308)); Vital Pharms., Inc. v. USA 
Sports, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-975, 2012 WL 760561, at *4 (M.D. Penn. Mar. 8, 
2012) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Lexington & Concord Search & 
Abstract, LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 
873 A.2d at 1291)). 
 
736 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N. J. 1981). 
 
737 560 P.2d 3, 7–8 (Cal. 1977) (citing Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 
3d 842, 846 (1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 
780–81 (1971); Pierce v. Riverside Mtg. Secs. Co., 77 P.2d 226 (Cal. App. Ct. 
1938); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973); see also 
Tender Touch Rehab Svcs. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40656, at *10–11 (citing 
Aluminum Co. of America, 124 F.3d at 565 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 
308)); Vital Pharms., 2012 WL 760561, at *4 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d at 315 (citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291)); Kloberdanz v. Joy 
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968). 
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choosing to adopt a new exception rather than expanding the traditional 
exceptions.738 
 In Schmidt v. Boardman Co., the appellant/successor challenged the 
product line exception, purporting that it was “inconsistent with the 
rationale underlying strict products liability[] because it penalizes 
successor corporations which did not design, make, sell, or otherwise 
profit from a defective product, and which lacked any opportunity to 
make the product safe.”739  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not 
decide the issue, however, ruling that because it had not been raised in 
the lower courts, the matter was waived.740  While acknowledging that it 
had not adopted the product line exception, the court held that the 
exception, as it existed in the lower courts, consisted more of flexible 
factors, rather than elements or requirements.741  
 The court in Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc. held that a sale of 
assets by a secured creditor “pursuant to Section 9-504 of the UCC [13 
Pa.C.S. § 9504] does not, as a matter of law, preclude a creditor's claim 
against the purchaser based upon successor liability.”742 
 
 
738 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 10–11 (“It is perhaps only a matter of style how one 
proceeds.  One may retain the traditional exceptions but expand their 
boundaries, so that ‘merger’ or ‘continuation’ are held to include cases they 
once would not have included.  Or one may adopt a new exception, such as the 
product-line exception.  We believe it better to adopt a new exception.”); see also 
Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 965–69 (Pa. 2012) 
(quoting Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 
2005) (citing Gallenberq Equip., Inc. v. Agromac Int’l., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 
(E.D. Wis. 1998)); Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291 n.6 (noting that the product 
line exception applies in the context of products liability, but not otherwise).   
739 Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 936 (Pa. 2011) (citing Cafazzo v. 
Cent. Med. Health Servs., Inc., 688 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. 1995)). 
 
740 Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 942. 
 
741 Id. at 944–45 (citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d 811 (N. J. 1981); Ray, 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 
1977); Hill, 603 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Dawejko, 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981)).  
 
742 810 A.2d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
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Pennsylvania:  The Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions 
Many Pennsylvania courts note that, under Pennsylvania law, the 
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions are interrelated or 
difficult to distinguish.743  The court in Commonwealth v. Lavelle explained:   
“[T]he first of the four exceptions 
rendering the purchasing corporation 
liable for duties of the seller is a 
transaction amounting to a merger or 
consolidation.  In a merger a corporation 
absorbs one or more other corporations, 
which thereby lose their corporate 
identity. “A merger of two corporations 
contemplates that one will be absorbed by 
the other and go out of existence, but the 
absorbing corporation will remain.”. . . .  
“Another of the . . . exceptions to the 
general rule of nonliability arises when 
there is a continuation.  In a continuation, 
743 Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 614 F.2d 860, 871 (3d Cir. 1980) (“As is 
illustrated by the de facto merger cases, that exception is interrelated to the 
second exception for continuity”); United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 
F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005); Fiber-Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods. of 
Easton, Inc., 186 B.R. 603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that “the continuity 
exception which Fiber-Lite contended applied is actually subsumed by the de 
facto merger exception”); Lavelle, 555 A.2d 218, 227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(citing Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 
1974)) (applying the de facto merger exception, but stating that “[e]mployment of 
the mere continuation theory of liability would not alter our resolution of the 
issue since the two theories are difficult to distinguish”); see also Berg Chilling 
Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 468 (3d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Corr. 
Physician Servs., 725 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Tender Touch 
Rehab Servs. LLC v. Brighten at Bryn Mawr, No. 11-7016, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 40656, at *11–12 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 23, 2012) (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 
228; Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69); Johnson v. Svcs.2010) (citing 
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305; Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 134–35; Berg 
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69; Greenway Conter. Inc v. Essex Ins. Co., 
369 Fed. App’x. 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2010)); Vital Pharms., 2012 WL 760561, at 
*4–5 (quoting Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468; Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 
134; Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227). 
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a new corporation is formed to acquire 
the assets of an extant corporation, which 
then ceases to exist.” There is in effect 
but one corporation which merely 
changes its form and ordinarily ceases to 
exist upon the creation of the new 
corporation which is its successor.”744 
There is a difference in the iteration of the two tests, however.  
The term “elements” is used in the context of a mere continuation and 
“factors” used with de facto merger:  “The primary elements of the 
continuation exception are identity of the officers, directors, or 
shareholders, and the existence of a single corporation following the 
transfer.”745  “[W]hen determining if a de facto merger has occurred, 
courts generally consider four factors:”746 
 (1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation 
of the ordinary business by, and 
dissolution of, the predecessor as soon as 
practicable; (3) assumption by the 
successor of liabilities ordinarily necessary 
for uninterrupted continuation of the 
business; and (4) continuity of the 
management, personnel, physical location, 
and the general business operation.”747  
744 Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227 (quoting Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 
361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted) (citing Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 107). 
 
745 Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 134–35 (citing Fiber-Lite Corp., 186 B.R. 603; 
Widerman v. Mayflower Transit Inc., No. CIV.A. 96–2036, 1997 WL 539684 
(E.D. Penn. Aug. 6, 1997); see also Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69 
(quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 
1985)). 
 
746 Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227) 
 
747 Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); see also Berg 
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 
310); In re Total Containment, Inc., 335 B.R. at 617 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 762 F.2d at 310); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Lexington & Concord Search 
and Abstract, LLC., 513 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Lavelle, 
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Moreover, courts have noted that not all of the de facto merger 
factors must be present for the exception to apply.748    
It may be that the tests have become interrelated in application 
because, as a practical matter, if the facts fail to satisfy the factor-based de 
facto merger exception, the same facts will fail to meet the elemental 
requirements of the mere continuation exception.   
 Further confusion, though, is evidenced by the ruling of the 
Superior Court in Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., that 
continuity of ownership is perhaps not a mere factor of de facto merger; 
rather, “[c]ontinuity of ownership is a key element that must exist in 
order to apply the de facto merger doctrine[.]”749  In response to this 
Superior Court decision, “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a 
lengthy opinion explaining [the] contours [of the de facto merger 
exception in 2012].”750  The Supreme Court stated:   
[A] broad holding could state that when 
the underlying cause of action is 
contractual or commercial in nature, the 
de facto merger exception does require a 
strict continuity of ownership, but where 
the underlying cause of action is rooted in 
a cause of action that invokes important 
public policy goals, the continuity of 
ownership prong may be relaxed. 
555 A.2d at 227); In re Asousa P’ship., No. 01-12295DWS, 2006 WL 1997426, 
*8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 15, 2006) (citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 130)) 
 
748 Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); see also Berg 
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 469; Chicago Title Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d at 315 
(citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); Asousa P’ship., 2006 WL 1997426 at *8.  
 
749  Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 973 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2009).   
 
750 Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., 
L.P., 942 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Fizzano Bros. Concrete 
Prod., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 956 (Pa. 2012)).   
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However, the better course requires that 
we tailor our holding to the narrow facts 
of the case sub judice . . . . 
. . . [A]lthough the majority of the case 
law that we have reviewed from other 
jurisdictions would support a rigid 
holding that where, as here, the 
underlying cause of action is in contract 
or breach of warranty, continuity of 
ownership would be a necessary factor 
for establishing a de facto merger, we resist 
a mechanical, un-nuanced ruling . . . .  
. . . [I]t would be incongruous [with 
Pennsylvania statutory law] to adopt a 
blanket rule that a de facto merger would 
always require a rigid showing that the 
shareholders of the predecessor 
corporation have exchanged their 
ownership interests for shares of the 
successor corporation. . . .  
. . . [A] de facto merger analysis . . . requires 
that a court look beyond the superficial 
formalities of a transaction in order to 
examine the transactional realities and 
their consequences.   
. . . . 
Accordingly, we hold that in cases rooted 
in breach of contract and express 
warranty, the de facto merger exception 
requires “some sort of” proof of 
continuity of ownership or stockholder 
interest . . . .  However, such proof is not 
restricted to mere evidence of an 
exchange of assets from one corporation 
for shares in a successor corporation.  
Evidence of other forms of stockholder 
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interest in the successor corporation may 
suffice; indeed 15 Pa.C.S. § 1922(a)(3) 
contemplates that continuing shareholder 
interest pursuant to a statutory merger 
may take the form of “obligations” in lieu 
of shares in the new or surviving 
corporation.  Further, de facto merger, 
including its continuity of ownership 
prong, will always be subject to the fact-
specific nature of the particular 
underlying corporate realities and will not 
always be evident from the formalities of 
the proximal corporate transaction.  
These realities may include an issue 
concerning which entity is actually the 
true predecessor corporation . . . .  
Finally, the elements of the de facto 
merger are not a mechanically-applied 
checklist, but a map to guide a reviewing 
court to a determination that, under the 
facts established, for all intents and 
purposes, a merger has or has not 
occurred between two or more 
corporations, although not accomplished 
under the statutory procedure.751 
Pennsylvania:  The Fraud Exception 
In Commonwealth v. Lavelle  the court held that the fraud exception 
applied where: 
751 Fizzano Bros. Concrete Products, Inc., 42 A.3d at 966–69 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(a)(3)) (citing Berg 
Chilling Systems, Inc., 435 F.3d at 465; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid–
Atlantic States v. Clary & Moore, P.C., 123 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir.1997)); Bud 
Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985); 
Fizzano Bros. Concrete Products, Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 994 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 2010); 
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 28, 31 (Pa. 1958); Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 
230. 
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[The] . . . evidence was, when viewed as a 
whole, sufficient to establish that William 
A. Lavelle, III, was, at all relevant times, 
possessed of an undisclosed ownership 
interest in [the successor,] Lavco, Inc., 
and that the sole purpose for the 
concealment of that ownership interest 
was to avoid liability for the criminal acts 
committed by [the predecessor] Wm. A. 
Lavelle & Son, Co. under the direction of 
William A. Lavelle III.752 
Pennsylvania:  The Product Line Exception 
In 1981, in Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania adopted the product line exception.753  The court was 
careful to keep the product line exception from being too restrictive.754  
In essence, the court adopted the New Jersey product line exception set 
forth in Ramirez while acknowledging the relevance of the factors in 
California’s Ray v. Alad by stating: 
We also believe it better not to phrase the 
new exception too tightly. Given its 
philosophical origin, it should be phrased 
in general terms, so that in any particular 
case the court may consider whether it is 
just to impose liability on the successor 
corporation.  The various factors 
identified in the several cases discussed 
752 555 A.2d at 230. 
 
753 434 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (citing Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 
Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981)). 
 
754 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (citations omitted); see also Kradel v. Fox River 
Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 
110); Takacs v. Cyril Bath Co., No. Civ.A. 04–59, 2006 WL 840350, at *3–4 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2006) (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d passim). But see Schmidt v. 
Boardman Co., 958 A.2d 498, 514 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Takacs, 2006 
WL 840350, aff'd on other grounds, 11 A.3d 924 (Pa. 2011)). 
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above will always be pertinent—for 
example, whether the successor 
corporation advertised itself as an 
ongoing enterprise, Cyr v. B. Offen & 
Co. . . . ; or whether it maintained the 
same product, name, personnel, property, 
and clients, Turner v. Bituminous Casualty 
Co. . . . ; or whether it acquired the 
predecessor corporation's name and good 
will, and required the predecessor to 
dissolve, Knapp v. North American Rockwell 
Corp. . . . .  Also, it will always be useful to 
consider whether the three-part test 
stated in Ray v. Alad Corp. . . . has been 
met. The exception will more likely realize 
its reason for being, however, if such 
details are not made part of its 
formulation.  The formulation of the 
court in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. . . 
. is well-put, and we adopt it.755 
 Since the 1981 Dawejko decision, Pennsylvania courts have 
tightened the phrasing of the product line exception in subsequent 
decisions.  In Pizio v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Court of Common Pleas of 
Pennsylvania concluded that the product line exception requires, as a 
threshold matter, the successor to acquire all or substantially all of the 
predecessor’s assets.756  In Hill v. Trailmobile, Inc.,757 the Pennsylvania 
755 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Ramirez, 
431 A.2d at 811, 825 (“[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all 
the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if exclusively for cash, 
and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling 
corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by 
defects in units of the same product line, even if previously manufactured and 
distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor.”). 
 
756 No. 2676, 1983 WL 265433, at *452 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 9, 1983) (citing Ray 
v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8–9 (Cal. 1977)) (“An examination of the relevant 
case law reveals that the purpose of the product line exception is to afford a 
claimant an opportunity to bring a products liability action against a successor 
corporation where his or her rights against the predecessor corporation have 
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Superior Court recast the three Ray factors as requirements.758  Soon 
thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania stated that “the 
sale of the product line must cause the virtual destruction of the plaintiffs’ 
remedies . . . .  If a business goes on for years profitably after the product 
line is sold and goes bankrupt for other reasons, the sale of the product 
line for adequate consideration did not ‘cause’ the destruction of the 
remedy.”759  
In Schmidt v. Boardman Co., the appellant/successor (1) challenged 
the validity of product line exception product-line exception maintaining 
it was “inconsistent with the rationale underlying strict products liability, 
because it penalizes successor corporations which did not design, make, 
sell, or otherwise profit from a defective product, and which lacked any 
opportunity to make the product safe,” and (2) argued in the alternative 
that the product line exception should consist entirely of mandatory 
requirements versus flexible factors.760   
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not decide whether the 
product line exception was valid, ruling that the issue had not been raised 
below and was thus waived.761  Although it did not adopt the product 
been essentially extinguished either de jure, through dissolution of the 
predecessor, or de facto, through sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the 
predecessor.”). 
 
757 603 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 
758 Hill, 603 A.2d at 606–07 (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 109 (quoting Ray, 
560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1997)); see also Schmidt, 958 A2d at 507; Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332; 
Dillman v. Indiana Rolls, Inc., No. 2001-C-1963, 2004 WL 2491772 at *299–
300 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (citing Hill, 603 A.2d at 602); Griffiths v. Knoedler 
Mfg. Inc., No. 2634 Civil 1995, 2004 WL 3321079, at *188– 89 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
2004) (citing Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 106). 
 
759 In re Thorotrast Cases, No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120, at *504 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
Jan. 13, 1994); see also Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332 (“It is thus clear that the inability 
to recover from an original manufacturer is a prerequisite in Pennsylvania to 
the use of the product line exception.”).  
 
760 Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 936, 943–44 (citing Cafazzo v. Cent. 
Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 521, 524 (1995) and Schmidt v. Boardman, 
958 A.2d 498, 513–14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)) (Pa. 2011). 
 
761 Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 942. 
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line exception, the court addressed the second issue because of the 
conflict in lower court cases and confirmed the flexible approach to the 
product line exception set out in Dawejko.762  The court stated: 
Initially, it obviously poses some difficulty 
for this Court to address the boundaries 
of the product-line exception, where we 
have not yet decided on developed 
reasoning whether to adopt it in the first 
instance.  Nevertheless, there is confusion 
manifest in both the trial and intermediate 
appellate courts' opinions, which arises 
from inconsistencies in the Superior 
Court's application of the exception it has 
adopted. 
. . . 
. . . [T]he Dawejko panel took pains to 
clarify that it was adopting the Ramirez 
test as the core, governing standard, 
subject to more flexible consideration of 
other relevant factors, including those 
identified in Ray. 
. . . 
Thus, the most appropriate approach to 
reconciling governing Superior Court 
precedent is to correct Hill's mistake and 
to revert to Dawejko.763 
 
 
 
762 Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 944–45. 
 
763 Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 944–45 (citations omitted). 
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Rhode Island 
  Rhode Island courts have recognized the four traditional 
exceptions to the general rule of non-successor liability.764  Of the four 
traditional exceptions, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has 
articulated a test for the mere continuation exception765 and has 
recognized the express assumption, de facto merger, and fraud 
exceptions.766   The court in Angell v. Parillo, a 1986 case, briefly discussed 
the product-line exception, concluding that the doctrine was inapplicable 
because the predecessor did not dissolve subsequent to the asset 
purchase.767  That exception has not since been addressed by the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court.  
 
764 Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc. 124 F.3d 252, 266 (1st 
Cir. 1997); Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., No. PC 07-6855, 2008 WL 2227781, 
at *15–16 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 12, 2008); Asea Brown Boveri, S.A. v. Alcoa 
Fujikura, Ltd., No. PC 02-1084, 2007 WL 1234523, at *46–58 (R.I. Super. Ct., 
April 11, 2007); Angell v. Parrillo, No. PC 02-1084, 1986 WL 716005, at *1 
(R.I. Super. Ct., Feb. 14, 1986).  
 
765 See, e.g., Casey v. San-Lee Realty, Inc., 623 A.2d 16, 18–19 (R.I. 1993) (citing 
Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 241 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968); 
H.J. Baker & Bro. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989); Richmond 
Ready-Mix v. Atlantic Concrete Forms, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-0960, 2004 WL 
877595, at *9 (R.I. Sup. Ct. April 21, 2004) (quoting H.J. Baker & Bro., 554 
A.2d at 205) (citing Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc., 124 
F.3d 252, 268 (1st Cir. 1997) and Casey, 623 A.2d at 18–19)) . 
 
766 Douglas v. Bank of New Eng., 566 A.2d 939, 941–42 (R.I. 1989) (affirming 
the imposition of successor liability, stating:  “Here we have not only a de facto 
but a formal de jure merger governed by a federal statute and an agreement 
formulated by the parties in pursuance thereto . . . .  [W]e have a successor 
corporation that has expressly assumed the liabilities as a part of a business 
decision to utilize a formal de jure merger.”); see also H.J. Baker & Bro., 554 A.2d 
at 205 (remanding for a new trial on the issue of the fraud exception, noting the 
trial court’s grant of a new trial on the count of actual fraud was inconsistent 
with its denial of a new trial on the count of successor liability based on fraud); 
Blouin, 2008 WL 2227781, at *17. 
  
767 Angell, 1986 WL 716005, at *2 (citing Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, 
Inc., 431 F.Supp. 834 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
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Rhode Island:  The Assumption of Liability  
Courts look to the language of the pertinent documents covering 
the transaction in determining whether the successor has expressly 
assumed liability.768  In Douglas v. Bank of New England, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that the following language in a merger agreement 
included an assumption of liability for punitive damages: 
 “All assets as they exist at the effective 
time of the merger, including trust powers 
of each of the merging banks, shall pass 
to and vest in the Association (Bank of 
New England-Old Colony, N.A.) without 
any conveyance or other transfer; and the 
Association shall be responsible for all the 
liabilities of every kind and description, 
including arising out of the exercise of 
trust powers of each of the merging 
banks existing as of the effective time of 
the merger.”769 
Rhode Island:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Jackson v. Diamond T. 
Trucking Co.,770 for the following “five persuasive criteria for finding a 
‘continuing’ entity[:]”771 
(1) there is a transfer of corporate assets; 
(2) there is less than adequate 
consideration; (3) the new company 
continues the business of the transferor; 
(4) both companies have at least one 
768 See, e.g., Douglas, 566 A.2d at 941; Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *51–58. 
 
769 Douglas, 566 A.2d at 941 (emphasis supplied in original) (quoting merger 
agreement). 
 
770 241 A.2d 471 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1968).  
 
771 H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477).  
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common officer or director who is 
instrumental in the transfer; and (5) the 
transfer renders the transferor incapable 
of paying its creditors because it is 
dissolved either in fact or by law.772  
The court noted that “[o]ther courts have examined criteria such as the 
common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders, and the 
continued use of the same office space and service to the same client 
base.”773  The court considered all of these factors when holding that a 
successor was indeed the mere continuation of its predecessor.774   The 
Asea Brown court, when analyzing the mere continuation exception, 
noted that it “does not necessarily disagree” that all five factors are not 
required but stressed the importance of the “less than adequate 
consideration” factor, stating that “in this case, the Plaintiffs’ claim 
cannot be maintained without at least some showing that less than 
adequate consideration was paid.”775  The court in Blouin v. Surgical Sense, 
Inc., noted that all of the facts and circumstances should be considered as 
a whole and that not all factors need be met for the mere continuation 
exception to apply.776 
 
772 H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477); see also 
Casey v. San-Lee Realty, Inc., 623 A.2d 16, 18–19 (R.I. 1993) (quoting H.J. 
Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205); Richmond Ready-Mix v. Atlantic Concrete 
Forms, Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-0960, 2004 WL 877595, at *8–9 (R.I. Sup. Ct. April 
21, 2004) (quoting H.J. Baker & Bros., 54 A.2d at 205); Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. 
v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc. 124 F.3d 252, 268 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing H.J. Baker & 
Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 and Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477).  
 
773 H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox 
co., 739 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash 
Cab Co., 249 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)) (other citations omitted).  
 
774 H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205; see also Barry v. PMC Film Can., Inc., 
No. PC 07-3163, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *1 (Aug. 4, 2011); Cone v. 
AGCO Corp., No. PC 08-0575, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS, at *11 (Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
775 Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *57. 
 
776 Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., 2008 WL 2227781, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
63, at *20–21 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 12, 2008). 
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Rhode Island:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not articulated a test for de 
facto merger; however, superior courts have used the following factors 
derived from Kleen Laundry and Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Total Waste 
Management Corp. in determining whether or not a de facto merger had 
occurred:777  
1.  [t]hat there was a continuation of the 
enterprise of the selling corporation vis a 
visa [sic] a continuation of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operation; 
2.  [t]hat there is a continuity of 
shareholders resulting from the purchase 
of the assets with shares of stock, rather 
than cash; 
3.  [t]hat the selling corporation ceases 
operations, liquidate, or dissolves as soon 
as possible; and 
4.  [t]hat the purchasing corporation 
assumes the obligations of the selling 
corporation necessary for uninterrupted 
continuation of business.778 
 
 
777 817 F. Supp. 225, 230–31 (D.N.H. 1993) (quoting Acushnet River & New 
Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass. 1989)). 
 
778 Richmond Ready-Mix, No. Civ.A. 92-0960, 2004 WL 877595, at *9 (quoting 
Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 230–31) (alterations in 
original); see also Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., No. PC 07-6855, 2008 WL 
2227781, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 63, *17–20 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 12, 2008) 
(stating “‘it is not necessary that all the factors be found for there to be a de 
facto merger’”) (quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7124.20 at 295 (rev. 
perm. ed. 1983)); Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *47 n.28.   
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Rhode Island:  The Fraud Exception 
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the 
fraud exception, it has not articulated a test or standard for determining 
when it applies.779  The superior court in Asea Brown indicated the fraud 
exception was predicated on a fraudulent transfer and stated as dicta that, 
“[c]riteria for finding a fraudulent transfer are set forth in the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, G.L. 1956 §§ 6-16-1 to 6-16-12 (UFTA).”780   
The fraud exception was not at issue in that case, however.781 
South Carolina 
In Brown v. American Railway Express Co., a 1924 decision, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the traditional exceptions to 
the general rule of successor non-liability.782  In Holloway v. John E. Smith’s 
Sons Co., a 1977 case, the Federal District Court for the District of South 
Carolina, although ostensibly applying South Carolina law, applied the 
expanded exception to successor non-liability developed in Cyr v. Offen.783  
In 2005, though, the South Carolina Supreme Court confirmed that its 
“opinion in Brown sets forth the proper test to determine, in a products 
liability action, whether there is successor liability of a company which 
purchases the assets of an unrelated company.”784  In doing so, the court 
779 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989) 
(remanding for a new trial on the issue of the fraud exception, noting the trial 
court’s grant of a new trial on the count of actual fraud was inconsistent with 
its denial of a new trial on the count of successor liability based on fraud). 
 
780 Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *47–48 n. 29.   
 
781 Id. at *47. 
 
782 Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924); accord 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagle Windows & Doors, Inc., 714 S.E.2d 322 
(S.C. 2011).  
 
783 Holloway v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455–456 (D.S.C. 
1977) (citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
  
784 Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215 (S.C. 2005) (citing 
Brown, 123 S.E. at 97); see also Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d 67, 70 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 15 n.1); Pac. Capro Indus. v. 
Global Advantage Distrib., Inc., No. 4:08–cv–4155–RBH, 2010 WL 890052, at 
*4 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2010) (citing Brown, 123 S.E. at 97; Simmons, 622 S.E.2d 213; 
Walton, 657 S.E.2d 67). 
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stated that the Holloway court did not establish a new test of successor 
liability, but rather it applied the mere continuation exception.785  The 
court noted: 
[T]he majority of courts interpreting the 
mere continuation exception have found 
it applicable only when there is 
commonality of ownership, i.e., the 
predecessor and successor 
corporations have substantially the 
same officers, directors, or 
shareholders.  We decline to extend the 
exception to cases in which there is no 
such commonality of officers, directors 
and shareholders.786 
 In determining whether there was an agreement to assume 
liabilities, the appellate court in Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill looked to the 
asset purchase agreement, stating,  ‘“When a contract is unambiguous a 
court must construe its provisions according to the terms the parties 
used, understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense.”’787  
 Regarding the fraud exception, the same court explained: 
To meet the fraud exception to successor 
liability, the general rule is that a 
successor must knowingly participate in a 
fraudulent asset transfer . . . .  Proving 
such knowledge is difficult, and a few 
courts have advocated expanding the 
fraud exception to include reviewing the 
successor's actual or constructive 
knowledge . . . . Under either 
interpretation of the fraud exception to 
successor liability, we find no genuine 
 
785 Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 215 n.1. 
 
786 Id. (discussing Holloway, 432 F. Supp. 454); see also Capro Indus., 2010 WL 
890052, at *4 (quoting Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 215 n.1). 
 
787 Walton, 657 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oates, 
588 S.E.2d 643, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)). 
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issue of material fact.  Walton provides 
no theory supporting a claim of fraud.  
For instance, there is no evidence of 
inadequate consideration and no 
indication that McManus and Sigmon 
were not bona fide purchasers for 
value.788 
South Dakota 
South Dakota recognizes the four traditional exceptions to the 
general rule of nonliability for asset purchases, which the South Dakota 
Supreme Court set forth as follows: 
(1) when the purchasing corporation 
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume 
the selling corporation's liability; 
(2) when the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the purchaser 
and seller corporations; 
(3) when the purchaser corporation is 
merely a continuation of the seller 
corporation; or 
(4) when the transaction is entered into 
fraudulently to escape liability for such 
obligations.789   
788 Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d at 70 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original) (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor 
Liability, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845, 875–76 (1999); see also Pac. Capro Industries, 
2010 WL 890052 at *4 (quoting Walton, 657 S.E.2d at 70) (stating that the court 
in Walton “confirmed that to ‘meet the fraud exception to successor liability, the 
general rule is that a successor must knowingly participate in a fraudulent asset 
transfer’”). 
 
789 Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D. 1986) 
(citing Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); 
see also Parker v. W. Dakota Insurors, 605 N.W.2d 181, 184–85 (S.D. 2000); 
Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 169 (S.D. 1987); 
Mitchell Mach., Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 918 F.2d 1366, 1370 (8th Cir. 
1990) (quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518); Global Polymer Indus., Inc. v. C 
& A Plus, Inc., No. 05-4081, 2006 WL 3743845, at *2 (D.S.D. Dec. 14, 2006) 
(quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518); Parker v. W. Dakota Insurors, Inc., 605 
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 In Parker v. Western Dakota Insurors, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court explained that these exceptions would apply more expansively in 
the context of products liability: 
All these exceptions, we caution to 
explain, evolved under the traditional 
rules applicable to corporate law.  They 
have, however, undergone some 
expansion under the law of products 
liability.  Strict liability in tort for 
defective products applies regardless of 
negligence or privity.  Liability for 
defective products rests on the need to 
compensate eligible plaintiffs; thus, the 
burden of economic loss is shifted not 
just to the manufacturer of the defective 
product, but also at times to the successor 
manufacturer who by purchasing assets 
from the predecessor is able to continue 
making the same or similar products.  
Yet, these strict liability concepts created 
for the protection of injured persons do 
not have the same expansive application 
in a purely contractual dispute.790 
South Dakota:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception  
In determining whether a successor expressly or impliedly 
assumed liabilities, courts look to the language of the documents 
surrounding the asset purchase or other pertinent transaction.791  
N.W.2d 181, 184–85 (S.D. 2000) (quoting Downtowner , Inc. v. Acrometal 
Prod. Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984))). 
 
790 Parker, 605 N.W.2d at 185. 
 
791 See, e.g., Id. at 185–87 (finding no assumption of liabilities) (quoting purchase 
agreement); Groseth Intern., Inc., 410 N.W.2d at 169 (finding express and implied 
assumption) (citing purchase agreement); Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (“There 
is no language in the contract between these parties to suggest that Kenwel-
Jackson impliedly assumed responsibility for future products liability actions 
against Kenwel. In fact, the purchase agreement expressly conditioned the sale 
of assets upon Kenwel's promise to discharge, or to provide for, all of its 
current or long-term liabilities incurred or unsatisfied as of the date of 
closing.”) (referencing purchase agreement). 
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Moreover, in Parker, the court stated:  “‘[a] buyer of assets can avoid the 
implied assumption of liabilities by enumerating liabilities assumed and 
explicitly excluding the assumption of liabilities not enumerated.’”792  
South Dakota:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained in Hamaker:  “[A] 
merger involves the actual absorption of one corporation into another, 
with the former losing its existence as a separate corporate entity.  When 
the seller corporation retains its existence while parting with its assets, a 
‘de facto merger’ may be found if the consideration given by the 
purchaser corporation is shares of its own stock.”793   
South Dakota:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In Hamaker, the Supreme Court of South Dakota analyzed the 
reasoning of Turner, ultimately concluding that it would not follow this 
expanded approach to continuity.794  The Hamaker court stated:  “The 
 
792 Parker, 605 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 
587 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D. Pa.1984), rev'd on other grounds, 762 F.2d 303 (3rd 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)); see also Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 
(referencing purchase agreement). 
  
793 Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (citing Leannais v. Cincinatti, Inc., 565 F.2d 
437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 
(E.D. Wis. 1973)). 
 
794 Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 519 (noting: “Many of the factors relied upon in 
Turner exist here . . . .  However, we are not persuaded to follow Turner in this 
case where none of the owners, officers or stockholders were the same, where 
Kenwel-Jackson expressly contracted not to assume any of Kenwel’s liabilities, 
where Kenwel-Jackson’s business developed in a different direction relative to 
product line and customers and especially where the notcher in question was 
neither designed, manufactured nor sold by the successor corporation.  We 
find, therefore, that Kenwel-Jackson's cash purchase of Kenwel's assets does 
not fall within the “merger” or “continuation” exceptions to the general rule) 
(discussing Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 
1976).  But see Global Polymer Indus., Inc. v. C & A Plus, Inc., No. 05-4081, 
2006 WL 3743845, at *2 (D.S.D. 2006) (seemingly misinterpreting Hamaker’s 
rejection of Turner, stating:  “The South Dakota Supreme Court has indicated 
that cash consideration is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
continuation of a successor corporation's responsibility for liability if: ‘(1) There 
was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including, 
apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, 
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key element of a ‘continuation’ is a commonality of the officers, 
directors, and stockholders in the predecessor and successor 
corporations.”795  
South Dakota:  The Product Line Exception 
South Dakota has expressly rejected the product line exception, 
following the Supreme Court of North Dakota’s reasoning that imposing 
liability in such cases would amount to liability without duty and would 
thus not comport with their understanding of strict liability in tort.796  
Tennessee 
The Tennessee Supreme Court has not yet addressed or adopted 
a test for successor liability.  Tennessee appellate courts, however, have 
approved the four traditional exceptions and a possible fifth, involving 
inadequate consideration, as follows: 
 (1) The purchaser expressly or impliedly 
agrees to assume such debts; (2) the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or 
merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the 
purchasing corporation is merely a 
continuation of the selling corporation; or 
(4) the transaction is entered into 
fraudulently in order to escape liability for 
such debts . . . .  A fifth exception, 
sometimes incorporated . . . is the 
and the corporate name[;] (2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business 
operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration 
received from the buying corporation[;] (3) The purchasing corporation 
assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for 
the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller corporation; (4) 
The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective 
continuation of the seller corporation.’”) (citing Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 519). 
  
795 Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (citing Leannais, 565 F.2d at 440); see also 
Mitchell Machinery, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 918 F.2d 1366, 1371 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518). 
 
796  Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 520–21 (citing Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal 
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984)). 
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absence of adequate consideration for the 
sale or transfer.797   
 In Mapco Express, Inc. v. Interstate Entertainment, Inc. the court 
stated the general rule of successor non-liability and discussed the 
implied assumption, mere continuation, and de facto merger exceptions.798 
 Addressing the implied assumption doctrine, the district court 
stated:  “A party seeking to recover under the theory of contract implied 
in law must prove ‘[a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the 
plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and acceptance 
of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for 
him to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof.’”799 
 As for the de facto merger exception, the court noted, “In a de facto 
merger, ‘there is a sale of substantially all of one corporation’s assets in 
exchange for the stocks and bonds of the purchasing corporation[]’”800 
and that “[i]n a de facto merger, as opposed to a legal merger, the original 
company maintains its legal entity, despite retaining no assets and going 
out of business.”801 
797 Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699-COA-
R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001) (citations 
omitted) (quoting 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 5.06(2), at 
70.58(2)-(3) (1981) (quoting McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J.Super. 555, 
264 A.2d 98 (1970)); Gas Plus of Anderson Cty., Inc. v. Arowood, No. 03A01-
9311-CH-00406, 1994 WL 465797, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1994); see 
also Flake v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., Nos. 3:07–0925, 3:07–926, 3:07–
927, 2011 WL 1106694, at *8 n.6 (M.D. Tenn.  Mar. 23, 2011) (quoting 
Hopewell, 2001 WL 708850, at *4); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Potter, No. 4:04-cv-
112, 2006 WL 2854386, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2006) (citing Hopewell, 2001 
WL 708850; Gas Plus of Anderson Cty., Inc., 1994 WL 465797); Woody v. 
Combustion Engineering, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 819 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).   
 
798 No. 3:08-cv-1235, 2011 WL 12556959, at *14–17 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 
2011). 
 
799 Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959 at *15 (quoting Hopewell, 2001 WL 708850, at *6) 
(alteration in original).  
 
800 Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *15 (quoting Signature Combs, Inc. v. United 
States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (W.D. Tenn. 2004)). 
 
801 Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *15 (alteration added) (citing IBC Mfg. Co. v. 
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 187 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999); Signature Combs, Inc., 331 F. 
Supp. 2d at 641). 
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 And, finally, regarding the mere continuation exception, the 
court stated:  
 An acquiring corporation will be deemed 
a mere continuation of the acquired 
company if:  “(1) a corporation transfers 
its assets; (2) the acquiring corporation 
pays less than adequate consideration for 
the assets; (3) the acquiring corporation 
continues the selling corporations 
business, (4) both corporations share at 
least one common officer who was 
instrumental in the transfer, and (5) the 
selling corporation is left incapable of 
paying is creditors.”802 
Texas 
 Texas does not recognize the four traditional exemptions to non-
liability for asset purchases.  Successor liability in Texas is governed by 
statute and is limited to the express assumption of liability.803  The Texas 
legislature first codified the rule for successor liability in asset purchases 
in a legislative reversal of a court of appeals decision to impose the 
doctrine.804   
In 1977, the Texas Court of Appeals applied the de facto merger 
doctrine in Western Res. Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt.805  In its first session 
following the Gerhardt decision, the Texas legislature passed Texas 
Business Corporation Act art. 5.10 § B, which stated: 
A disposition of any, all, or substantially 
all, of the property and assets of a 
corporation, whether or not it requires 
 
802 Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *17 (citing IBC Mfg. Co., 187 F.3d at 637); 
Cricket Comm’ns, Inc. v. Talk Til You Drop Wireless, Inc., No. 3:09–128, 2009 
WL 2850687, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2009)). 
 
803 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 10.254. 
 
804 See generally TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B) (expired Jan. 1, 2010). 
 
805 See 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
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the special authorization of the 
shareholders of the corporation affected 
under Section A of this article: 
(1) is not considered to be a merger or 
conversion pursuant to this Act or 
otherwise; and  
(2) except as otherwise expressly provided 
by another statute, does not make the 
acquiring corporation, foreign 
corporation, or other entity, responsible 
or liable for any liability or obligation of 
the selling corporation that the acquiring 
corporation did not expressly assume.806 
 The abovementioned statute expired on January 1, 2010, and was 
replaced with one that is similar, limiting successor liability only to 
express assumption:  
(a) A disposition of all or part of the 
property of a domestic entity, regardless 
of whether the disposition requires the 
approval of the entity's owners or 
members, is not a merger or conversion 
for any purpose. 
(b) Except as otherwise expressly 
provided by another statute, a person 
acquiring property described by this 
section may not be held responsible or 
liable for a liability or obligation of the 
transferring domestic entity that is not 
expressly assumed by the person.807 
806 TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B) (expired Jan. 1, 2010). 
 
807 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 10.254; see Ford, Bacon & Davis, L.L.C. v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Where, as here, the 
entity purchasing assets has expressly not assumed liability for the assets it 
purchased, such liability will not extend under ‘operation of Texas law.’”) 
(referencing purchase agreement). 
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 As noted in Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co.,808 “the purpose of [the 
statute was] to preclude the application of de facto merger in any sale, lease, 
exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and 
assets of a corporation.”809  The Mudgett court also rejected the mere 
continuation exception, stating “[t]he ‘mere continuation’ doctrine is an 
even more liberal means of imposing liability upon the acquiring 
corporation in a purchase of assets transaction than is the de facto merger 
doctrine . . . .  Certainly if the de facto merger doctrine is contrary to the 
public policy of our state, so must be the mere continuation doctrine.”810  
Later, in Shapolsky v. Brewton the court also rejected the fraud exception, 
reaffirming that Texas only acknowledges the single exception to the 
non-liability rule.811  As noted by the 1st District Court of Appeals of 
Texas in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, “Texas strongly embraces the 
non-liability rule.  To impose liability for a predecessor’s torts, the 
successor corporation must have expressly assumed liability.” 812  In 
drawing a sharp comparison, the court noted, “Delaware and Maryland 
recognize all four exceptions to the rule of non-liability by case law . . . . .  
The Business Corporation Act controls in Texas.”813    
 
808 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App. 1986) (emphasis in original) (alteration added). 
 
809 Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758 (quoting TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.10 
cmt).  
 
 810 Id. (alteration added) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) 
(citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
 
811 Shapolsky v. Brewton, 56 S.W.3d 120, 137–39 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).  
 
812 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 139 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B)(2)); see also Ford, Bacon & Davis, 
L.L.C., 635 F.3d at 737 (quoting Keller Founds., Inc. v. Wausau 
UnderwritersTravelers Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 871, 877 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
 
813 Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 134 (citations omitted) (citing Elmer v. 
Tenneco Resins, 698 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 
594 A.2d 564, 565–66 (Md. 1991); see also Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 S.W.3d a 
139–40); C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W. 3d 768, 780–81 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2004) (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art 5.10(B)(2004); Sitaram v. Aetna 
U.S. Healthcare of N. Tex., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 817, 826 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing 
TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art 5.10(B)(2); C.M. Asfahl Agency, 135 S.W.3d at 778)); 
Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17, 20–21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
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Utah 
Utah adheres to the traditional approach to successor liability.814  
The de facto merger exception “considers whether the business operations 
and management continued and requires that the buyer paid for the asset 
purchase with its own stock.”815  The ‘“mere continuation[exception]’ 
considers not whether the ‘business operation[s]’ continued, but whether 
the ‘corporate entity’ continued. . . . [a] continuation demands ‘a 
common identity of stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence 
of only one corporation at the completion of the transfer.’”816   
 In response to certified questions from the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals,817 in 2007, the Utah Supreme Court held: (1) “Utah adheres to 
the traditional rule of successor nonliability, subject to four widely 
recognized exceptions[,]” and (2) “Utah law imposes on successor 
corporations an independent post-sale duty to warn consumers of 
defects in products manufactured and sold by the predecessor 
corporation.”818The court set out the four traditional exceptions as 
follows:  
A successor corporation or other business 
entity that acquires assets of a predecessor 
corporation or other business entity is 
814 See, e.g., Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 182 F. App'x 774, 776 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958–59 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004); Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748, 752 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d, 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000); Herrod v. Metal Powder Prods., 
413 F. App’x 7, 12 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 
814, 815 (Utah 2007)). 
  
815 Decius, 105 P.3d at 959 (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F.Supp. 
797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).  
 
816 Decius, 105 P.3d at 959 (citations omitted) (quoting Travis v. Harris Corp., 
565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 
75, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (Mansmann, J., dissenting)); see also Icon Health & Fitness, 
Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *6 (D. Utah 2011). 
 
817 Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 182 F. App'x 774, 776–77 (10th Cir. 2006) 
[hereinafter Tabor I], certified question answered, 168 P.3d 814.  
 
818 Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 816–17 (Utah 2007) [hereinafter 
Tabor II] (emphasis in the original). 
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subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by a defective product 
sold or otherwise distributed 
commercially by the predecessor if the 
acquisition: 
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for 
successor to assume such liability; or 
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance 
to escape liability for the debts or 
liabilities of the predecessor; or 
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger 
with the predecessor; or 
(d) results in successor becoming a 
continuation of the predecessor.819 
The Utah Supreme Court declined to further extend the rules of 
successor liability stating, “[i]n our view, the general rule of successor 
nonliability, together with the four exceptions provided . . . affords 
adequate protection to consumers, and we accordingly decline to expand 
the exceptions.”820  
 The court did, however, adopt the position of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, which imposes on successors a duty to warn in these 
circumstances: 
(a) A successor corporation or other 
business entity that acquires assets of a 
predecessor corporation or other business 
entity, whether or not liable . . . is subject 
to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the successor's failure 
to warn of a risk created by a product 
sold or distributed by the predecessor if: 
819 Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 816–17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)). 
 
820 Tabor II, 168 P.3d. at 817; Herrod v. Metal Powder Prods., 413 F. App'x 7, 
12 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The Utah Supreme Court has declined to adopt the 
‘product line’ or ‘continuity of enterprise’ exceptions recognized by some other 
states.”) (quoting Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 815)). 
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(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to 
provide services for maintenance or 
repair of the product or enters into a 
similar relationship with purchasers of the 
predecessor's products giving rise to 
actual or potential economic advantage to 
the successor, and 
(2) a reasonable person in the position of 
the successor would provide a warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the position of 
the successor would provide a warning if: 
(1) the successor knows or reasonably 
should know that the product poses a 
substantial risk of harm to persons or 
property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be 
provided can be identified and can 
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of 
the risk of harm; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively 
communicated to and acted on by those 
to whom a warning might be provided; 
and 
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to 
justify the burden of providing a 
warning.821 
Regarding the determination of whether a duty to warn has been 
discharged, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
If a successor corporation has a duty to 
warn under section 13, one factor in 
determining whether a successor 
corporation has discharged its duty to 
warn is whether it provided warning to 
the end user, not just an intermediary like 
821  Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 818 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)). 
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a distributor or retailer.  In making this 
determination, the successor has a duty to 
only warn the end user if it has a 
reasonable means of doing so.  Another 
factor to consider in this case might be 
the effect of the closed [product] recall.  
Other factors may be relevant, but the 
factual development of this case is 
insufficient for us to identify them.822 
Vermont 
In 2005, the Vermont Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
restate its position on successor liability in Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, 
Inc.823  The court began by reciting the traditional rule of non-liability in 
asset sales, unless one of five traditionally accepted exceptions applied: 
(1) express or implied assumption, (2) de facto merger or consolidation, 
(3) mere continuation, (4) a fraudulent scheme to avoid liability, or (5) 
inadequate consideration for the sale.824  Interestingly, the court appears 
to have split the traditional fraud analysis into two types: actual fraud and 
constructive fraud.  The latter of which appears to have only one 
element, inadequate consideration, rather than the more common 
alternative, the two-element approach set forth in the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act.825 
 In Gladstone, the Supreme Court of Vermont noted that in 
Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp.,826 it had declined to adopt either the 
continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions because the successor 
was not responsible for creating the risk of harm nor did it benefit from 
the proceeds of the product’s sale; it also did not invite the product’s use 
822 Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 818 (footnote omitted). 
 
823 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214 (Vt. 2005); Post v. 
Killington, Ltd., No. 5:07–CV–252, 2010 WL 3323659, at *8 (D.Vt. 2010). 
 
824 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220. 
 
825 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (UFTA enacted as part of the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
 
826 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984). 
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or make any safety representations, and it could not enhance the safety 
of the product given that it had already been released into the market.827  
The Gladstone court then turned to Cab-Tek, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc.,828 which 
addressed the distinction between consolidation and de facto merger.  
Consolidation occurs when the ‘“combining corporations are dissolved 
and lose their identity in a new corporate entity.”’829 De facto merger 
occurs where a corporation (1) takes control of all of the assets of 
another corporation, (2) without consideration, and (3) the predecessor 
corporation ceases to function.830  Simply put, no asset purchase is 
required for a de facto merger in Vermont.  
The Gladstone court then announced the contours of the mere 
continuation doctrine noting, “[a]s they have evolved, there is little 
difference between the de facto merger exception and the mere 
continuation exception . . . .  We view the name of the exception as 
unimportant.”831  The mere continuation doctrine, said the court, focuses 
on continuation of the corporate entity, not its business.832  Traditional 
indicators or factors for a finding of continuation are a commonality of 
officers, directors, and shareholders and the existence of only one 
corporation after the sale is complete.833  Although these are traditional 
827 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220 (citing Ostrowski, 479 A.2d at 127). 
 
828 571 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1990). 
 
829 Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 
437, 440 (7th Circ. 1977)) (citing Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 
F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971)); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw–Coggeshall, Inc., 431 
F.Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y.1977). 
 
830 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 221 (citing Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672). 
 
831 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222 n.4 (citations and quotations omitted) (citing 
Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 45 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003); Nat’l 
Gypsum Co. v. Cont’l Brands Corp., 895 F. Supp. 328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995); 
Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672); Morrison Enters., Inc. v. Perrotta, No. 292-8-04 
Bncv, 2006 Vt. Super. LEXIS 34, at *5–6 (Vt. Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 2006). 
 
832 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222. 
 
833 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222; see also Post v. Killington, Ltd., 424 F. App’x 27 
(2d Cir. 2011) (court discusses the factors that determine whether the mere 
continuation exception applies: (1) whether there is continuity of ownership 
and management between the purchasing and selling corporations, (2) only the 
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indicators, they are not requirements in Vermont.834  The court stated 
that de facto merger, on the other hand, focuses on the absorption of one 
corporation’s business by another, and its traditional indicators include 
similarity of assets, locations, managements, personnel, shareholders, and 
business practices.835  Inadequacy of consideration may also be 
present.836 
The Gladstone court then returned to the mere continuation 
doctrine—considering, listing, and discussing its factors in declining 
order of significance:  (1) continuity of ownership and management, 
“[t]he single most important factor[;]”(2) whether only the successor 
corporation survived, although survival as a mere shell or for a short 
period is not significant; (3) inadequate consideration; (4) similarity of the 
business operated by the successor to that of the predecessor; and (5) 
continuation of business practices, including how the company holds 
itself out to the public.837   
The court also considered whether or not recognition of the 
transfer as being free and clear of liabilities would work a fraud on 
creditors by way of a breach of the fiduciary duty that corporations and 
their directors owe to creditors of insolvent corporations on those 
operating in the zone of insolvency.838  The court concluded that a duty 
to creditors did exist here because “[the successor corporation’s] actions 
advanced [its] own interests while leaving [the predecessor corporation] 
insolvent and unable to pay its debt to plaintiffs . . . .”839 
successor corporation has survived, (3) adequate consideration supported the 
sale, and (4) the successor operates the same business as the seller). 
 
834 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222. 
 
835 Id. 
 
836 Id.  
 
837 Id. at 222–23; see also Post v. Killington, Ltd., 2010 WL 3323659, at *9–13 
(D. Vt. 2010). 
 
838 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 224. 
 
839 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 225 (citing Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate 
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 
(1993)). 
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Virginia 
Virginia follows the traditional rule of successor liability and 
recognizes only the four traditional exceptions.840  In order to hold a 
purchasing corporation liable for the obligations of the selling 
corporation, “it must appear that (1) the purchasing corporation 
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume such liabilities, (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction warrant a finding that there 
was a consolidation or de facto merger of the two corporations, (3) the 
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation, or (4) the transaction is fraudulent in fact.”841  Virginia has 
declined to adopt either the product line exception or the “‘expanded 
mere continuation’” exception, primarily because Virginia has not 
adopted the doctrine of strict liability and these exceptions are based 
upon that doctrine.842   
Virginia:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
In Harris v. T.I., Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia looked at 
provisions of the asset purchase agreement and determined that there 
was no expressed or implied assumption of tort liability by the 
purchaser.843  In States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Construction Corp., the appellate 
court found an implied assumption of liabilities in the context of a 
840 Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992) (citing Pepper v. Dixie 
Splint Coal Co., 181 S.E. 406, 410 (Va. 1935); Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Morris, 
148 S.E. 828, 829 (Va. 1929)); see also Fuisz v. Lynch, 147 F. App'x 319, 322 
(4th Cir. 2005); Bizmark, Inc. v. Air Prods., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D. Va. 
2006).  
 
841 Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Pepper v. Dixie Splint Coal Co., 165 Va. 
179, 191, 181 S.E. 406, 410 (Va. 1935); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Morris, 152 Va. 
814, 819, 148 S.E. 828,829 (Va. 1929); see also Kaiser Found. Health Plan of 
Mid-Atlantic States v. Clary & Moore, P.C., 123 F.3d 201, 204–05 (4th Cir. 
1997); States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 126–27 (Va 
Ct. App. 1993); 1993MDM Assocs. v. Johns Bros. Energy Techs., Inc., No. 
L01-1190, 2002 WL 31989156, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002).  
 
842 Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609–10 (citations omitted).   
 
843 Id. at 608–09. 
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worker’s compensation case where the conduct of the successor 
evidenced the intention to assume the role of predecessor.844  
Virginia:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
“A common identity of the officers, directors, and stockholders 
in the selling and purchasing corporations is the key element of a 
‘continuation.’ . . .  When, however, the purchase of all the assets of a 
corporation is a bona fide, arm's-length transaction, the ‘mere 
continuation’ exception does not apply.”845   
In Fuiz v. Lynch, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, further explained: 
Several factors have been identified for 
assessing whether a business entity 
constitutes a mere continuation of a 
predecessor entity.  The key element for 
such an assessment, according to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, is the 
“common identity of the officers, 
directors, and stockholders” in the 
successor and predecessor corporations . . 
. .  Also relevant is whether a successor 
entity “continues in the same business as 
its predecessor,” although this factor is 
less important than identity of ownership 
. . . .  Other factors identified as pertinent 
to such an assessment include “whether 
two corporations or only one remain” 
and whether the successor continues to 
844 States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1993) (Where a successor-subcontractor purchased the “equipment, trade 
accounts receivable, contract rights and inventory” of a predecessor-
subcontractor but did not assume any of its liabilities or obligations; the 
successor-subcontractor informed the contractor that it was going to continue 
work on the predecessor-subcontractor’s jobs; and the successor-subcontractor 
notified the sub-subcontractor to continue work, the successor-subcontractor 
was the “statutory employer” of an employee of the sub-subcontractor as a 
successor to the predecessor-subcontractor).   
 
845  Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609 (citations omitted); Bizmark, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 
694; In re Meredith, 357 B.R. 374, 381 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). 
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operate at the same location with the 
same telephone number as its predecessor 
. . . .  Additionally, when a predecessor 
entity's assets are transferred for less than 
adequate consideration, the successor is 
“likely to be a mere continuation.” . . .  
Finally, notwithstanding these factors, 
Virginia law provides that the mere 
continuation exception does not apply 
when the “purchase of all the assets of a 
corporation is a bona fide, arm's-length 
transaction.”846 
 In Fuiz v. Lynch, the court concluded that the mere continuation 
exception applied where (1) there was complete continuity of ownership, 
(2) the successor operated the same business in the same offices, using 
the same phone number, (3) the predecessors ceased to exist, and (4) 
even though adequate consideration was paid, the transaction was not 
conducted as if the seller and buyer were “strangers” and thus, was not a 
bona fide arm’s length transaction. 847 
 Virginia: De Facto Merger Exception 
 The Virginia state circuit court has used the four traditional 
factors in deciding whether a de facto merger has occured, stating:   
Generally, courts look for four factors to 
determine whether a de facto merger has 
occurred: (1) continuity of enterprise; (2) 
continuity of shareholders; (3) cessation 
of operations by seller; and (4) 
assumption of the obligations necessary 
846 Fuisz v. Lynch, 147 F. App’x 319, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609; Clary & Moore, 123 F.3d at 20); see also 
Beck v. Va. Sash & Door, Inc., 58 Va. Cir. 65, 70 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001).    
 
847 Fuisz, 147 F. App’x at 322–23; see also Beck, 58 Va. Cir. at 70 (concluding that 
the purchasers were liable under the mere continuation exception); Clary & 
Moore, 123 F.3d at 208  (same).  
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to uninterrupted continuation of normal 
business operations by the seller.848  
 The court in Augusta Lumber Co., Inc. v. Broad Run Holdings used 
the term “factors” (and all four were present in the case’s fact pattern), 
but the cases cited by Augusta had previously described these 
considerations as “elements,” with continuity of ownership being the 
most important.849  Thus, it appears to remain an open question whether 
the de facto merger exception in Virginia is made up of factors (indicators) 
or elements (requirements).    
Washington 
Washington recognizes the traditional four exceptions to the 
general rule of non-liability in asset purchases as well as the product line 
exception.850  The Washington Supreme Court noted that the adoption 
of the product line exception was preferable to expanding the mere 
continuation exception- a rule “designed for other purposes.”851  
848 Augusta Lumber Co. v. Broad Run Holdings, LLC, 71 Va. Cir. 326, 327 (Va. 
Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted); see also Blizzard v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
831 F. Supp. 544, 547 (E.D. Va. 1993); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake 
Const. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987).  
 
849 Augusta Lumber, Co., 71 Va. Cir. at 328 (citing Blizzard, 831 F. Supp. at 547; 
Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985)); 
Crawford Harbor Assocs., 661 F. Supp. at 884. 
   
850 See Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 789–90 (Wash. 1984) (“The 
general rule in Washington is that a corporation purchasing the assets of 
another corporation does not, by reason of the purchase of assets, become 
liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation, except where: (1) 
the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume liability; (2) the purchase 
is a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) the purchaser is a mere continuation 
of the seller; or (4) the transfer of assets is for the fraudulent purpose of 
escaping liability.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 702 F.3d 553, 572 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (U.S. 2013); 
U.S. ex rel. Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065–66 (W.D. Wash. 
2012); Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star Roofing, 209 P.3d 863, 868 
(Wash. 2009); Creech v. AGCO Corp., 138 P.3d 623, 624 (Wash Ct. App. 
2006).  
 
851 Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 386, 386 (Wash. 1984) (citing Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1997); see also Hall v. 
Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 790 (Wash. 1984) (“Rather than 
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In 2009, the Washington Court of Appeals held, applying Wash. 
Rev. Code 51.16.200, which makes successors liable for the unpaid taxes 
of the business they succeed, that “selling or conveying a significant or 
substantial portion of the closing business’s property to another business 
triggers successor liability.” 852  In Orca Logistics, the court determined that 
a significant portion of a closing business is “a major part of the 
materials, supplies, merchandise, inventory, fixtures, or equipment[,]” 
including intangible property that “has no physical existence, but may 
have value[,]” such as goodwill and customer lists.853  The court found 
that the successor corporation was a liable successor to the predecessor 
corporation due to the ‘“sale or transfer of four trucks, four trailers, [and 
other materials],’ which constituted a “significant… portion of the 
closing business” and thus, the successor was liable for the predecessor’s 
unpaid premiums of workers' compensation coverage.854 
Washington:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
In 1954, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed this 
exception, citing to a treatise for the following proposition:   
“[U]nless the corporation has expressly 
assumed the debts and obligations of its 
predecessor, its liability, if it exists at all, 
must arise by implication or presumption, 
out of the facts and circumstances 
attending the incorporation, and the 
acquisition by the corporation of the 
assets and property of the firm or 
association, and it is quite obvious that 
these must be peculiar to each case and 
are very seldom exactly the same in any 
expanding the mere continuation exception founded on corporate law 
principles, we adopted the ‘product line rule’ of liability as developed by the 
California Supreme Court . . . .”).  
 
852 Orca Logistics, Inc. v. State, No. 62264-1-I, 2009 WL 1589366 at *2 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2009) (footnote omitted). 
 
853 Orca Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 1589366 at *2. 
 
854 Orca Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 1589366 at *2. (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
assessment of the Board). 
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two cases.  The corporation, of course, would 
not be liable on the partnership obligations where 
no showing is made that it either expressly or 
impliedly assumed them.”855 
 An express assumption of liability by the successor corporation is 
determined from the fair meaning of the language in the contract.856 
 Washington:  The Fraud Exception 
  In Eagle Pacific Insurance Co., the appellate court noted, “The 
different common law tests for applying for [the fraud] exception 
include:  (1) a showing of fraud or actions otherwise lacking good faith, 
(2) insufficient consideration for the assets, and (3) predecessor left 
unable to respond to creditor's claims.”857  In applying the fraud 
exception, the court concluded the test was met where the successor was 
created for the “sole purpose” of hindering the predecessor’s creditors.858 
 
 
 
855 Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. W. Tenino Lumber Co., 265 P.2d 807, 812 
(Wash. 1954) (quoting 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 393, § 4012 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999)) 
(emphasis added by the court).  
 
856Creech v. AGCO Corp., 138 P.3d 623, 624–25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); 
Optimer Int’l., Inc. v. Bellevue, L.L.C., No. 55967-2-I, 2006 WL 2246197, at *4 
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2006). 
 
857 Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d, 959 P.2d 1052, 1056–60 (Wash. 1998) (quoting 
Robert C. Manlowe, Note, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY- Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Company, 6 
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 323, 331 n.37 (1983)) (affirming the Appellate Court 
on the issue of Fraudulent Transfer); see also Hamer Elec., Inc. v. TMB-NW 
Liquidation, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-5332 RBL, 2012 WL 3239190, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012); Gremp v. Ramsey, No. C08-558RS, 2009 WL 112674, at *6 
(W.D. Wash. 2009).  
 
858 Eagle Pac. Ins Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 at 
1059–60; (Wash. 1998); Long v. Home Health Servs. of Puget Sound, Inc., 719 
P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. Ct. App 1986).  
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Washington:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
Washington courts have not set out a definitive test for de facto 
merger.  One Washington appellate court did list one key element of a de 
facto merger:   
In addition to other requirements . . . such a union can only be 
found when the consideration given to the selling corporation for its 
assets is shares of the purchasing corporation's stock, rather than cash.  
The rationale behind this requirement is that liability should be imposed 
on the purchaser only in cases where the seller's stockholders [] retain an 
ownership interest in the business operations.859 
Washington:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
In 2009 the Supreme Court of Washington determined that a 
successor corporation to a sole proprietorship was a mere continuation 
of the sole proprietorship.860  The court explained: 
Washington courts rely on several factors 
to determine whether a successor 
business is a mere continuation of a seller 
. . . .  These include a common identity 
between the officers, directors, and 
stockholders of the selling and purchasing 
companies, and the sufficiency of the 
consideration running to the seller 
corporation in light of the assets being 
sold . . . .  In considering these factors, 
the objective of the court is to discern 
842 Cashar v. Redford, 624 P.2d 194, 196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); see also Payne v. 
Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 190 P.3d 102, 108 n. 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (“de 
facto merger ‘can only be found when the consideration given to the selling 
corporation for its assets is shares of the purchasing corporation's stock, rather 
than cash . . . .’”) (quoting Cashar, 624 P.2d at 196). 
 
860 Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star Roofing, 209 P.3d 863, 868–69 
(Wash. 2009). 
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whether the “purchaser represents 
‘merely a “new hat” for the seller.’”861 
 The court rejected the successor’s argument that a corporation, 
as a matter of law, could not be a mere continuation of a sole 
proprietorship, holding that the continuity of officers, directors, and 
shareholders was not a “rigid requirement,” stating:862  
The successor liability doctrine is a 
common law rule, and the principle it 
embraces is not linked to statutes or laws 
governing corporate entities.  Though 
there is no continuation of officers, 
directors, or shareholders where a sole 
proprietorship is involved, we can 
consider the continuity of individuals in 
control of the business as satisfying this 
factor, which at any rate is not a rigid 
requirement for finding successor 
liability.863 
Previously, several appellate courts had treated the mere 
continuation test as more stringent.  Some required that the plaintiff 
establish three requirements in order to prove that a successor is a mere 
continuation of a predecessor; the requirements were set forth as 
follows: 
(1) a common identity of the officers, 
directors, and stockholders between the 
companies; (2) that the new company 
gave inadequate consideration for the 
assets transferred; and (3) a transfer of all 
or substantially all of the old company’s 
assets.864 
861 Cambridge Townhomes, LLC, 209 P.3d at 868 (citations omitted) (quoting and 
citing Cashar, 624 P.2d at 196); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). 
 
862 Cambridge Townhomes, LLC, 209 P.3d at 868. 
 
863 Id.  
 
864 Rendoni v. Pac. Fleet & Lease Sales, Inc., No. 43049-1-I, 1999 WL 674584, 
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.  June 1, 1999) (footnotes omitted); Gall Landau Young 
                                                          
 
2017]   A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED)   997 
Others required proof of the first two requirements but not the third.865  
In either case, the mere consideration test was treated as having more 
rigid requirements than in Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star 
Roofing.866   
Washington:  The Product Line Exception 
In Washington, a court applying the product line exception is 
required to determine: 
“(1) whether the transferee has acquired 
substantially all the transferor’s assets, 
leaving no more than a mere corporate 
shell; (2) whether the transferee is holding 
itself out to the general public as a 
continuation of the transferor by 
producing the same product line under a 
similar name; and (3) whether the 
transferee is benefiting from the goodwill 
of the transferor.”867   
 Much like California, Washington requires that the successor, in 
some manner, cause the destruction of a plaintiff’s remedies in order to 
satisfy the first element of the product line test.868   The successor must 
Constr. Co., v. Hedreen, 816 P.2d 762, 765–67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), rev. 
denied, 118 Wash. 2d 1022, 827 P.2d 1392 (Wash. 1992).  
 
865 Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721 n.1 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d, 959 P.2d 1052, 1056–60 (Wash. 1998); see Long v. 
Home Health Servs. of Puget Sound, Inc., 719 P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. App 
1986).  
 
866 Cambridge Townhomes, 209 P.3d at 868. 
 
867 Hall, 692 P.2d at 790 (quoting Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 387 
(Wash. 1984)); see also George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 510 (Wash. 1987) 
(for the exception to apply, the successor must continue to manufacture the 
specific type of product). 
  
868 Hall, 692 P.2d at 792 (“A key premise of the product line exception is that 
successor liability is only appropriate when the successor corporation by its 
acquisition actually played some role in curtailing or destroying the claimants’ 
remedies.”); Fox v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc., 821 P.2d 502, 508 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1991); see also Stewart v. Telex Comm., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675 (Cal. Ct. 
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also continue to produce the same specific type of product at issue in the 
lawsuit.869  Although Washington courts have not expressly addressed 
the application of the second element, the court in Hall v. Armstrong Cork, 
Inc., addressed the application of the third, stating, “[t]he goodwill 
transfer contemplated by the product line rule is that associated with the 
predecessor business entity, not that associated with individual 
products.”870   
West Virginia 
In In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litigation, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia set out the traditional exceptions to the general 
rule of successor nonliability but then applied the implied assumption 
and mere continuation exceptions quite broadly.871  The court described 
the traditional exceptions as follows:  
“A successor corporation can be liable for 
the debts and obligations of a predecessor 
corporation if there was an express or 
implied assumption of liability, if the 
transaction was fraudulent, or if some 
element of the transaction was not made 
in good faith.  Successor liability will also 
attach in a consolidation or merger under 
W.Va. Code, 31-1-37(a)(5) (1974).  
Finally, such liability will also result where 
the successor corporation is a mere 
continuation or reincarnation of its 
predecessor.”872   
App. 1991) (“[S]ome causal connection between the succession and the 
destruction of the plaintiff's remedy must be shown”). 
 
869 George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 510 (Wash. 1987) (holding that the 
product line exception did not apply where the predecessor produced DES, and 
the successor produced various pharmaceuticals but not DES). 
 
870 Hall, 692 P.2d at 792 (citing Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d at 388–89); Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).  
 
871 In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litigation, 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W. Va. 
1994). 
 
872 Id. (quoting Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992)). 
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The court then affirmed the trial court’s finding of successor liability, 
stating:  “Grace [(the successor)] acquired all of Zonolite's assets and 
continued to manufacture the same products as Zonolite.   Therefore, 
the trial judge could conclude that Grace impliedly assumed 
responsibility or that it is a mere continuation or reincarnation of its 
predecessor.”873 
 A year later, though, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia indicated that ‘“[t]he mere continuation exception to the rule of 
nonliability envisions a common identity of directors and stockholders 
and the existence of only one corporation at the completion of the 
transfer.”’874  The court then held that the mere continuation exception 
did not apply because there was no commonality of ownership and only 
one common director shared between the predecessor and the 
successor.875    
Wisconsin 
Wisconsin follows the traditional approach to successor liability 
as well as the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability of asset purchasers:   
“(1) when the purchasing corporation 
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume 
the selling corporation's liability; (2) when 
the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the purchaser 
and seller corporations; (3) when the 
purchaser corporation is merely a 
continuation of the seller corporation; or 
(4) when the transaction is entered into 
 
873 In re State, Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d at 425 (footnote omitted); 
Carter Enters., Inc. v. Ashland Specialty Co., Inc., 257 B.R. 797, 803 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2001). 
 
874 Jordan v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 455 S.E.2d 561, 564 (W. Va. 1995) 
(quoting AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2711 (1986)). 
 
875 Jordan, 455 S.E.2d at 564. 
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fraudulently to escape liability for such 
obligations.”876    
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressly declined to adopt the 
product line exception or the “expanded continuation” exception 
(continuity of enterprise) set out in Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.877 
Wisconsin:  The Express or Implied Assumption Exception 
Wisconsin recognizes express or implied assumption of liabilities 
as one way that a successor may be liable for the liabilities of its 
predecessor.878  “The first exception under Fish [v. Amsted Industries, Inc.] 
requires an express or implied assumption of liabilities, not an express 
exclusion of liabilities.”879  The Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas Co. 
court noted the importance of not blurring “the well-established and 
fundamental distinction between an asset purchase and a stock 
purchase.”880 
In Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC v. Generac Power 
Systems, Inc., the court noted, “[T]he express mention of one matter 
excludes other similar matters [that are] not mentioned.”881   Thus, the 
876 Fish v. Amsted Indus., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Wis. 1985) (quoting Leannais 
v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977)); Columbia Propane, L.P. v. 
Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
877 Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 829 (stating, inter alia, in regard to the product line 
exception, “[i]f the liability of successor corporations is to be expanded, we 
conclude that such changes should be promulgated by the legislature,” and in 
regard to the Turner, 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), exception, “we decline to 
adopt the ‘expanded continuation’ exception to nonliability for the same 
reasons that we declined to adopt the product line exception.”); Red Arrow 
Prods. Co. v. Emp’r Ins. of Wausau, 607 N.W.2d 294, 299–300 (Wis. Ct. App.  
2000).  
 
878 See Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 823.  
 
879 Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Wis. 2003) 
(citing Fish v. Amsted., Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 
1985)).  
 
880  Id. at 785.  
 
881 Briggs & Stratton Power Products Grp., LLC v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 
796 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting FAS, 
LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 733 N.W.2d 287, 297 (Wis. 2007)). 
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court reasoned:  “The liabilities Briggs expressly assumed in the 
Agreement were numerous; however, products liability was not expressly 
included.  Because products liability was not included in other Assumed 
Liabilities under the Agreement, we conclude that Briggs did not assume 
Generac's products liability under the Agreement.” 882 
Wisconsin:  The De Facto Merger Exception 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has identified four factors used 
to determine whether an asset purchase constitutes a de facto merger: 
 “(1) the assets of the seller corporation 
are acquired with shares of the stock in 
the buyer corporation, resulting in a 
continuity of shareholders; (2) the seller 
ceases operations and dissolves soon after 
the sale; (3) the buyer continues the 
enterprise of the seller corporation so that 
there is a continuity of management, 
employees, business location, assets and 
general business operations; and (4) the 
buyer assumes those liabilities of the seller 
necessary for the uninterrupted 
continuation of normal business 
operations.” 883 
Although not every factor need be present, “[t]he key element in 
determining whether a merger or defacto [sic] merger has occurred is 
that the transfer of ownership was for stock in the successor corporation 
rather than cash.”884  
 
 
882 Briggs & Stratton, Power Products Grp., LLC, 796 N.W.2d at 238 (citing Town of 
Bass Lake, 733 N.W.2d at 287). 
 
883 Sedbrook v. Zimmerman Design Group, Ltd., 526 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Parson v. Roper Whitney, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1447, 
1449 (W.D. Wis. 1984)); see Smith v. Meadows Mills, 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917 
(E.D. Wis. 1999). 
  
884 Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 824 (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 
439 (7th Cir. 1977)); Sedbrook, 526 N.W.2d at 761; Smith v. Meadows Mills, 
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917–18 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
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Wisconsin:  The Mere Continuation Exception 
 “In determining if the successor is the ‘continuation’ of the 
seller corporation, the key element ‘is a common identity of the officers, 
directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing 
corporations.’”885   
Wyoming 
As of February 2017, Wyoming courts do not appear to have 
addressed successor liability. 
The U.S. Virgin Islands 
In 1985, the Federal District Court for the Virgin Islands 
adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor 
nonliability as well as the continuity of enterprise exception, citing, 
among other cases, Korzetz v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,886 and Turner v. 
Bituminous Casualty Co.,887 for the respective guidelines.888  The court 
expressly rejected the product line theory, concluding that it was a 
minority rule and not the “modern trend.”889  The Third Circuit agreed 
with the district court’s decision to reject the product line exception but 
rejected its adoption of the continuity of enterprise exception stating 
“[t]o the extent that the continuity of enterprise approach reaches 
beyond the traditional exceptions, it violates the established principle of 
corporate liability grounded on the continued existence of that entity.”890 
The Third Circuit set forth the traditional exceptions as follows:  
885 Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 824 (quoting Leannais, 565 F.2d at 440); see also Smith v. 
Meadows Mills, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917–18 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
 
886 72 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).  
887 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).  
888 Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (D.V.I. 1985), rev’d, 802 
F.2d 75 (3d. Cir. 1986).  
 
889 Id. at 1545. 
 
890 Polius, 802 F.2d at 83.   
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 (1) [the purchaser] assumes liability; (2) 
the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger; (3) the 
transaction is fraudulent and intended to 
provide an escape from liability; or (4) the 
purchasing corporation is a mere 
continuation of the selling company.891 
 Regarding the de facto merger exception, the district court in 
Martin v. Powermati, Inc. stated:  
A transaction deemed an “asset purchase 
agreement” may be a de facto merger 
where: 
“(1) There is a continuation of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so 
that there is a continuity of management, 
personnel, physical location, assets, and 
general business operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing 
corporation paying for the acquired assets 
with shares of its own stock, this stock 
ultimately coming to be held by the 
shareholders of the seller corporation so 
that they become a constituent part of the 
purchasing corporation. 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates, 
and dissolves as soon as legally and 
practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes 
those liabilities and obligations of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the 
uninterrupted continuation of normal 
891 Polius, 802 F.2d at 78; (citations omitted); Martin v. Powermatic, Inc., No. 
01–0137, 2008 WL 2329642, at *3 (D.V.I.  Jun. 4, 2008). 
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business of operations of the seller 
corporation.”892 
 Regarding the mere continuation exception, the Third Circuit 
stated:  “[W]hen the form of the transfer does not accurately portray 
substance, the courts will not refrain from deciding that the new 
organization is simply the older one in another guise.  In that instance, 
the continuation approach [is] applicable.”893 
Guam 
Courts in Guam do not appear to have addressed the issue of 
successor liability in a published decision. 
The Northern Mariana Islands 
Courts in the Northern Mariana Islands do not appear to have 
addressed the issue of successor liability in a reported opinion. 
Puerto Rico 
 Puerto Rico has, on several occasions, addressed the issue of 
successor liability and has adopted the traditional exceptions.  Successor 
corporations are not liable for the debts or acts of a predecessor 
corporation except:  (1) when the purchasing corporation expressly or 
impliedly agreed to assume the selling corporation's liability; (2) when the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and 
seller corporations; (3) when the purchaser corporation is merely a 
continuation of the seller corporation; or (4) when the transaction is 
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for such obligations.894  
892 Martin, 2008 WL 2329642 at *4 (quoting Berg Chilling Sys. v. Hull Corp., 
435 F.3d 455, 468–69 (3d. Cir. 2006)). 
 
893 Polius, 802 F.2d at 78; Martin, 2008 WL 2329642 at *4; see Postdissolution 
Product Claims and the Emerging Role of Successor Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861, 866 
(1978). 
 
894 Maldonado v. Valsyn S.A., 434 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92 (D.P.R. 2006); Carballo-
Rodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.P.R 2001) (citing 
Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill & Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443, 1447 (1st Cir. 1995)); 
Ricardo Cruz Distribs., Inc. v. Pace Setter, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 106, 110 (D.P.R. 
1996); Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enterps. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 364, 
367 (D.P.R. 1985). 
                                                          
